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A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY



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VOL. XX

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No. 1

THE TOTALITY OF SOCIETY: FROM JUSTICE TO FRIENDSHIP



HUMAN society has become for the modern world a very complex reality, far too intricate for the mind of any one man to know thoroughly. Consequently, it is rarely understood in its totality, in the basic structure that makes up its unity. Some know this phase, some that. Yet, the basic structure of society can be grasped since man can reflect on his experience and therefore can know the means and ends of his life in the city. In reality, there are many ways to discover the basic totality of society, but perhaps the clearest way open for such a comprehension is by means of an analysis of the various aspects of law as it was set down and understood by St. Thomas Aquinas. It would be also possible to begin with the notion of justice, or of the common good, or of friendship; but these problems, as we shall see, are one; the starting point alone is different. In this analysis, the most striking

thing to note about the treatment of St. Thomas is that, within the context of the problem as he saw it, he implicitly, if not actually, uses the political definitions and distinctions between state and society and their functions which have become such an important part of the thought of such excellent thinkers as R. M. MacIver, Jacques Maritain, Ernest Barker, J. T. Delos, and Johannes Messner.¹

In treating of law, Aquinas uses several ideas and terms which shall serve as our basic outline. Here, however, let it be clear that we do not wish to treat of the essence of law. This writer accepts the Thomistic doctrine as the true one consistent with rational psychology and ethics; that is, "an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated."² Rather we wish to inquire about law as it exists in a society, what it commands, what it does, what effects it has.

The most fundamental truth about human law is that it deals only with external, human acts.³ These external acts must be ordered in such wise that the temporal peace and tranquillity of society be maintained. This is accomplished by regulating and prohibiting anything that could disturb the conditions of concord in society. St. Thomas calls this peaceful order *the end of human law*. "For the end of human law is the temporal tranquillity of the state, which end law effects by directing external actions, as regards those evils which might disturb the peaceful condition of the state."⁴ Here it is necessary to inject some thoughts on terminology, for St. Thomas when dealing with the essence of law maintains in several in-

¹ Cf. R. M. MacIver, *The Modern State* (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), esp. pp. 1-22, and *passim*; Jacques Maritain, *Man and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), ch. 1; Ernest Barker, *Principles of Social and Political Theory* (Oxford, 1952), pp. 42 ff.; J. T. Delos, O.P., *La Société Internationale* (Paris, 1929), ch. 1; J. Messner, *Social Ethics* (St. Louis: Herder, 1949), bk. 3.

² *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 90, a. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, q. 98, a. 1; q. 91, a. 4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, q. 98, a. 1.

stances that the end of law is the common good.⁵ His idea seems to be this, that the principle according to which these external acts are regulated is the objective order of just relations without which a society cannot at all exist. Consequently, when speaking of the end of the law as the common good, he means the common good as a final cause by which particular external acts can achieve their end. ". . . Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters: but those particular matters are referable to the common good, not as to a common genus or species, but as to a common final cause, according as the common good is said to be the common end."⁶ St. Thomas identifies this common good in other places as the intention of the legislator, meaning that it is the end for which he acts.⁷ However, the end of law in the sense of temporal tranquillity refers to the effect actually achieved by the order of just relations in an existent society.

The first and minimal requirement of society, then, is the *de facto* order of men such that their actions with respect to one another be at least just. Consequently, law will command the acts of those virtues which have either directly or indirectly an effect on the external order. Those acts which have a relation *ad aliud* in the external order are the acts of justice.⁸ The precepts of law, therefore, will embody the external acts of justice. "For the precepts of every law prescribe acts of virtue."⁹ And virtues other than justice are embodied in law only insofar as their acts have an effect externally so that they can be considered as relating to justice.¹⁰ If any given society establish and keep established this minimal order, it will have

⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 96, a. 4; q. 90, a. 2.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 90, 2, ad 2.

⁷ ". . . Legislatores ad hoc maxime tendere videntur, ut procurent utilitatem communem." *In Eth.*, #1666. "Now the intention of every lawgiver is directed first and chiefly to the common good." *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 100, a. 8.

⁸ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 2; et a. 5; *III Sent.*, d. 33, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 3, ad 3; etc.

⁹ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 107, a. 1, ad 2.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 8, ad 3; a. 9, ad 2.

the basic requirement for a healthy society. The organization or institution directly concerned with this order is the *state* or in St. Thomas' terminology, the prince. The state, therefore, is that section of a society which has the external order of just actions and relations as its direct end. "For a prince is ordained to this purpose that he keep justice, and as a consequence equality. . . ." ¹¹ It is interesting at this point to compare this doctrine of St. Thomas with some more recent thought on this subject.

If we remember that law finds its end, as was seen above, in the external tranquillity and peace and that the state looks primarily to this order, we will find the best modern thinkers giving strikingly similar definitions. For instance, Professor MacIver defines the state as "an association which, acting through law as promulgated by a government endowed to this end with coercive power, maintains within a community territorially demarcated the universal external conditions of social order." ¹² Professor Barker notes that the ". . . state exists for the great but single, purpose of law." ¹³ What he means by this is that the area of "legal action" is that of the state:

. . . legal action is a mode of treating things in general, things of all sorts and descriptions, religious or moral or educational or economic or whatever they may be, *so far as they can be brought under a rule of law and thus made a matter of compulsory uniformity*. Law touches and treats *all* acts—so far as acts are amenable to its touch and treatment.

But it is only external acts which are amenable to such treatment. A rule of law is an order (ultimately issued . . . by the community itself, but immediately issued by some organ which declares and enforces the sense of the community), to do, or to abstain from doing, a defined and definite external act: an order enforced, in the last resort, by another external act of physical coercion. ¹⁴

¹¹ "Ad hoc enim princeps institutus est ut custodiat justitiam, et per consequens aequalitatem. . . ." *In Eth.*, #1009.

¹² MacIver, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

¹³ Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

The state, however, will be more or less perfect; it can progress or regress in its duty, for there is a whole range and hierarchy of just actions stretching from the prevention of murder and theft to establishing the norms for a universal just price. "... The intention of the law is to make all men virtuous, but in a certain order, namely, by first of all giving them precepts about those things where the notion of duty is most manifest. . . ." ¹⁵ All problems of the external order may fall within the competency of the state in some sense at least, but it may very well be that in any given body of men very few of the factors that really constitute the good life will be realized.

This total order of just relations in society is called the common good of the multitude, and it will be the end for which all civil laws are primarily intended. ¹⁶ Laws get their meaning and proportion from this end. "All laws are posited according as they are conformed to the political end. . . ." ¹⁷ This is not to deny, of course, that states *de facto* seek different ends and consequently establish different laws according to the way different peoples set up for themselves different goals or understandings of the common good; that is, virtue, or wealth, or world domination, or pleasure. However, as a matter of fact, the only legitimate understanding of the common good will be the one that aims ultimately as virtue.

* * * * *

Human law, we have held, deals with the precepts of the virtue of justice. But just how is law related to justice in reality? A man becomes just by performing just acts which performance involves both the intellectual act of specification and the actual volitional exercise of an act according to this specification. ¹⁸ This means that a man must see the objective *justum* (just, or better, right relation) in any of his acts. Now

¹⁵ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 122, a. 1, ad 1; cf. a. 2.

¹⁶ Cf. *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 80; and *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 47, a. 10, ad 2.

¹⁷ "Omnes enim leges ponuntur secundum quod congruunt fini politicae. . . ." *In Eth.*, #1030.

¹⁸ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 51, a. 2; and *In Eth.*, #250.

these objective *justa* (right relations) are in part determined by nature, that is by reason itself, and in part by positive ordination of society.¹⁹ These relations which man recognizes to be *de facto* existing and operative are facts, and he knows that he did not make these relations solely by himself. He must, therefore, take them into consideration in his every action so that the action will be proportioned to his end. By seeing and acting according to these just relations he will be able to become a just and good man.

Law is just the other side of this same reality. It looks to what man should do, not from the side of the individual person himself but from the side of the legislator who establishes these *justa* (right relations) and *debita* (things due) for the common good and which man in his turn discovers to be factors in his every action. What a man can discover from reason, therefore, namely that there are natural limits and guideposts for his actions in reason; he, ultimately, comes to see as commands of a lawgiver, either human as in the case of civil law or divine as in the case of natural or revealed law. In other words, a man can see from reason *that* there are ways for a human being to act, and he can discover in large measure just what these ways are. He may not know why this is so, but he cannot escape the fact that it is so.

However, when he progresses and discovers that these limits were not just accidental or arbitrary (assuming for the moment just human laws) and further, when he has come to see that they are commands of a lawgiver who in the case of natural law not only made the law but also the man himself; then he sees fully that the moral law is not simply a restriction or impediment, but a definite order to man's end, a road by which he travels and not a pit into which he has fallen.²⁰ Consequently, law commands that act be done which man from his point of view sees that it is in accord with his nature to perform.

¹⁹ Cf. *In Eth.*, #1004 and 1019.

²⁰ Cf. Dom Odon Lottin, O.S.B., *Principes de Morale* (Louvain: Editions de L'Abbaye du Mont César, 1947), Vol. I, p. 125.

The formal cause of the human act is the dictate of reason which at the same time is the law as received in the subject and the *ratio juris* that man sees must be maintained in the act. The *ratio juris*, then, and the law are the same thing except that the law as such refers to the lawgiver.²¹

The order of strict just relations, therefore, in the same reality will include the multiplicity of just human actions required for the existence of society and the basic laws by which these acts are enforced and ordered.

I answer that, since the precepts of the law are ordained to the common good . . . the precepts of law must needs be diversified according to the various kinds of community: hence the Philosopher (*Polit.* iv, 1) teaches that the laws which are made in a state which is ruled by a king must be different from the laws of a state which is ruled by the people, or by a few powerful men in the state. Now human law is ordained for one kind of community, and the divine law for another kind. Because human law is ordained for the civil community, implying mutual duties of man and his fellows: and men are ordained to one another by outward acts, whereby men live in communion with one another. This life in communion of man with man pertains to justice, whose proper function consists in directing the human community. Wherefore human law makes precepts only about acts of justice; and if it commands acts of other virtues, this is only insofar as they assume the nature of justice. . . .²²

The principle or end according to which these acts can be denominated just and good will, then, be the objective common good of the multitude. The effect of this order will be concord, the external peace.²³ And concord is the result of the effective establishment of special justice, i. e., commutative and distributive, among men.²⁴ This is why, incidently, the principle of revolution is found precisely here, in the failure to establish justice, for men do not long endure their unequal lot.

We might ask at this point about the actual content of the

²¹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 57, a. 1, ad 2.

²² *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 100, a. 2. Cf. also *In Eth.*, #904-5.

²³ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 98, a. 1.

²⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, I-II, q. 180, a. 2, ad 2; and q. 123, a. 5, ad 3.

order of *justa*, what exactly does it embrace? The general term that St. Thomas and Aristotle use for this order is *justum politicum* or *simpliciter justum*.²⁵ The term is used to designate the order of justice in a perfect and self-sufficient community, a community looking to the fulness of human life. Such a community, however, can only be found among free and equal men so that the primary function of justice and law must always be the establishment and protection of equality and freedom—that is, the end and purpose of the justice that the law effects. Law is the dictate of reason by which the problems of what is just and what is right are settled, as it were, outside the contingent and turbulent exchange of ordinary human intercourse; it is the attempt to apply pure reason, reason abstract from passion and ignorance to human affairs.²⁶

Justum politicum, however, is a complex notion. It is a complex genus referring to all the just actions in the community no matter how these acts obtain their *ratio* of justice. Now these actions are subject to various divisions according to the various ways this same reality taken as a whole can be considered. Thus we can consider the complexus of actions according to how the rightness in each action is determined—in this case, some will be proportional, some arithmetical, some will find their rightness measured in other ways, as in the instances of the potential parts of justice. Only the first two of these, however, the *justa distributiva* and *justa commutativa*, strictly pertain to society as such.²⁷ But we can also consider these self-same actions according to their cause or origin—then some will be just because they are naturally reasonable (*justa naturalia*), others will be just only because the particular community establishes them as such (*justa legalia*).²⁸ The legal *justa* (right relations) are always determinations of the natural precepts.²⁹ Therefore, some *justa* can be *distributiva et natur-*

²⁵ *In Eth.*, #1004.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, and 1009.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, #1005. That is as regulated by law in a society.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, #1018.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, #1023.

alia, others *distributiva et legalia*, etc., but always *justa legalia* must be in accord with the natural *justa*.

* * * * *

In the *Summa Theologiae*, St. Thomas makes a division of the Old Law which proves very valuable in this regard. He divides the Old Law into moral, caeremonial, and judicial precepts according to the type of *justa* they contain. The moral precepts are the reasonable principles and their strictly reasonable conclusions both of which necessarily flow from the nature of man.³⁰ These *moralia* in turn can be divided according to the difficulty with which they are known—some are known to all (do good, avoid evil), some are known by most men (the ten commandments), some are known only by the wise (no divorce), and some only to God. These precepts embrace man's relations both with God and with other men. Those which deal with man's relations to God are very general and must be determined by society to give unity and coherence to the acts of worship—such positive determinations are called *caeremonialia*. These sorts of *justa*, then, will be positive in cause, either by society in the natural order or by God Himself in the case of revelation. The determinations which deal with man's relations with one another are called *judicialia*.³¹

There are, however, four types of relationships that men can have to one another: 1) prince to people, 2) citizens to one another, 3) people as a whole to another people, and 4) the domestic relationships.³² These *justa* which deal with these relationships insofar as they are determinations of natural principles or conclusions will be positive in character. This, then, gives a fairly good conspectus of the content of the basic structure of just relationships in a society, what they must contain and deal with, the sources from which they will be designated just.

Were this the sole meaning of the order of just relationships,

³⁰ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 100, a. 1; q. 102, a. 1, ad 3.

³¹ *Ibid.*, q. 101, a. 1; q. 104, a. 1.

³² *Ibid.*, q. 104, a. 4.

however, it would produce a barren and rigid society indeed. But the order of *justa* is, as it were, the foundation or basis of something far richer and more significant. Thus when a legislator commands, he primarily and initially commands an external act of justice in some sense, and the order of *justa* means exactly the external, objective order and unity of objectively right relationships existing because of the efficient actions of men. This suffices to maintain and define the objective and minimal order of justice. But the legislator—be he the legislator of the natural or the positive law—has in mind not simply this act of a virtue, but he intends that virtue itself, the habit, be implanted in the citizen. This does not mean, of course, that every lawgiver in Washington or in London must recognize this truth and have it in his mind when making a law. St. Thomas is speaking about the nature of the law as such, what it must do from its very nature and what the legislator must do as a simple consequence of making the law. Consequently, that about which the law is given is an act of virtue—which is at the same time the rule of society and the act which is capable of inducing a habit in the man.

The end, however, to which the precept is ordained is not simply that the citizen perform the act, but that he acquire the virtue.

The intention of the lawgiver is twofold. His aim, in the first place, is to lead men to something by the precepts of the law: and this is virtue. Secondly, his intention is brought to bear on the matter itself of the precept: and this is something leading or disposing to virtue, viz., an act of virtue. For the end of the precept and the matter of the precept are not the same: just as neither in other things is the end the same as that which conduces to the end.³³

Therefore, under the strict precept of the law will be the virtuous acts that a man does, whether he does them willingly or not. The principle intent of the legal structure of society, none the less, is that man do these acts virtuously, that is,

³³ *Ibid.*, q. 100, a. 9, ad 2.

because he sees their worth and not because they are commanded by coercion. This virtue, then, is what the legislator intends, though, strictly speaking, the external order of society will be maintained if the external commanded acts be performed from whatever motive.

An act is said to be an act of virtue in two ways, first, from the fact that a man does something virtuous; thus the act of justice is to do what is right, and an act of fortitude is to do brave things: and in this way law prescribes certain acts of virtue.—Secondly, an act of virtue is when a man does a virtuous thing in a way in which a virtuous man does it. Such an act always proceeds from virtue: and it does not come under a precept of law, but is the end at which every lawgiver aims.³⁴

In this sense, then, the realm of virtue is very definitely a matter for society.

Thus the existence of habitual moral virtue in the citizens is itself a common good, the common good of the many.

There is also a human good, not common to many (in the sense of one common end), but belonging to an individual by himself, yet useful not to one only, but to many: for instance those things which all and each one must believe and observe, such as the articles of faith, the divine worship, and the like.³⁵

This common good of the many is something which each one personally possesses, but whose operation and effect is shared by many. This is also sometimes called the order of (habitual) justice and virtue.³⁶ The effect and end of the whole order of *justa*, therefore, will be the making of men good, and in this way we can see the truth of St. Thomas' dictum: "... He who seeks the common good of the many as a direct consequence must also seek his own good."³⁷ For it is in and through the order of external just relationships that men can become good, but their goodness is their own perfection.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, q. 96, a. 3, ad 2; cf. also q. 92, a. 1. Cf. also Lottin, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

³⁵ *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 80.

³⁶ *Summa Theol.*, q. 100, a. 8.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 47, a. 10, ad 2: "... qui quaerit bonum commune multitudinis ex consequenti etiam quaerit bonum suum. . . ."

There are, however, some further things to remember about this order of society. First of all, there are activities going on within society which cannot be strictly considered under the equality and debt due in strict justice. These activities have a correct measure, of course, but it is a relative one, or a least one that cannot be legislated accurately. For instance, we cannot actually give back to God, or to our native land, or to our parents all that is due to them. We must do something certainly, but the return will never be equal. Most of these relationships, in addition to the natural obligation, have further determinations of the divine or positive law by which certain definite acts must be placed so that they do in this sense fall within the pale of the legal and just structure of society, but the acts as such never fully repay the obligation really due.³⁸

Some human activities cannot fall strictly under justice for another reason, i. e., because the thing due is only due from a certain "goodness of virtue," or better, from the exigencies of virtuous intercourse. Here we must see that some things are absolutely necessary for human life on the part of the individual, such as the virtue of truth in man's words and actions. The thing due in this case is not something that can be measured or determined by a specific law, except perhaps in the case of civil contracts, yet society cannot exist without this honesty. Such is also liberality and affability which, while not absolutely necessary, nevertheless are the perfections of human communication without which society could not last—though again the thing due must be left to individual determination.³⁹

* * * * *

None the less, we still have not penetrated to the depth of the Thomistic social position if we content ourselves with the making of the good man, or better, if we simply permit the man to make himself good. So if men are good, they will have reached their natural perfection in the sense that their lives

³⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 80, art. unic.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 80, art. unic; and *III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 1, a. 2.

are well-ordered, naturally speaking, should death come. But in societal philosophy we look to the true perfection that society itself effects; for there is, as it were, something beyond virtue and that is friendship. In accord with our intention of exposing the full meaning of society from the basis of law, we discover that the principal intention of the law, as opposed to the intention of the lawgiver, is friendship. This is, ultimately, the most beautiful and most powerful gift that God has granted to men—and so it is that when we pass beyond human society we find that Aquinas conceives of charity as nothing more than friendship with God.⁴⁰ Surely there is nothing which is at the same time more noble and more humbling than this.

As the Apostle says (1 *Tim.* 1: 5) *the end of the commandment is charity*; since every law aims at establishing friendship, either between man and man, or between man and God, wherefore the whole Law is comprised in this one commandment, *Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself*, as expressing the end of all commandments: because love of one's neighbor includes love of God, when we love our neighbor for God's sake.⁴¹

As Christians and as men, we cannot find a more truly profound and gratifying truth than this fact that our whole social and personal lives are ordained to friendship; for, even from our own limited experience, it is clear that friendship is the perfection of human living; and, as we believe, of divine living as well.

Human law, therefore, in the mind of St. Thomas has as its ultimate intention, the friendship of men one to another. "... The principal intention of human law is to create friendship between man and man. . . ." ⁴² The relationship between the establishment of the order of just relations, the common good of the multitude, and the existence of human friendship is, then, a causal one; for friendship presupposes justice even though it passes beyond it in its own sphere. The purpose of justice is primarily to establish equality, either proportional or arith-

⁴⁰ *Summa Theol.*, loc. cit., q. 23, a. 1; and *III Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1.

⁴¹ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 99, a. 1, ad 2.

⁴² *Ibid.*, a. 2.

metical, among the members of society. When this equality is established the function of justice ends, but that of friendship begins.

And the reason for this diversity is this, that friendship is a certain union or society of friends, which cannot exist among those who greatly differ, but it should exist among those who approach equality. Wherefore, it belongs to friendship equally to employ the equality already established; but it belongs to justice to reduce unequal things to equal ones. When, however, equality exists, the work of justice is complete. And thus equality is the last thing achieved in justice, but it is the beginning in friendship.⁴³

Both justice and friendship, therefore, deal with the same reality, that is human communication, so that where there is justice there is a possibility of friendship. “. . . Justice and friendship are about the same things. But justice consists in communication. For every sort of justice is to another (*ad alterum*). . . . Therefore, friendship consists in communication.”⁴⁴ And this must mean that the perfection of human societal communication is not justice, but friendship.

This conclusion, therefore, shows that the philosophy of friendship and love is at the root of society; that is, it is the goal of any real human life in the city (the Aristotelian city, of course, not the modern monstrosities). Further, St. Thomas with Aristotle distinguishes the kinds of friendship according to two principles of logical division: 1) according to the kind of communication the friendship is based upon, and 2) according to the end of friendship, i. e., utility, pleasure, or virtue.⁴⁵ Of course, friendship based upon virtue is the highest of these, but we should not fail to understand the importance of the friendship of business relationships or of pleasure even. For example, commercial society in itself is a horribly cold and impersonal deity as anyone who has ever walked into say J. C. Penny's to purchase a pair of gloves can well testify.

⁴³ *In Eth.*, #1632.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, #1658.

⁴⁵ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 23, a. 5.

The exchange of money for the gloves is the just communication involved and of itself it is a very insignificant and heartless thing.

But suppose the clerk in the store sees the customer coming and greets him with a smile and shows a real interest in the man about to make the purchase. The two have a pleasant exchange over the purchase or about a million other things, the customer then leaves and the two never see each other again. Yet, that exchange was a fine thing, it made something otherwise distasteful, a pleasant and human thing—society as a whole benefited as did both men because there was a real friendship based on utility surely, but still a friendship which lessened the tensions among men. Incidentally, this is also a good argument for private property, especially in the form of human sized and owned stores where this sort of exchange is more likely to happen. Also such friendly communications can form the starting point for the more perfect type of friendship and a more real union among the members of society. In a higher order Christian charity gives depth and meaning to such friendship. This is not to deny, of course, that men are naturally friendly with one another in some sense, but it is difficult that this be more than passing, given human nature as it is since the Fall.⁴⁶

Philosophically, this type of utilitarian friendship is called by St. Thomas the "*amicitia, quae affabilitas dicitur*," or friendliness. It is a potential part of the virtue of justice, having an object distinct from the other forms of justice, namely, the external requirements of human order and communication.

And it behooves man to be maintained in a becoming order towards other men as regards their mutual relations with one another, in point of both deeds and words, so that they behave

⁴⁶ "Potest enim esse aliqua amicitia cujuslibet hominis ad omnem hominem in quantum possunt communicare aliqua lege. . . ." *In Eth.*, #1700. "Quia enim omnes homines conveniunt in natura speciei, omnis homo est naturaliter omni homini amicus." *De Perf. Vitae Sp.* (Parma; Vol. XV, p. 87), c. 14. Also *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 114, a. 1, ad 2.

towards one another in a becoming manner. Hence the need of a special virtue that maintains the becomingness of this order: and this virtue is called friendliness.⁴⁷

There is a very definite distinction, of course, between friendliness and the friendship following on virtue. St. Thomas is clear on this point, following the position of Aristotle:

The Philosopher speaks of a twofold friendship in his *Ethics*. One consists chiefly in the affection whereby one man loves another and may result from any virtue. . . . But he mentions another friendliness, which consists merely in outward words or deeds; this has not the perfect nature of friendship, but bears a certain likeness thereto, insofar as a man behaves in a becoming manner towards those with whom he is in contact.⁴⁸

Thus friendliness is not the friendship of virtue which stands at the very summit of societal life, but it has a very vital part to play in our daily lives.

* * * * *

However, the perfection of all human communication is friendship based on virtue. This perhaps sounds a bit unusual, but the truth of the matter is clear. A man who is, theoretically, perfectly good will be a very unhappy man without the friendship which follows upon virtue. For as we know, man's true happiness is not simply the possession of a good number of habits but in virtuous activity and indeed in continuous and pleasing activity. "But to be happy consists in continuous life and operation. . . . For he would not be virtuous who would not delight in the operation of virtue."⁴⁹ And the peculiar and distinguishing thing about friendship is that it consists in the communication of virtue; that is, of all the highest powers of man: "The friendship which consists in the communication of virtue. . . ."⁵⁰ Thus the phrase of God that it is not good for men to live alone is not solely pertinent to the man-wife

⁴⁷ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 114, a. 1.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, ad 1.

⁴⁹ *In Eth.*, #1894. Cf. also the whole first book of St. Thomas' Commentary.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, #1798. Cf. also #1946, 1698, 1702, and 1724.

relationship, but in its own way it is of the very nature of every human relationship including the divine one:

For no one would choose to live by himself always, that is alone, even after he had all other things, because man is naturally a political animal and is born with a natural aptitude to live with others. Therefore, since the happy man has those things which are naturally good for man, it follows that he should have those with whom he may live. It is clear, therefore, that it is better to live with friends and virtuous men than with strangers and people of any sort.⁵¹

Consequently, from the communication of virtuous activity, there is established and secured the society of friends.⁵²

The communication in true friendship, therefore, is principally the one wherein man lives most fully since he operates according to the highest faculty, reason.

. . . He [Aristotle] manifests that in which living consists. And he says that in all animals to live is commonly determined according to their sense potency. In men, however, it is determined according to the sense potency as to that which man has in common with other animals, and according to intellectual power as to that which is proper to himself. Every potency, however, is reduced to its operation, as to its proper perfection. Wherefore that which is of greatest importance consists in the operation, and not in the bare potency. For act is prior to potency. . . . And from this it is clear that to live for an animal or for a man principally consists in sensing or in understanding.⁵³

Thus in one sense, *esse* (to live) for man in this life is *intelligere* (to understand).⁵⁴ And friendship implies the fact that we come closest to the being and life of a friend precisely when we communicate thought and ideas; for being is what we

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, #1891.

⁵² *Ibid.*, #1899; also *III Sent.*, d. 28, a. 1.

⁵³ *In Eth.*, #1902 and 1908.

⁵⁴ This statement needs to be understood, however, in the light of *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 18, a. 2, ad 1: “. . . Philosophus ibi accipit *vivere* pro operatione vitae.—Vel dicendum est melius, quod sentire et intelligere, et huiusmodi, quandoque sumitur pro quibusdam operationibus; quandoque autem pro ipso esse sic operantium.” The reference is to *In Eth.*, #1908.

naturally love. "This, however, is natural, namely, that each one should love his own being."⁵⁵ If the being of a friend is good; that is, if he is a good man, the highest manifestation of his being, his thoughts and his loves, will be most delightful to us.

Therefore, just as someone delights in his own being and life by knowing himself, so to this fact that someone delight in a friend, he must simply know his being.⁵⁶ . . . If his own being is of its very nature a thing to be chosen by a happy man, insofar as it is naturally good and delightful; since, then, the being and life of a friend are in one's affections the next thing to one's own life, it follows that a friend is also a thing to be chosen by a virtuous and happy man.⁵⁷

We do need our friends, then, for our very highest endeavors.

So it is that the principal act of friendship is what St. Thomas calls "*convivere*" which consists in the communication of human ideas and ideals, and hence is the primary human stimulus to contemplation as well as the basic source of the new and vital thinking required for the continuance and development of a people.

Which indeed happens by living together according to the communication of words and the consideration of the mind. For in this manner men are said properly to live together, namely, according to the life which is proper to man, and not simply according as they eat together, as happens in the case of animals.⁵⁸

The joy and comradeship of friends is, then, found in their very intercommunication with one another. ". . . True friendship desires to see the friend and causes a rejoicing in much conversation, towards which end friendship is principally ordained. . . ." ⁵⁹ Thus there is a truth of the deepest and most profound nature in the observation that: "The supreme and

⁵⁵ *In Eth.*, #1846.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, #1909.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, #1911.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, #1910. Cf. also *III Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 2; and *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 28, a. 1, ad 2.

⁵⁹ *III Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, ad 11.

ultimate product of civilization . . . is two or three persons talking together in a room.”⁶⁰ Consequently, society is absolutely dependent for its vitality and existence on its ability to effect adequate friendships among its people. This is why M. Maritain, following a suggestion of Father Phelan, has well said that friendship is society’s “life-giving form.”⁶¹ Of course, friendship cannot be commanded, yet it remains that it is the perfection and beauty of society. And so it is that St. Thomas beautifully remarks about law: “. . . all precepts of law, especially those ordered to the neighbor, seem to be ordained to this end, that men love one another.”⁶²

The love of friendship, moreover, is *the* love required by society because it alone of its very nature makes a society, a real relation between persons.

But friendship adds two things (to *amor*): of which one is a certain society of the one loving and the one loved in love, namely, in order that they might have mutual love for one another and that they might know of their mutual love; the second is that they work from choice and not from passion. . . . Thus it is clear that friendship is the most perfect of those things which pertain to love, for it includes all the foregoing (loves, that is, desire of presence, *dilectio*, benevolence, *beneficium*, concord, *amatio*). Wherefore in this category we must place charity which is a certain friendship of man to God through which man loves God and God man; and thus there is effected a certain association of man to God.⁶³

Friendship extends to the persons involved so that the terms of the relations are real persons and not accidents. This shows the nature of the real communication must be a mutual sharing of love and life among rational creatures.

Friendship, however, cannot pertain (directly) to the virtues nor to any accidents for two reasons: Firstly, because friendship brings it about that man wishes to be a friend and to have good

⁶⁰ In George Herbert Palmer, *Self-Cultivation in English* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1909), p. 6.

⁶¹ Maritain, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

⁶² *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 105, a. 2, ad 1.

⁶³ *III Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 28, a. 1.

things. Accidents, however, do not have being (*esse*) per se, nor goodness per se, but their being (*esse*) and well-being (*bene esse*) belongs to them in substances. Wherefore, when we wish virtues and accidents to be, this is referred to the substances which we wish to be or to be well under those accidents. . . . Secondly, because friendship consists in a certain society, according to which the ones loved exchange love among themselves and do the same things and converse together. Wherefore friendship cannot be except towards something which is also capable of acting. And because activity (*agere*) does not belong to accidents, but to substances, therefore it is not possible that friendship be any virtue or accident.⁶⁴

The ultimate and most perfect meaning of society, then, will be the acts of men who are friends with one another.

Even on the material side of life friendship is necessary that society be perfected. We have already noted how business friendships are most valuable. On the other hand, friendships cause the material welfare of society to be better achieved, for they automatically provide for the immediate relief of citizens in distress so that the humiliation and degradation that may come from say public and therefore impersonal relief is avoided by the love and aid of friends.⁶⁵ Thus, as a point of investigation, is not the need and existence of so much public aid in our society a good indication of a serious lack of real friendship among our people? Perhaps people do not have enough to help others, but that is the fruit of another problem, the problem of well-divided property in a modern nation. Aquinas reveals his recognition of these problems when he remarks that the intention of one of the Old Testament Laws was “. . . to accustom men to its precepts, so as to be ready to come to one another’s assistance . . .,” and he then adds “because this is a very great incentive to friendship.”⁶⁶ A society, therefore, should actually have laws which command men to aid one another in their necessities both in order that

⁶⁴ *III Sent.*, d. 28, a. 1.

⁶⁵ Cf. *In Eth.*, #1936-42.

⁶⁶ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 105, a. 2, ad 4. Also read *ibid.*, ad 1.

friendships may arise from such natural aid, and in order that society will not have to burden itself with an excessive amount of works which in this life would be much better provided for by human beings in their own small circle of life.

St. Thomas appears to make a distinction between what he calls political friendship and the true friendship of virtue. The problem is the one of the number of friends a man can have and of the basis or communication on which the friendship is founded. Obviously, men are not friends in the strict sense with everyone in a society. Sheer human limitation prevents this, for they neither know all of them, nor know them well enough to be true friends with them. However, citizens of a given state can be said to be friends none the less. Insofar as all the citizens of a state agree about the form of their government and the nature of the society and culture in which they dwell; they can be called friends. The best examples of this are when two men totally unknown to one another sit down together on a train, both completely diverse in occupation, religion, place of residence, etc. Yet, both find themselves staunch democrats to the core, and as a result they find it easy to be friends. The same thing happens when two men of the same nation chance to meet on a foreign soil; they become as long lost brothers. Such agreement throughout society St. Thomas calls concord:

... political friendship, whether it be of citizens of one state towards one another, or among diverse states, seems to be the same as concord. And so also are men accustomed to speak; namely, that cities, or agreeing citizens, have friendship with one another. For political friendship is about useful things, and about those things which belong to human life, about which we say there is concord.⁶⁷

And such concord or friendship is something without which no society can long exist.

Thus all political friendship is a part of the potential part of justice called friendliness or affability of which we have

⁶⁷ *In Eth.*, #1836. Cf. also especially #1924.

treated above, that part, namely, which is concerned with the particularly political relationships, whereas friendliness includes all relationships. Concord, when not used as a simple substitute for political friendship, is a term generally attributed to the whole society or people, designating the effect of political friendship among the people, though it could also refer to the existence of friendliness in general.⁶⁸ The term, peace, adds the additional note of personal internal peace and order to external peace or concord.⁶⁹

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St. Thomas, then, in his understanding of the nature of law has shown his deep and penetrating grasp of the societal problem by implicitly, at least, revealing all the necessary distinctions modern theorists have come to find in society. He clearly shows, following Aristotle, that society, the life of the city, is the area that depends on human friendship; while the state, the area of authority and justice in the city, aims at the external order of human actions. And law is the font out of which these orders are both kept distinct and ordered to one another. It will be profitable, therefore, to set down some sort of diagram of all that we have found, comparing the Thomistic terms with some more modern ones:

ST. THOMAS' TERMS	REALITY CONCERNED	MODERN TERMS
1. The end of the law. ⁷⁰	Temporal tranquillity and peace. The common good of the multitude. The area of strict justice.	The sphere of the modern state.
2. The effect of the law or the in-	To make men personally virtuous and good.	The sphere of society; that is, all the individual societies—

⁶⁸ Cf. above ftn. 23.

⁶⁹ Cf. all St. Thomas' treatise *de Pace, Summa Theol.*, esp. II-II, q. 29, a. 1.

⁷⁰ It should be remembered that St. Thomas does not restrict himself always to one and the same term for one and the same reality. He of all authors must be understood in context. The point here is that he does use these specific terms for the realities indicated, though he can and does use the same term for one of the other realities. Cf. ftn. 7.

ST. THOMAS' TERMS	REALITY CONCERNED	MODERN TERMS
<i>tention of the legislator.</i>	The common good of the many.	familial, economic, educational, fraternal, athletic, religious, etc., within the order maintained by the state. ⁷¹
3. The <i>intention of the law.</i>	The area of habits and virtues. The friendship of men.	The bond of perfection of society. The perfect societal relation among men.

Thus we can see somewhat better, it is hoped, the totality of societal life as it is found in all its ramifications.

In concluding, however, it might be well to add a few notes about the function of the Gospel of Christ within the societal system. Natural justice and friendship, even of the highest sort, are simply not sufficient to the race of men as they exist under the present dispensation. Indeed, any intelligent understanding of ourselves and of our fellows will tell us that something needs to be added to human beings to overcome the insufficiency of motivation and the lack of universal love which we find at the root of all societal friction. Some will, of course, say that this needs to be proved, but we wonder sometimes whether such objectors can really be serious. There is the whole course of history, and if that be not sufficient, there is that spectacle of potential destruction known as the modern world.⁷² If more proof be needed, it is difficult to know what it could be. Here, however, there is no intention of treating the Christian dispensation from the aspect of eternal salvation and ultimate friendship with God, but rather we wish to treat of it from its effect on society—although it would be vain to try to divorce totally the two considerations.

The three major failings of natural society appear to be: 1) the inability to make men good, 2) the inability to extend

⁷¹ Remember that it is in these lesser societies that men actually live and act and hence acquire their perfection. The state is ordered to the maintenance of these societies intact and not to destroy them. Cf. Yves Simon, *The Philosophy of Democratic Government* (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 36-71.

⁷² For a very illuminating discussion of the reality of man's Fall as it actually is seen in history see Herbert Butterfield's *Christianity and History* (London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd., 1949), 146 pp.

effective love and friendship to all men, and 3) the inability to order rightly men's interior intentions as well as his exterior dispositions. All societal evils can ultimately be placed under one or more of these points. Now the Christian law does not cease at the external act, but it passes beyond to order correctly man's interior acts and ideas, placing order at the very root of the matter.

Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters, of which he is competent to judge. But man is not competent to judge of interior movements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear: and yet for the perfection of virtue it is necessary for man to conduct himself aright in both kinds of acts. Consequently, human law could sufficiently curb and direct interior acts: and it was necessary for this purpose that divine law should supervene.⁷³

Also since man is a social animal needing other men, this relationship is most adequately attained by a mutual and sincere love which binds all men to one another. ". . . Since man by nature is a *social animal*, he needs assistance from other men in order to obtain his own end. Now this is most suitably done if men love one another mutually. Hence the law of God, which directs men to their last end commands us to love one another."⁷⁴

Moreover, the divine law is meant as a help to the natural law which latter also demands that men love one another.⁷⁵

Further. The divine law is offered to man in aid of the natural law. Now it is natural to all men to love one another: a proof of which is that a man, by a kind of natural instinct, comes to the assistance of anyone even unknown that is in need, for instance by warning him, should he have taken the wrong road, by helping him to rise, should he have fallen, and so forth: *as though every man were intimate and friendly with his fellow-man* (VIII *Ethic.*, 1, 3; 1155a). Therefore, mutual love is prescribed to man by the divine law.⁷⁶

⁷³ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 91, a. 14.

⁷⁴ *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 117.

⁷⁵ "Sed praecepta moralis ex ipso dictamine naturalis rationis efficaciam habent . . . quaedam sunt certissima, et adeo manifesta quod editione non indigent; sicut mandata de dilectione Dei et proximi. . . ." *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 100, a. 11.

⁷⁶ *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 117.

We must also notice that the contemplation of divine things presupposes peace and tranquillity which are destroyed by a lack of love.

Again. In order to apply himself to divine things, man needs calm and peace. Now mutual love, more than aught else, removes the obstacles to peace. Seeing then that the divine law directs men to apply themselves to divine things, we must conclude that this same law leads men to love one another.⁷⁷

Thus the highest effect of order on earth is true peace out of which springs true contemplation of God.⁷⁸ It can be truly said, therefore, that a society of Christian men will come the closest to a perfect civil body on earth, since among them the sources of friction and hatred are most completely recognized and controlled, while the sources of human and divine love are most effectively encouraged and in operation.⁷⁹

In this whole matter of friendship and its perfection in the communication of thoughts and ideals, of dreams and hopes, we very often, it seems, permit ourselves to be confused and deceived. We live our lives as if these friendships were mere incidents or side issues to the main problems of human existence. Yet, the reality is quite otherwise. We live our lives for our friendships; they are the goals, not the means. Sometimes I think that the only modern man who really saw this truth as St. Thomas did was G. K. Chesterton, who in this as in so many things reflects conclusions which Aquinas propounded in a more philosophical, though certainly not more interesting way. Indeed, Chesterton's book on Charles Dickens is perhaps the best societal analysis ever written. It may be permitted, then, to use the concluding lines of this masterpiece for our own summation of the perfection of friendship in human life:

The hour of absinthe is over. We shall not be much further troubled with the little artists who found Dickens too sane for

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, q. 29, aa. 1-4; also *III Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5.

⁷⁹ Cf. Hilaire Belloc, *Essays of a Catholic* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931), pp. 295 and 297.

their sorrows and too clean for their delights. But we have a long way to travel before we get back to what Dickens meant: and the passage is along a rambling English road, a twisting road such as Mr. Pickwick travelled. But this at least is part of what he meant; that comradeship and serious joy are not interludes in our travel; but that rather our travels are interludes in comradeship and joy, which through God shall endure for ever. The inn does not point to the road; the road points to the inn. And all roads point at last to an ultimate inn, where we shall meet Dickens and all his characters: and when we drink again it shall be from the great flagons in the tavern at the end of the world.⁸⁰

And again we see that Christianity has not been wrong in proclaiming that the friendships of men are the very means to the friendship with our God—he who loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the law. So too, when Christ Our Lord wished to show to His Apostles His deep love for them, He could only say to them, “No longer do I call you servants. . . . But I have called you friends, because all things I have heard from My Father I have made known to you.”⁸¹ And here we have it! God sharing His ideas and ideals with men—this is indeed the highest and most perfect act of friendship possible to us, His creatures.

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⁸⁰ G. K. Chesterton, *Charles Dickens* (New York: The Press of the Reader's Club, 1942), p. 212.

⁸¹ John 15: 15. Cf. also St. Thomas' beautiful passage in *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 65, a. 5.

A COMPARISON OF THE THOMISTIC AND SCOTISTIC CONCEPTS OF HOPE

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THE problem of pure love is a recurrent one in the various branches of philosophy. Whether it be the conflict between the ecstatic and physical concept of love,¹ as derived from the philosophy of Aristotle and Plato, or the "egoism" and "altruism" of psychologists, or the interested and disinterested love of the theologian, the problem remains the same. Must man seek his own good in everything he loves, or can he love something purely for its own sake without any reference to himself? Theologians take their stand in the matter according to their answer to whether man could love God in the impossible situation that He were not man's good. St. Thomas says man could not love even God under these circumstances.² Scotus, on the other hand, because for him the love of benevolence is an act distinct from the love of concupiscence, maintains that even if God were not man's good, man would be able to love Him according to the affection of justice.³

Because of the similarities in the nature of charity and of hope, both being acts of the will tending toward the good, any radical change in the concept of charity is naturally reflected in

¹ Cf. Dom Gregory Stevens, O.S.B., "The Disinterested Love of God," *The Thomist*, XVI (1953), 307-333, 497-541; also, Rousselot's *The Problem of Love in the Middle Ages*.

² *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 26, a. 13, ad 3: "Dato enim per impossibile quod Deus non esset hominis bonum, non esset ei ratio diligendi." Cf. I, q. 60, a. 5, ad 2: "Non enim esset in natura alicujus quod amaret Deum, nisi ex eo quod unumquodque dependet a bono quod est Deus."

³ Joannes Duns Scotus, *Liber III Sententiarum, Opera*, Tomus VII, P.I.II, Durand (Lyons, 1639), d. 27, q. un., 2: "Haec virtus (caritas) distincta est . . . similiter a spe, quia actus eius non est concupiscere bonum amanti, inquantum est commodum amantis, sed tendere in obiectum secundum se, etiamsi per impossibile circumscriberetur ab eo commoditas eius ad amantem. Hanc virtutem perfectientem voluntatem inquantum habet affectionem iustitiae, voco caritatem."

the concept of hope. In its widest acceptance, hope is the desire of something, together with the expectation of obtaining it. The conflict of ideas as to the nature of charity resulted in a difference of opinion as to which of these elements actually determines the nature of hope. This is the aspect of the problem that will be studied here. Traditionally, that is, according to the Scriptures, the Fathers and St. Thomas, the element of confidence or expectation is regarded as the distinctive characteristic of the virtue of hope. Within the last three centuries, however, there has been a growing trend toward the identification of hope with the element of concupiscible love, that is, the desire of God, not for His own sake, but because in Him we find our own happiness and perfection. Father DeLetter, in his study on "Hope and Charity,"⁴ attributes this change of concept to the combined teaching of the theologians, Duns Scotus, an English Franciscan, who lived from 1270 to 1308, and Francis Suarez, a Spanish Jesuit (1548-1617).

This new concept of hope identifying it with interested love made the virtue of hope the object of the attacks of many overzealous Christians who exaggerated the love of charity peculiar to the gospel. Although the basic Protestant doctrine of justifying faith, i. e., joyous confidence in the forgiveness of sin, would seem to be motivated by self-interest, both Luther and Calvin very illogically championed the cause of purely disinterested love and rejected as sinful whatever was done only through consideration of eternal reward, or "*amor concupiscentiae*."⁵ There is, however, an inner connection between Luther's doctrine of justification and his view of love. Just as justification is the exclusive work of God and the will to purify oneself first by good works before taking refuge in Him is unwarranted presumption, so Christian love is not strictly concerned with the love with which we love God, but essentially with the love

⁴ P. DeLetter, S. J., "Hope and Charity in St. Thomas," *The Thomist*, XIII (1950), 204-248, 325-352.

⁵ Joseph F. Delany, "Hope," *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, VII (1913), 466. Condemned by Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 31, *DB* 841: "Si quis dixerit, iustificatum peccare, dum intuitu aeternae mercedis bene operatur: A.S."

with which God Himself loves. Luther will not refine and sublimate self-love but demands its total annihilation. Love, therefore, has no place in justification, which depends only on faith.⁶ But this theory of love is less the triumph of absolute disinterestedness than the negation of our merits in order to exalt the merit of Christ alone. And because merit and reward are corresponding terms, the horror with which he regarded the pursual of meritorious works reflected on the pursual of a reward.⁷ Justification and salvation, therefore, could be the object of faith alone and our confidence in obtaining them must have the absolute certitude that faith requires.⁸ Such a theory leaves no place for the virtue of hope as we know it.

The fanatical rigorism of the Jansenists was the result of the strict application of the principle of completely disinterested love. Although in opposition to Protestantism, Jansenius permitted the seeking of heavenly beatitude, even considered as a reward, he insisted on the absolute disinterestedness of its motive considering it as a supreme means of glorifying God, and demanded of every Christian a perpetual act of disinterested charity.⁹ He reached this conclusion from his interpretation¹⁰ of St. Augustine, who often uses the word "charity" in a very wide sense. He considered the love of hope, therefore, as morally bad and incapable of becoming good until transformed by charity into the love of friendship.¹¹

⁶ Anders Nygren, *Agape and Eros* (London: S. P. C. K., 1953), p. 681.

⁷ S. Harent, "Espérance," *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, V (1924), col. 658.

⁸ Nygren, *op. cit.*, p. 681.

⁹ Harent, *op. cit.*, col. 658.

¹⁰ "The vision of God ought not to be loved by a Christian from any other species of love; in all the works of Augustine, as in Holy Scripture, there is not a trace of the idea that one may desire his salvation in virtue of a love different from that of true charity"—*Augustinus*, III *De gratia Christi*, I, v, c. X, p. 224 (Rouen, 1643), cited by Harent, *DTC*, col. 607.

¹¹ *Condemned DB 1300*: "Intentio, qua quis detestatur malum et prosequitur bonum mere, ut coelestem obtineat gloriam, non est recta nec Deo placens"; *DB 1303*: "Quisquis etiam aeternae mercedis intuitu licet beatitudinis operatur"; *DB 1407*: "Totum deest peccatori, quando ei deest spes; et non est spes in Deo, ubi non est amor Dei."

The Quietists, on the other hand, conceding the goodness of hope, denied its necessity. Molinos claimed that hope is altogether incompatible with pure benevolent love.¹² Quietism so concentrated on the imperfection of hope as to forget that the coming of a perfection removes only those imperfections which are its opposites. Since the imperfection of hope's love is not opposed to the perfection of charity's love,¹³ there is nothing to prevent us from loving God for two different reasons—both because He is good in Himself and because He is good for us.¹⁴ Fénelon and the Semi-quietists limited the necessity of hope to the beginning stages of the spiritual life and claimed it is entirely foreign to the advanced spiritual state.¹⁵ The Quietists conceived of an habitual state of love of God so disinterested that fear of punishment and desire of reward no longer had any part in it.¹⁶ St. Paul spoke of a desire to be "anathema" for the sake of his brethren.¹⁷ St. Thérèse of Lisieux tells how reluctantly she recited the verse of the Divine Office, "I have inclined my heart, O Lord, to do Thy justifications for the sake of Thy rewards."¹⁸

No doubt an act of pure love is possible, but an habitual

¹² Delany, *op. cit.*, p. 466. Condemned DB 1332: "In hoc sanctae indifferentiae statu nolumus amplius salutem ut salutem propriam, ut liberationem aeternam, ut mercedem nostrorum meritorum, ut nostrum interesse omnium maximum; sed eam volumus voluntate plena, ut gloriam et beneplacitum Dei; ut rem, quam ipse vult, et quam nos vult velle propter ipsum."

¹³ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 62, a. 7, ad 1; II-II, q. 18, a. 1, ad 3.

¹⁴ Peter Lumberras, O.P., "Hope the Self-Seeker," *Cross and Crown* (June 1951), p. 183.

¹⁵ Delany, *op. cit.*, p. 467. Condemned DB 1337: "In hoc statu anima amittit omnem spem sui proprii interesse; sed nunquam amittit in parte superiore, id est in suis actibus directis et intimis, spem perfectam, quae est desiderium disinteressantium promissionum."

¹⁶ M. Molinos, *Spiritual Guide*, cited by Delany, p. 466. Condemned DB 1327: "Datur habitualis status amoris Dei, qui est caritas pura et sine ulla admixtione motivi proprii interesse. Neque timor peonarum, neque desiderium remunerationum habent amplius in eo partem. Non amatur amplius Deus propter meritum, neque propter perfectionem, neque propter felicitatem in eo amando inveniendam."

¹⁷ Romans 9:13.

¹⁸ St. Thérèse of Lisieux, *An Autobiography*, trans. Rev. Thomas N. Taylor (New York, 1926), p. 317.

state of life in which all actions have only motive is not. Such a concept is not in accord with reality. The frailty of our nature makes us incapable of sustaining this most perfect act at its highest pitch indefinitely.¹⁹ St. Thomas himself in his answer to the Stoics²⁰ gives us the clue. Virtue should perfect nature, not destroy it, and a moral system contrary to nature is useless. God, the Author of nature, combined the useful with the agreeable, because even virtuous people do not always experience the whole force and attraction of virtue. Hope, therefore, is necessary as the defense of charity and perfection when we are not conscious of the fervor of charity, nor the charm of virtue. In order not to succumb to temptation, man needs to walk by hope as he walks by faith. "He must look forward to the promised land in order not to fail in the long and difficult journey through the barren desert."²¹

Furthermore, St. Thomas in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans distinguishes the disinterestedness demanded by the Quietists of the perfect from that which St. Paul exemplifies, by pointing out that the Apostle could not desire to be "anathema" from Christ through sin, which would be contrary to charity, but only to be deprived of the divine fruition for a time in order that God might be the more honored by the conversion of his compatriots.²² Thus his sacrifice of beatitude is conditional and for a time and consists in a transient act. The sacrifice of the Quietists, however, was absolute and constituted a permanent state.²³

The problem of pure love, therefore, is not confined to the realm of charity. It occasioned a change in the concept of hope, which, in turn brought upon Christian hope a series of violent attacks.

¹⁹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 180, a. 8, ad 2.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 34, a. 1.

²¹ Lumberras, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

²² Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 27, a. 8, ad 1.

²³ R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *De Virtutibus Theologicis* (Turin, 1949), p. 540.

I. THE EXPECTANT HOPE OF ST. THOMAS

As a preliminary observation it may be well to note that this study does not involve two hopes, but two concepts of one reality, Christian hope, the essential notes of which are found in revelation. Variety of concept often follows variety of approach to a subject, but the differences that result may be only apparent differences, having their root not in the subject itself, but in the point of view from which it is seen. In order to correctly evaluate St. Thomas' concept of hope, then, the virtue must be studied in its relation to man's progress toward his last end, for the principles of finality are the integrating factor of St. Thomas' moral system.²⁴ The act of hope, as described by St. Thomas, therefore, may not always be verified by conscious observance of our own psychological states, because his approach is on the deeper ontological level where real finality plays. With this in mind, we shall examine especially the texts of St. Thomas that deal with the act of hope that is common to hope both as a passion and as a virtue, as well as the formal object and the motive that specify theological hope.

Hope exists on three different levels: the passion of hope, which resides in the sensitive appetite, hope which follows cognition and exists in the rational will, and the theological virtue of hope which elevates the will to a new mode of acting. Strictly speaking, hope in the second sense is not a virtue, for the will does not need a special virtue to give it confidence with regard to some object within the natural capacity of the one willing.²⁵ Moreover, since hope pertains to things not possessed and human power can be frustrated, reliance on it cannot be sufficiently firm to establish natural hope as a virtue.²⁶ This study, which is primarily concerned with the theological virtue of hope, will be limited, therefore, to the consideration of its

²⁴ *III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1: "Prima autem mensura et regula omnium est divina sapientia; unde bonitas et rectitudo sive virtus uniuscujusque consistit secundum quod attingit ad hoc quod ex sapientia divina ordinatur."

²⁵ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 22, a. 1, ad 1.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 62, a. 3, ad 2.

supernatural aspect and to the act of the passion of hope insofar as the activity of hope on this level forms the basis for its supernatural activity and gives much valuable information concerning its nature. "For although the virtue of hope has a stability not found in the passion, it nevertheless remains true that it is known only by its acts, the exterior characteristics of which are stamped with the same frailty as those of natural hope."²⁷

The Notion of Hope in General

Hope is a complex act that in some sense contains elements of love, desire, courage and confidence. Each of these elements is a response on the part of the subject to certain qualities that the object hoped for must possess. Because the object of hope appears as good, the subject tends toward it by love. This love takes the special form of desire because the good is future, in the sense that it is not yet possessed. Future is not to be understood here in its relation to time, for hope and confidence can have for their object present or even past objects, if the hoped-for event is not known with certainty.²⁸ For example, a penitent sinner who has been forgiven but not yet absolved, can still hope that he has been pardoned, because he does not know with certainty that God has already forgiven him. So the object of hope is loved because it is good, and desired because it is absent.

The object that provokes the act of hope, however, cannot be simply a good that is non-possessioned, because hope rises in the irascible appetite, while love and desire are acts of the concupiscible appetite. Love and desire must precede hope, for nothing is hoped for which is not loved and desired, and thus the action of the concupiscible appetite is always presupposed in that of the irascible.²⁹ In order to arouse the irascible appetite, how-

²⁷ Le Tilly, O.P., *L'Espérance*, Saint Thomas D'Aquin, *Somme Théologique* (Tournai, 1950), p. 6: "Et si la vertu donne a l'espérance une permanence que ne comporte pas le sentiment, il reste cependant qu'elle ne se fait connaître que par ses actes, dont les caractères extérieurs sont frappés de la même infirmité que ceux de l'espérance naturelle."

²⁸ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 40, a. 1, ad 2.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 25, a. 1.

ever, the object must be not only good and non-possessed; its pursuit must also have the quality of arduousness that calls forth in the subject "a certain effort, and a certain raising of the spirit to the realization of the arduous good."³⁰ Hope, therefore, has a formal relation to difficulty, for at this point its object takes on a character essentially different from that of the object of desire. Although difficulty, as such, can only impede the action of hope as a tendency toward good, it is a necessary quality of the good sought by the irascible appetite, the nature of which is to overcome difficulties, as it is the nature of the concupiscible to delight in good. And even for the concupiscible appetite, the difficulty, if it is conquerable, adds to the object a greater value, "*un piquant gout*,"³¹ because of the effort involved in attaining it.

Hope, by a certain "*erectio animi*," or courage, fortifies the soul against the discouragement that difficulty and uncertainty tend to evoke. This response to the arduousness of its object is the characteristic of hope that finds frequent and apt expression in the "Lift up your head!" of the Psalms. It differs from the courage inherent in the moral virtue of fortitude, because it is affective rather than effective. This follows from the difference in their objects: hope tends toward the difficult object to be attained, "*arduum consequendum*"; fortitude, toward the difficult feat to be performed, "*arduum faciendum*."³² That is, hope braces the soul against its own weakness and despondency, rather than disposes it to attack exterior obstacles. Then, too, the courage of hope strengthens the soul in the pursuit of good, while that of fortitude assists in the attack against evil. When hope is intense, this courage produces daring³³ which, though not a part of hope, is numbered among its effects.³⁴ Thus the soul responds to a difficult good that it does not possess by desire and courage.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Le Tilly, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

³² *De Potentia*, q. 6, a. 9, ad 11: "Ad undecimum dicendum quod objectum spei est arduum consequendum, non autem arduum faciendum."

³³ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 45, a. 3, ad 2.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, ad 3.

The act of hope is not complete, however, unless the soul sees the difficult good as possible of attainment and can thereby tend toward it with confidence, for no man hopes for what is impossible, no matter how much he may desire it.³⁵ The ultimate formality of the act of hope, therefore, arises from the possibility of its object, because a future difficult good that is impossible of attainment, evokes not hope, but its opposite, despair. Only when the object is seen as possible does it give rise to hope.³⁶ Possibility gives to the object its actual goodness and draws the irascible appetite in pursuit; it constitutes the arduous good formally as an object by explaining and limiting its other qualities, and makes it an object absolutely irreducible to any other species.³⁷

This last quality of the object of hope also indicates a relation with that which makes it possible. Possibility supposes a force capable of vanquishing the difficulties which oppose the possession of the object. With regard to the possibility of hope, a two-fold movement can arise, depending on whether the hoped-for good is possible to the subject by his own power or by another's. In the first case, the movement is one of simple hope (*sperare*); in the second, it is better characterised as expectation (*expectare*).³⁸ This, however, is not a specific difference, because the fact that the subject looks for help outside himself contributes nothing new to the act, neither energy to the tendency, nor certitude to the result. Neither does it affect the object. Expectation differs from simple hope only by an acci-

³⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 40, a. 1.

³⁶ *III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 3, ad 1: "Sed quia voluntas est possibilium et impossibilium; neque aliquis operatur propter aliquid quod est impossibile adipisci, quamvis illud appetat: ideo oportet quod voluntas ad hoc quod operari incipiat, tendat in illud sicut in possibile et haec inclinatio voluntatis tendentis in bonum aeternum quasi possibile sibi per gratiam, est actus spei."

³⁷ Le Tilly, *op. cit.*, p. 197: "C'est cette possibilité qui donne à l'objet sa bonté actuelle, et à la difficulté l'attrait spécial qui ébranle l'irascible vers la poursuite. La possibilité, caractère dernier de l'objet, le constitue formellement comme objet, explique et limite ses autres caractères, et fait de lui un objet absolument irréductible à toute autre espèce."

³⁸ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 40, a. 2, ad 1.

dental determination in the subject, who keeps his eye not only on the good he hopes for, but also on the person from whom he looks for help.³⁹ The distinction is important, however, insofar as it serves to constitute the theological virtue of hope as expectant hope, because its object far exceeds the power of the subject and makes him look outside himself for the assistance that will make the object possible.

The possibility of the object, moreover, enables one to hope for it with confidence, which is so closely allied to hope that it is often used interchangeably with it. "Such confidence we have, through Christ towards God, not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God."⁴⁰ St. Thomas, however, assures us that confidence itself does not denote a virtue, but rather a certain mode of hope, i. e., hope strengthened by a strong opinion.⁴¹ This strong opinion may be based on our faith in another's promise, (whence its name, "*confides*"), or it may denote the hope of having something because of what we have observed in ourselves or in others.⁴²

St. Thomas is careful to specify that the object must be possible or probable, but not necessarily certain.⁴³ It is this quality of mere possibility which gives to the certitude of hope its unique character. It is not the same as the absolute certitude of faith,⁴⁴ which banishes doubt from the intellect, although hope is certain because faith is certain. The certitude of hope is rather an affective certitude which is opposed to mistrust or hesitation.⁴⁵ The contrast between the certitude which faith imparts and that derived from hope can be observed in the

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ II Cor. 3: 4-5.

⁴¹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 129, a. 6, ad 3.

⁴² *Ibid.*, a. 6.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 67, a. 4, ad 3.

⁴⁴ Council of Trent, sess. VI, cap. 13, *DB* 806: "Nemo sibi certi aliquid absoluta certitudine polliceatur, tametsi in Dei auxilio firmissimam spem collocare et reponere omnes debent."

⁴⁵ *III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 4: "Quia certitudini fidei opponitur dubitatio; certitudini autem spei opponitur diffidentia vel haesitatio."

firmness by which a Catholic *believes* that if he dies in the state of grace he will be saved, and *hopes* that he will die in the state of grace. In other words, the certitude of hope consists in the firmness and determination of the will to attain salvation⁴⁶ and not in the determination of a judgment that he will be saved.⁴⁷ This limitation is necessary in the certitude of hope, not because there is any uncertainty or deficiency in God's power or mercy, in which hope places its trust and on which we can rely with absolute confidence, but because man is able through his free will to place an obstacle to the reception of grace. In other words, while the promise of the assistance of grace is absolute, the promise of salvation is conditional.⁴⁸

The genus of hope, therefore, is established from the essential qualities of the hoped-for object.⁴⁹ If the object lacks any of these special characteristics, it will evoke not hope, but some related act. An evil object will call forth fear. Joy follows if the good is present to the subject. If the good is future, but easy to attain, simple desire is the response of the soul. However, if the difficulty is so great as to be considered impossible of attainment, it will be despaired of rather than hoped for. The object of hope, whether it be considered as a passion or a virtue, must be a future good, difficult, but possible to attain.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Harent, "Espérance," *DTC* (1924), col. 613.

⁴⁷ On this point the Council of Trent (Sess. VI) denied the Protestant contention that we can and must be altogether certain of our salvation. The horror with which the initial Protestant position regarded the pursual of meritorious works was reflected in their denial of any hope of reward. They therefore identified faith and confidence (*fiducia*) and made hope rather an act of the intellect than of the will. Since man could not hope for blessedness through good works, the only thing left was to believe most firmly in the divine mercy and promises. Hope, then, had to have the absolute certitude of faith. Joseph F. Delany, "Hope," *Catholic Encyclopedia* (1913), VII, 466.

⁴⁸ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 54, a. 2; Garrigou-Lagrange, *op. cit.*, p. 13: "Habit us et actus specificantur et specie diversificantur ab objecto formali."

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, q. 40, a. 1.

The Essence of Theological Hope

The theological virtue of hope, with which we are mainly concerned, differs from the other species in the genus of hope in that it seeks a supernatural good in contrast to the sensible good of the passion of hope and the moral good of the virtue of magnanimity. Moreover, the passion, if not regulated by the virtue of fortitude, gives way either to temerariousness or to pusillanimity. No one, however, can use Christian hope badly, for it is not a passion to be regulated, but a virtue which regulates, and which attains not a merely sensible, arduous good, but the Supreme Good, God, in Whom alone man, by his supernatural vocation, is destined to find true happiness. The eminence of such a goal requires that man be equipped with principles other than those he has by nature, for effects can be proportionate only to their causes and principles.⁵¹ Neither the sensitive passions nor the natural virtues of the intellect and will are sufficient to produce acts that will enable man to attain the Infinite Good, an object which far surpasses the capacity of his nature. In order that man may achieve this supernatural destiny, God infuses into his soul the virtues of faith, hope, and charity, which orient him to the supernatural life in the same way as his natural inclinations direct him to his connatural end.⁵² The intellect and the will are thus conditioned to an elevated mode of activity proportionate to the Supreme Good which is their object. On this level, hope, though it retains the essential notions of the passion of hope, is an act of the will under the influence of grace, tending toward the divine good, future because of the divine will, arduous because of the divine eminence and possible because of divine help.⁵³

Light will be shed on the nature of hope as a virtue by investigating its special role in the theological trio. St. Thomas

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, q. 63, a. 3.

⁵² *Ibid.*, q. 62, a. 3.

⁵³ Joannis a S. Thoma, *Tractatus de Spe, Cursus Theologicus* (Paris, 1886), VII, Q. 17, disp., IV, a. 1, n. 3.

bases the "deduction" of three distinct virtues on two principles: the faculty from which the acts of the virtue proceed and the mode by which they adhere to the object. By the first deduction, he considers the intellect ordained to supernatural beatitude by faith; and the will, by hope and love. Faith gives us knowledge of our supernatural goal, presenting it as both good and possible of attainment, while by hope the will tends toward the good seen as possible and becomes conformed to it in the union of love.⁵⁴ Although in the natural order, the very nature of the will suffices to direct it toward its end, both as to the intention of the end and its conformity to it,⁵⁵ when the will strives for its Supernatural End, no power of its nature is adequate and the human appetite needs a virtue to enable it both to tend toward this end and to be conformed to it.⁵⁶ Moreover, these two acts are distinct, since the soul can tend to God by hope without being united to Him by charity,⁵⁷ for the act of hope is to expect future beatitude, whether from merits already possessed or from merits to be acquired in the future. This latter act, springing from unformed hope, is not presumption, for by it one hopes without charity to obtain salvation through charity, but not to obtain beatitude without charity.⁵⁸

Elsewhere, St. Thomas gives the special function of the three virtues, which each in its own way unite us to God, as:

Faith is necessary, which causes the end to be known; and hope, through which one is confident of attaining the last end, as something possible for the agent; and charity, which makes the end appear as a good for him who strives after it, inasmuch as it causes him to love it; otherwise he would never strive after it.⁵⁹

This manner of deduction makes us see the two sources from which hope takes its origin. It has an origin of knowledge

⁵⁴ *Summa Theol.*, q. 62, a. 3.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, ad 1.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, ad 1 and 3.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 65, a. 4.

⁵⁸ Garrigou-Lagrange, *op. cit.*, p. 7; also I-II, q. 62, a. 4, ad 2.

⁵⁹ *III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 5.

derived from faith which makes us know the supernatural end to which God has called us and the supernatural helps promised to those who ask for them. In this sense, faith is the foundation of hope⁶⁰ as it is the foundation of the whole process of justification. The judgment of possibility which faith supplies produces the confidence that is so characteristic of hope.

More important still, hope has origins of affection, by which we desire God for ourselves, for good is never hoped for unless it be desired and loved. Thus, knowing God by faith and desiring the good that comes through Him, the soul begins to love God⁶¹ and obey His commandments. The formal motive of charity, God loved for his own sake, ennobles the imperfect love of concupiscence by referring it to His greater glory and purifying it of all disordered love of self. Then the soul by hope relies upon Him more and more, abandoning itself to His infinite goodness and mercy as a friend;⁶² it thereby comes to love Him more, not only because of the benefits He bestows or promises, but also because He is good in Himself and better than His gifts. Thus there is a mutual interaction between hope and charity.⁶³ Hope by making the soul dependent on God's goodness leads it to love Him for His own sake. Charity, on the other hand, perfects hope, not only by making it meritorious, but also by freeing it from its imperfections by which it confides too much in human help or remissly in divine.

The second "deduction" St. Thomas makes of the theological virtues brackets faith and hope according to their imperfect

⁶⁰ Hebrews 11:1.

⁶¹ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 62, a. 4, ad 3.

⁶² *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 17, a. 8, corpus et ad 2.

⁶³ L'Abbé Combes in his penetrating analysis, "*The Spirituality of St. Thérèse*," (New York: Kenedy, p. 31) thus describes the reciprocal influence of the theological virtues in the life of the young Carmelite, whose genius in spiritual science L'Abbé Combes compares to the genius of St. Thomas in metaphysics and theology: "The trial was continuous and in two phases: the first, in which her faith and her hope defended, enlightened, purified, strengthened and preserved her love; the second, the shorter, in which her love, now arrived at its perfection and unshakably centred in its divine object, in its turn saves her faith and her hope. Thus did Thérèse attain, . . . to a condition analogous to her starting point, but now purified from all mere sentiment and very nigh to heaven."

mode of adherence to the object and further highlights the perfection of charity in this respect. Faith and hope adhere to the object as to a principle from which certain things accrue to us. Thus, faith makes us adhere to God as the source of truth, and hope makes us adhere to Him as the source of good. But by charity we adhere to God for His own sake.⁶⁴ By this deduction is seen the real superiority of charity. This deduction is very near the heart of the question whether hope is a species belonging to the genus of concupiscible love or whether it is a distinct genus in its own right, merely presupposing the desire of God. If St. Thomas in this article meant to establish the mode of adherence to the object as the absolute distinction between hope and charity, he would seem to approve of the inclusion of hope in the genus of desire, especially if one considers it in conjunction with article 8, where, in giving the order of hope and charity according to their generation, he elaborates upon the perfect love of charity and the imperfect love to which hope pertains. This latter article, however, connects hope with imperfect love for the purpose of establishing the superiority of charity and does not necessarily identify the two. Article 6, however, does present the mode of adherence to the object as a means of distinguishing hope from charity, but St. Thomas clearly specifies that by hope the subject adheres to the object in a mode peculiar to the virtue of hope, that is, by reliance on divine assistance to attain the good, and not merely by desire of that good. By hope we tend to God as the source of perfect goodness, and so God is the final cause of our hoping. But hope, which, even as a virtue, regards a difficult object, is formally caused by trust in divine assistance, which makes the object possible. This deduction, therefore, does not mean that hope is the acquisition of happiness or the desire for it; hope is rather reliance on God's help to attain this beatitude. The union with God produced by hope is the confidence we have in His helping power.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 17, a. 8.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, a. 6, ad 3.

It is this close connection of hope with concupiscible love that occasioned the attacks of Protestants, Jansenists and Quietists against this virtue. In opposing these heresies, it was necessary that the desire for a supernatural reward, whether as hope or as concupiscible love, be established theologically and canonically as both good and necessary. The love of concupiscence which pertains to hope is in no way inordinate since it desires no created reward, but only the possession of God, and this only as ordained to God. By it I desire God for myself (*mihi*) but for the sake of God (*propter Deum*). It is, nevertheless, distinct from charity, although it tends to God as the last end and for God's sake. Charity loves God formally for His own sake (*formaliter propter Deum*); concupiscence loves God finally for His own sake (*finaliter propter Deum*). In other words, by concupiscible love, I desire salvation only as it is good for myself (*ut bene sit solum mihi*), while by charity, I desire salvation not only as good for me, but also that God may be glorified (*non solus ut bonum nobis, sed ut bonum Deo*).⁶⁶ Thus the love of concupiscence for God has a two-fold relation to charity: antecedently, by which we desire God as our highest Good, and consequently, as a secondary act of charity, by which we desire God in a perfect manner, referring our salvation to Him as a friend, loved more than ourselves.⁶⁷ St. Thomas therefore says: "Hope presupposes a desire and is intermediate between love and desire."⁶⁸

God is loved by the love of concupiscence for the sake of something else (*propter aliud*) only in the sense in which the less perfect subject loves the Supreme Good by which he is perfected (*propter finem cui*). This is the sense of the words of the Creed: "*Qui propter nos homines descendit de coelis.*" The Incarnation is greater than our redemption and cannot be ordained to it as a means subordinated to an end. But in God's mercy, the Incarnation is ordained to our redemption as an eminent cause to its effect and to us as a perfectible object

⁶⁶ Garrigou-Lagrange, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 386.

⁶⁸ *III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 3, q. 2.

on which God bestows His favor.⁶⁹ Thus, the love of chaste concupiscence seeks a reward, not so much as a reward, but, as Billuart says, we wish to see God that we may glorify Him eternally, being so disposed, that even if there were no beatitude to be hoped for, we would love and serve Him none the less.⁷⁰

These two "deductions" of the theological virtues show a clearcut distinction between faith and hope, by reason of the active principles from which they proceed. But the distinction between hope and charity is not nearly so decisive, since both are acts of the will tending toward the Infinite Good. The ultimate specification of hope, therefore, can be arrived at only by a consideration of its formal object. As a theological virtue its object can be nothing less than God Himself,⁷¹ which it has in common with faith and charity. The specification of their "*habitus*," therefore, will be determined not by a real difference in their objects, but by the different aspects under which God, the Supernatural End, is viewed and attained by them.⁷²

The Specification of Hope

Hope as expectation has a two-fold object: the good for which one hopes (*quod*) and the help by which that good becomes possible (*quo*).⁷³ Hope is directed toward eternal beatitude and all things necessary to attain it, e. g., grace, our daily sustenance. But everything created that is sought, even the beatific vision itself, is sought only that we might possess God Himself. Therefore, God to be possessed is the principal object, which arouses the movement of hope, orientates it and

⁶⁹ Garrigou-Lagrange, *op. cit.*, p. 320: "Sic Incarnatio altior est redemptione nostra, et ideo ad redemptionem non ordinatur, ut medium subordinatum, ad finem cuius gratia, sed ex misericordia ad redemptionem ordinatur ut causa enim ad effectum et ad nos ut ad finem, cui Deus vult gratiam scil. ad finem perfectibilem, non perfectivum."

⁷⁰ Cited by Garrigou-Lagrange, *op. cit.*, p. 471: "intendimus videre Deum, ut eum in aeternum glorificemus, sic affectu, ut si nulla esset beatitudo speranda, nihilominus diligeremus illum atque illi serviremus."

⁷¹ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 62, a. 1.

⁷² *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 17, a. 6, ad 1.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, a. 7.

terminates it. It differs specifically from the object of charity, which is God lovable in Himself, and from that of simple desire, in that hope regards its object not merely as our Supreme Good that is infinitely desirable, but as the supreme arduous good⁷⁴ which is impossible to any created power. Whatever makes this arduous good possible, therefore, will provide the ultimate formality of Christian hope. Divine assistance provides the essential reason for hoping; it thereby animates, sustains, directs, and therefore specifies, hope.⁷⁵ This intrinsic relation of the tendency of hope to the means by which its object is obtained can be observed in a sick man who *desires* health because it is good, but *hopes* for it because he relies on effective medicines or skillful doctors.

Just as faith does not have the aspect of a theological virtue unless it adheres to the testimony of the First Truth, so hope, also, takes its specification as a virtue from the fact that it relies on the help of divine power to attain eternal life. It would be a vicious act, and opposed to the virtue of hope, to rely upon human help or one's own power (as did the Pelagians) to attain the perfect good. Garrigou-Lagrange expresses this principle in modern terms:

The formal object of faith is the First Truth, by reason of which one gives assent to those things which are believed, and which constitute the material object of faith, so the formal object of hope is the help of divine power and mercy, on account of which the motion of hope tends toward the hoped-for goods which are its material object.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ *III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2: "Et secundum hoc spes est in homine principium omnium operationum quae ad bonum arduum ordinantur, sicut caritas omnium quae in bonum tendunt, et sicut fides omnium quae ad cognitionem pertinent."

⁷⁵ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 17, a. 1: "Inquantum igitur speramus aliquid ut possibile nobis per divinum auxilium, spes nostra attingit ad ipsum Deum, cujus auxilio innititur"; and a. 6: "Spes autem facit Deo adhaerere prout est nobis principium perfectae bonitatis: inquantum scilicet per spem divino auxilio innitimur ad beatitudinem obtinendam."

⁷⁶ Garrigou-Lagrange, *op. cit.*, p. 323.

In other words, we hope to obtain God by the help of God, just as by faith we believe in Him because of Him.⁷⁷

Hope, therefore, is characterised by our reliance on God's help (*Deus auxilians*), for we are not able to hope for beatitude with firm confidence except from him who we know is able and willing to give it. God alone can give eternal life and He must be willing to do so, for He promised to give it to those who believe in Christ⁷⁸ and He commands us to strive for it. For as the Council of Trent says, rephrasing St. Augustine, "God does not command the impossible, but commanding, urges us to do what is possible to our own power, and to ask for what is not, and then He helps that it may be possible."⁷⁹ In other words, the only reason for hoping that we shall enjoy beatitude is because God can give and wishes to give it to us.

Moreover God is the only source of this assistance that brings us to beatitude, for the order of the agent must correspond to the order of the end, and only the supreme and supernatural agent can lead us to the ultimate supernatural end. God's help may be transmitted to us by the sacred humanity of the Savior and by Mary, the Dispensatrix of all grace, but the formal motive of theological hope is God always willing to help (*Dieu toujours secourable*), according to His goodness, mercy, fidelity, and omnipotence. All these perfections in this order are supposed by the formal motive: *Deus auxilians*.⁸⁰ However, since this help has the character of an efficient cause,⁸¹ which implies the performance of an action and the bestowal of active assistance,⁸² it is to Divine Omnipotence especially that we have recourse in the very act of hope. All presupposed things are not sufficient, however, if God is not positively

⁷⁷ R. Bernard, O.P., *La Charité*, Saint Thomas D'Aquin, Somme Théologique, p. 315.

⁷⁸ John 3: 16.

⁷⁹ Cited by Council of Trent, DB 804.

⁸⁰ R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *La Synthèse Thomiste* (Paris, 1946), p. 518.

⁸¹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 17, a. 4.

⁸² Le Tilly, *op. cit.*, p. 206: "c'est à la toute-puissance que nous avons recours, car il s'agit à proprement parler d'une action à produire, d'un secours actif à nous apporter."

helping and thus, formally, hope depends on the helping Omnipotence of God.⁸³

This concept of the motive of hope as *Deus auxilians*, God always able and ready to help us, is the support especially of souls who are subject to the trials of the passive purification of the spirit as described by St. John of the Cross, for when all secondary motives are obscured, the supreme motive is brought into relief and the soul is led to rely completely on God, who does not abandon those who hope in Him. Contrary to the doctrine of the Quietists, in this night of the spirit souls are not asked to sacrifice either the hope or the desire of salvation; instead, with St. Paul, they must "hope against hope." This thesis also has a very intimate connection with the efficacy of divine help. So much so that Molina says that the Thomistic doctrine of grace, efficacious of itself, destroys hope.⁸⁴ In spite of the Molinists, however, there is nothing to fear for our liberty in the intrinsic efficacy of God's help, which adapts itself to the mode of free election proper to the human will. Although God works in us both to will and to accomplish,⁸⁵ He does so without doing violence to our nature. In fact, the efficacy of divine help, far from destroying hope, adds a new motive of confidence, so that "hope makes us tend to God as a certain good or end to be obtained and as a kind of help EFFICACIOUS in assisting."⁸⁶

This dual regard of hope, tending toward the good as well as toward the necessary help that makes the good possible, occasions the difference of opinion as to what constitutes the virtue of hope. On the one hand, with respect to its object *quod*, hope is a movement of love, of search for the perfect good of the

⁸³ R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *De Virtutibus Theologicis* (Turin, 1949), p. 325: "Sed formaliter innititur spes in Deo auxiliante, quia omnia praesupposita non sufficerent si Deus non esset insuper positive auxilians. Non sufficit quod Deus possit dare auxilium, sed requiritur quod velit auxilium dare et hoc constat prout impossibilia non jubet."

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 324.

⁸⁵ Philippians 2: 13: "Deus est enim qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere pro bona voluntate."

⁸⁶ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 17, a. 6, ad 3.

subject. Perceiving by faith its connaturality with the object, hope obeys the attraction of love and seeks possession of the loved object. The arduousness of the object provokes the irascible appetite and becomes a new incentive to love if the helps are sufficient to triumph over the obstacles.

On the other hand, with respect to its motive, hope evokes confidence. Overcoming the natural fear of a possible inadequacy between the means and the end in the face of a difficult work, the subject abandons himself to the One Who will aid him and confides in His powerful help. Although confidence in natural assistance always includes some uneasiness with regard to the outcome, reliance on the help of Omnipotence appeases the hesitation of the appetite and gives it firmness and the absolute tranquillity of certitude. Hope is absolutely certain because that which constitutes its formal motive, the divine Omnipotence and Mercy, cannot fail. The possibility of defection, due to human freedom, produces in the subject a certain uneasiness which is accidental to the act of hope but essential to the special action of the Holy Spirit in the gift of fear.⁸⁷ The very consideration of his frailty, however, impels man to rely still more firmly on Omnipotence, and thus he grows in hope.

It is clear, then, that hope, as St. Thomas sees it, although related to love and desire, is characterised by a firm reliance on the help of God to attain beatitude. For he says that, with the knowledge of God's providence over human affairs, "stirrings of hope arise in the soul of the believer that *by God's help*, he may gain possession of the goods he *naturally desires*, once he learns of them through faith."⁸⁸ Hope does not *merely desire* the Good; it *expects* it through divine Mercy and relies on Infinite Power to obtain it.

The anchor which for centuries has been the traditional symbol for the virtue of hope graphically portrays this very

⁸⁷ Le Tilly, *op. cit.*, p. 244: "Cet élément de crainte n'empêche pas la certitude pratique, parce qu'accidental au mouvement d'espérance mais il détermine une certaine inquiétude et laisse dans l'espérance une imperfection que vient combler une motion spéciale du Saint-Esprit dans l'exercice du don de crainte."

⁸⁸ St. Thomas Aquinas, *Compendium of Theology*, trans. Cyril Vollert, S.J. (St. Louis, 1948), p. 313.

quality of firm reliance. Just as the ship riding at anchor is able to withstand the shifting forces of tide and current, so the soul that hopes in God stands with unshaken confidence against the obstacles from within and without that threaten its salvation. The anchor gives no indication of the urgent forward press of desire; it speaks only of the subject's trust and dependence on a force outside itself.

Father De Letter gives a well-documented exposition⁸⁹ to prove that the pre-Thomistic concept of hope was essentially the same as that of the Scriptures and of St. Thomas. Both the Greek and Latin Fathers, as well as the great Scholastic Doctors unite with St. Thomas in seeing hope as "trust in God, reliance on Him from whom we expect the reward of the future life . . . trust (which) makes the soul stand up, gives it courage and firmness."⁹⁰ They all agree that the essence of hope is, as Peter Lombard says: "The certain expectation of future beatitude, coming from God's grace and from the merits that precede either the hope itself (which in the order of nature comes after charity), or the hoped for thing, that is, the eternal beatitude."⁹¹

II. THE CONCUPISCIBLE HOPE OF SCOTUS

The concept of concupiscible hope, as indicated by Scotus and developed by Suarez, differs from the Thomistic concept in three respects: the *habitus* from which it springs, the nature of its object, and its motive. The act of hope, according to the Scotistic-Suarezian concept, has no proper *habitus*; it is merely the most difficult and noblest act of the habit of concupiscible love. The object of the *habitus* is good as such; arduousness acts only as the mode or condition that distinguishes hope from other acts that flow from the same *habitus*. The motive of hope is the Goodness of God toward us; the Omnipotence of God moves only extrinsically to the act as a

⁸⁹ P. De Letter, S. J., "Hope and Charity in St. Thomas," *The Thomist*, XIII (1950), 206-212.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

⁹¹ *Sententiarum Liber III*, d. 26.

prerequisite condition. This is the notion of hope that, due to the influence of Suarez, has been most commonly accepted by theologians until the recent Thomistic revival.⁹²

Only the barest outline of this concept is found in Scotus who gives merely a statement of the principles that hope is desire, that its object is good, and its motive the Goodness of God toward us. He makes no attempt to reconcile these principles with the traditional concept of hope. Perhaps the explanation of Scotus' stand can be found in the nature of the theories he was refuting.

At the time that Duns Scotus wrote his Commentary on the Sentences in which he treats of hope, theologians were involved in a controversy as to whether or not hope is a theological virtue distinct both from faith and charity. This difficulty arose from the consideration of the act of hope, which, according to accepted tradition, was "*expectare*," to expect. And because expectation seems to include the certitude of the intellect and the desire of the will, the conclusion was reached that hope is a composite act resulting from the habits of faith and charity. The object of Scotus, then, was to refute the opinion of Ockham that hope is nothing more than, while believing, to desire beatitude. This he does in the first part of the tract and then proceeds to develop the concept of hope as he sees it. Three characteristic notes may be observed in his approach to the subject.

First of all, in spite of the fact that at the head of the tract is inscribed the definition of Peter Lombard that hope is the virtue "by which spiritual and eternal goods are hoped for, that is, expected with confidence,"⁹³ Scotus always uses the verb *desiderare*, to desire, instead of *expectare*, to expect, to designate the act of hope. He evidently does this to avoid the erroneous connotations attached to *expectation*. Lycheti, his commentator, however, claims that it was the common opinion

⁹² De Letter, *op. cit.*, p. 348.

⁹³ Joannes Duns Scotus, *In Liber III Sententiarum*, Opera, Tomus VII, P. I. II (Lyons, 1639), d. 26.

of the Doctors, except for a few Thomists⁹⁴ that the act of hope is "to desire."⁹⁵

Secondly, Scotus' concept of hope is derived not so much from the consideration of the role that hope plays in the achievement of man's last end, as from the observation of the various psychological factors that enter into its act. For example, when he establishes hope as a virtue, he does so by referring to the testimony of human experience as to the existence of such an act,⁹⁶ and then proving that the circumstances of this act, of which all men are conscious, are the circumstances due a virtuous act. Suarez, too, arrives at the nature of hope more by the experimental observation of psychological facts than by consideration of the role it plays in man's orientation to his last end, as, for instance, when he proves that "to expect" is nothing more than "to desire," "if we attend to the common way of conceiving things."⁹⁷

Thirdly, the nature of hope is arrived at by the negative process of determining what it is not and from these principles determining what it is. This is seen most clearly in the passage in which Scotus distinguishes hope from charity. All three distinctions are made by asserting that charity is thus and so, and since hope lacks these special characteristics, hope is not charity. The deduction thus made gives very little positive information as to what really constitutes hope.

Although Scotus himself does not explicitly use this line of reasoning, both Harent⁹⁸ and Suarez⁹⁹ in explaining Scotus'

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 636.

⁹⁵ Later, however, Suarez, in refuting the objection that to conceive hope as desire is against the common opinion (III, n. 12, "Nam videtur hoc esse contra communem modum concipiendi de spe"), does so, not by denying that hope is commonly held to be expectation, but by claiming that "to expect" is the same thing as "to desire."

⁹⁶ Scotus, III, d. 26, n. 10: "experimur in nobis hunc actum, scilicet desiderare bonum infinitum inesse nobis bonum."

⁹⁷ Franciscus Suarez, *De Triplici Virtute Theologica*, Opera Omnia, Tomus XI (Venice, 1742), Sect. III, n. 12.

⁹⁸ Harent, *DTC*, col. 640.

⁹⁹ Suarez, *op. cit.*, n. 14; also n. 21: "Ex quo tandem concluditur esse spem: quia virtus haec Theologalis est cum proxime versetur circa bonum, et increatum,

position, justify the first of these factors, the identification of hope with desire, by a process based on the second and third factors. They argue in this manner: We experience in ourselves the desire to possess the infinite goodness that is God, the author of grace, as He is revealed to us by faith. This is not an act of the intellect and therefore, cannot be an act of faith. This act tends toward God that He might be good to us and therefore cannot be charity, which tends to God as He is Good in Himself. This desire, however, because it has God as its object, must proceed from a theological virtue. If it is not the act of hope, then there must be a fourth theological virtue, which conclusion would be opposed to revelation, for the Apostle explicitly speaks of "these three."¹⁰⁰ Therefore, the desire of God as our highest good is hope.

Having thus established the existence of the act of desire of God, and having identified it with hope, Scotus proceeds to examine its circumstances. Its object is good; therefore it is an act of the will. The fact that the object is an absent good, and therefore imperfectly possessed, merely qualifies the love as desire. Because the good that is desired is a supernatural good, God Himself, the act must proceed from a theological virtue. But these circumstances are not sufficient to distinguish hope from charity because they are common to both virtues. Charity, too, is an act of the will tending toward the Infinite Good, which in this life is imperfectly possessed and therefore the object of desire.

The Specific Difference between Hope and Charity

In seeking the ultimate principle of distinction between hope and charity, Scotus rejects the opinion of Henry of Ghent, who based the difference in the distinction between the concupiscible and irascible powers of the will and claimed that charity rose in the concupiscible part, the "*potentia*," and hope in the

et non est fides, neque charitas; ergo spes; nam secundum veram Theologiam, non sunt nisi tres virtutes Theologicae."

¹⁰⁰ I Cor. 13: 13.

irascible part, the "*vis*." Scotus does this, not because he rejects absolutely such a distinction in the will, for he uses this very distinction in specifying the moral virtues, but because hope, thus considered as the force, *vis*, emanating from the power, charity, would thereby be superior to charity, which is contrary to revelation. "And the greatest of these is charity."¹⁰¹ Under this aspect, hope would be endowed with all that charity has and possess in addition something that charity does not have. Scotus, therefore, preferred to distinguish hope from charity by the two kinds of love operative in them. He feels that the difference between these loves is so great as to justify the infusion of two distinct virtues. These two loves, the love of friendship and the love of concupiscence, although materially the same and directed toward the same object, Infinite Good, are distinct moral species, because of their "*finis cui*," the one to whom the good is referred. The love of friendship loves the good for its own sake; the love of concupiscence loves the good as it is good for the subject.

Scotus defends this referring of the good to self as a virtuous and commendable act because the act of willing terminates immediately and primarily in the Infinite Good and only secondarily desires that good for itself. Not all referring of the will's object to another object is the love of use, which would be repugnant with respect to God, the Highest Good.¹⁰² God cannot be referred to self as to a proper and principal end, for the end is always of greater importance than the means ordained to it. But God can be loved and desired as our good in the same way that "matter desires its form, not to make itself the ultimate end of form, but to become enriched by the form, a completed principle of being and operation."¹⁰³ Thus, when God came down from heaven to redeem us, the proximate end of His coming was the good of mankind, but ultimately, both the Incarnation and man enriched by its

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² Scotus, III, d. 26, n. 14.

¹⁰³ P. Lumbreras, O.P., "Hope the Self-Seeker," *Cross and Crown* (June 1951), p. 180.

benefits are referred to God.¹⁰⁴ Thus, there is no subordination of God to self in the act of concupiscible love. God is loved above all else as the Highest Good, but loved in order that His Goodness may be in us. As Scotus puts it, "the will sees the object as an abundant good from which flows the lesser good which contributes to its own perfection."¹⁰⁵ The aspect of the object is thus changed from an objective good, one that is lovable in itself, to an advantageous one, which is lovable for another. This change, however, takes place in the disposition of the subject and effects no real change in the formal object. It does, however, put concupiscible love outside the limits of charity, for to desire the Infinite Good as my good is not an act of friendship.¹⁰⁶ Charity, as the supreme habitual love,¹⁰⁷ cannot be the imperfect love of concupiscence.

Scotus places these two loves in the will according to its twofold tendency, the "affection of justice" (*affectio justitiae*), whose object is the objective good, and the "affection of advantage" (*affectio commodi*), whose object is the useful good. These terms he borrows from St. Anselm.¹⁰⁸ In the rational appetite, the *affectio commodi* is the natural tendency of the will to seek its own perfection; the *affectio justitiae* is a free act of choice that follows cognition. The superiority of the latter lies in its love for the inner values of other goods as known in the light of reason, independent of, or even contrary to, the good of the ego, while the former of necessity seeks the good of the ego. On the supernatural level, the *affectio commodi* is perfected by hope, by which it seeks its proper supernatural

¹⁰⁴ I Cor. 3: 22-23: "Omnia enim vestra sunt, vos autem Christi, Christus autem Dei." Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *La Synthèse Thomiste*, p. 519.

¹⁰⁵ Scotus, III, d. 26, n. 14.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, d. 27, n. 17: "Desiderare bonum infinitum esse bonum meum, non est amor amicitiae."

¹⁰⁷ Scotus, II, dist. 6, q. 2: "supremus amor habitualis."

¹⁰⁸ St. Anselm, *De Casu Diaboli*, Cap. 4 and *De Concordia*, Cap. 9. "It (Charity) arises from supreme affection of justice and honesty, the other (concupiscible love) from the affection of benefit to self; i. e., the one from excellence of reason and free will; the other, more from the inclination of nature." Quoted also by Suarez, III, n. 5.

perfection. The *affectio justitiae*, on the other hand, is perfected by charity which loves the object in proportion to its intrinsic supernatural value.¹⁰⁹ Hope and charity, therefore, are distinct, not only by reason of their acts, which are love and desire, but also by reason of the twofold affection of the will which they perfect.¹¹⁰ Thus Scotus presents hope as the habit of supernatural concupiscible love, the primary act of which is to desire.

To the objection that hope cannot be desire, because the evident sadness of a despairing man shows that he still desires beatitude, even though he has ceased to hope for it, Scotus replies that one who has despaired wills beatitude only conditionally, that is, if it were possible. His sadness rises from the conviction that it has ceased to be possible to him, and therefore, he does not will it absolutely, nor does he hope for it. Therefore, while it is true that to hope is to desire, to desire conditionally is not the same as to hope.¹¹¹

And when it is objected that the two kinds of love are not really distinct since all love of friendship includes love of concupiscence, because a friend wills good to his friend, and the love he has for the good things he wishes for his friend is a love of concupiscence, he answers that such desires are merely reflex acts of the habit of charity and do not, therefore, spring from the habit of concupiscible love.¹¹² And this, he adds, is the perfect way of desiring beatitude, not for one's own sake, but for the love of God.¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ Santa Barbara Mission, *The Virtues According to the Franciscan School*, (Santa Barbara, 1947), p. 32.

¹¹⁰ Scotus, III, d. 27, n. 18: "Ita erunt distinctae virtutes non tantum ex actibus, qui sunt amare et desiderare, sed etiam ex susceptivis, quae sunt voluntas, secundum illam duplicem affectionem affecta."

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, n. 20.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, n. 21: "Principium enim actus recti est principium omnium actuum reflexorum tendentium in finem ultimum sub eadem ratione."

¹¹³ From this principle Suarez concludes that one can, by the virtue of charity, *hope* for the neighbor's salvation, if the act proceed from the love of friendship. The act of hope, therefore, can be elicited either by the virtue of hope or by the virtue of charity, depending on the kind of love that motivates it: "efficaciter proximo bonum supernaturale ut bonum ejus, ad gloriam Dei, et sperare illud ex

Moreover, the fact that the will has two acts of desire, the one elicited by hope and the other by charity, does not make either virtue unnecessary or incompatible with the other, for the will is perfectly capable of loving what pertains to the end at the same time that it enjoys the end itself.¹¹⁴

From all that has been said, it is evident that for Scotus the specifying quality of the object of hope is its goodness. The fact that the good is arduous,¹¹⁵ or absent,¹¹⁶ or good for the subject,¹¹⁷ does not affect the formality of the object. But since good as such is the object of the act of desire elicited both by hope and by charity, the real distinction between these virtues must be sought in the mode by which they tend to their common object. Charity seeks the good for its own sake according to the "affection of justice"; hope seeks the good as the source of the subject's good according to the "affection of advantage." Scotus thus places the Goodness of God toward us¹¹⁸ as the motive of hope, since the fact that God is good to us provides the ultimate reason for hoping, that is, for desiring that that very Goodness may be in us.

eodem motive; sed illud desiderium, sine dubio, est charitatis; ergo et haec spes charitas erit." (Suarez, IV, n. 16.)

¹¹⁴ Scotus, III, d. 27, n. 21: "forte est necessarium . . . amentem ordinate illud, quod est ad finem, utendo simul frui fine." Perhaps in this principle can be found the solution to the apparent incompatibility between hope and perfect contrition. Since perfect contrition must be motivated by perfect love, it would seem at first glance to exclude any self-seeking and consequently become impossible to make concomitantly an act of hope with an act of perfect contrition. This is one of the difficulties consequent upon the identification of hope with concupiscible love. According to the traditional concept, hope is essentially reliance on God's Power, and the desire of beatitude which precedes it can be motivated by the pure love of charity. There is, therefore, no opposition between expectant hope and perfect contrition. In fact, the closer we are united to God by charity, the more we confide in His help, for we always hope for more from our friends. (Garrigou-Lagrange, *De Virtutibus Theologicis*, p. 317.)

¹¹⁵ Scotus, d. 27, n. 18.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, d. 26, n. 12.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, n. 13.

¹¹⁸ Modern theologians use the term "relative Goodness of God" as the motive of hope, to distinguish it from the motive of charity which they designate the "absolute Goodness of God."

The Scotistic Concept of Charity

The effects of such a distinction will be even more profound in the realm of charity than in hope. Scotus distinguishes a three-fold aspect of the object of charity: God as the desirable good of the lover invites to love; God as beatifying good of the lover completes the act of love without specifying it; and God Himself, considered under no relative aspect, in Whom the act of charity terminates.¹¹⁹ Desire and joy, therefore, are conditions that will always accompany the act of charity but, according to the Scotistic formula, they do not enter into its formal constitution. Such is not the case with St. Thomas who holds that charity loves God for what He is, the last end, Who alone deserves to be loved for His own sake, and the only source of happiness.¹²⁰ In this respect, St. Thomas makes the classic distinction between the end of charity and the nature of charity in the loving subject. Although God's goodness to us cannot be the end of charity, it is a necessary condition to charity, since if God were not our good, there would be no relation between His goodness and our faculty of loving, and the love of God would be impossible to us.¹²¹ Thus His goodness is a twofold cause of our love; first, as being the reason for love; and secondly, as being a way to acquire love.¹²² Therefore, by charity we desire the favors He bestows, the rewards He promises, because by them we are disposed to advance in His love.¹²³ For Scotus, moreover, the act of the love of friendship will be a distinct act from that of the love of concupiscence, and any desire for union compatible with it is altruistic to the point of excluding from the object of desire the enrichment following on the acquisition of our supreme good. St. Thomas, on the other hand, holds that the love of friendship, by one and the same act, loves the friend and desires His company. Well-

¹¹⁹ Scotus, III, d. 27, q. un., n. 7.

¹²⁰ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 60, a. 5, ad 4; II-II, q. 23, a. 5.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, I, q. 60, a. 5, ad 2.

¹²² *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, a. 3.

wishing alone does not constitute charity; return of love is essential, and hence the wish for it cannot be excluded.¹²⁴ Surrender to the friend is only one aspect of love; such an act implies and virtually includes the possession of the beloved.¹²⁵

This difference of concept, in charity as in hope, seems to derive from a difference of viewpoint in St. Thomas and Scotus. As Father De Letter points out: ¹²⁶ "Psychologically they (love of desire and love of benevolence) may appear isolated, but in reality (that is, ontologically), union with God is both supreme surrender and supreme enrichment." While Scotus regards the act of charity as a psychological phenomenon by which the mind is able to concentrate on one of the aspects to the exclusion of the other, St. Thomas sees the attainment of the Last End by charity as a metaphysical reality necessarily implying a double relation of the love of friendship to the object and to the subject.¹²⁷ In this sense charity is prompted by the divine goodness, lovable for itself and as it establishes a friendly communication of divine life and eternal beatitude, and the desire of sharing in this beatitude is subordinate, but essential, to the act of charity,¹²⁸ both in order that charity may preserve its character of friendship and because unless a man loves his own perfection, he does not rightly love God.¹²⁹ Whence charity is formally the love of benevolence and of friendship, but concomitantly and consequently occasions a certain love of concupiscence, by which we wish God for ourselves, referring the whole to God as a friend.¹³⁰ St. Thomas refers to this concupiscible element in charity again when he speaks of the twofold joy which arises in charity: i. e., joy in the divine good considered in itself, and joy in the divine good as participated by us. He says that the former proceeds chiefly

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, a. 2.

¹²⁵ Cf. Father De Letter's treatment of "Charity According to St. Thomas," *op. cit.*

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 231 ff.

¹²⁷ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 27, a. 3.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 26, a. 3, ad 3; also II-II, q. 28, ad 4.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 25, a. 4, ad 3 and a. 7.

¹³⁰ Garrigou-Lagrange, *op. cit.*, p. 386 ff.

from charity, while the latter proceeds from hope, as well as from charity.¹⁸¹

Scotus' teaching, therefore, differs from that of St. Thomas as radically in charity as it does in hope.

III. LATER DEVELOPMENT OF THE TWO CONCEPTS IN THE WORKS OF JOHN OF ST. THOMAS AND SUAREZ

Having established the fundamental positions of St. Thomas and Scotus with regard to the virtue of hope, we can arrive at a better understanding of the two concepts by an examination of the works of two later theologians, John of St. Thomas and Francisco Suarez, who developed the respective principles of St. Thomas and Scotus in their treatment of hope. The juxtaposition is valid in spite of the fact that both claim to be interpreting St. Thomas, because the Suarezian concept of hope emerges as a full development of the concupiscible love outlined by Scotus,¹⁸² while John of St. Thomas finds in the text of St. Thomas only the expectant hope described by the Master of the Sentences. The comparison is interesting, moreover, in showing how the same text is used to support two such discordant ideas.

The interpretation of three controversial texts serve to illustrate the main points of difference between the Scotistic-Suarezian concept and the traditional concept as defended by John of St. Thomas. The fundamental difference is found in their stand on the relation of hope to concupiscible love, which St. Thomas indicates by saying, "Hope pertains to imperfect love."¹⁸³ The other texts are cited in support of the two quite different ideas as to what constitutes hope formally. These sentences—"Hope makes us tend to God as to a good to be obtained finally, and as to a helper strong to assist,"¹⁸⁴ and "Now the good which a man hopes to obtain has the aspect of

¹⁸¹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 28, a. 1, ad 3.

¹⁸² Suarez cites Scotus when determining the object of hope but contends that such is also the mind of St. Thomas. III, n. 4).

¹⁸³ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 17, a. 8.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, a. 6, ad 3.

a final cause, while the help by which one hopes to obtain that good, has the character of an efficient cause,"¹³⁵—establish the object of hope for Suarez as good simply, for John of St. Thomas as an arduous good.

Suarez' problem, in order to make the principles of St. Thomas and Scotus compatible, was how to account for the arduousness of the object and the motivating power of Divine Omnipotence, which in concupiscible hope were no longer intrinsic elements of the virtue. He does so by distinguishing between the act and the virtue of hope. Arduousness and the Omnipotence of God then become necessary conditions of the act but do not enter into the formal constitution of the virtue.

The Object of Hope according to Suarez

Since Suarez accepts Scotus' thesis that hope is concupiscible love,¹³⁶ he must show that the object of hope is good as such, and not an "arduous but possible" good. He therefore explains that arduousness, "which for some constitutes the formality of the object of hope"¹³⁷ can result either from the absence of the object or from the excellence it has because it exceeds all the powers of man. But in both these cases it produces desire and is merely a condition of the good toward which both hope and charity tend, and not the specifying quality of the object of hope. Arduousness cannot mean a special difficulty in obtaining the good, for difficulty cannot constitute the reason for the will's tending toward the good. The will rather flees from a difficult good than seeks it, and if such a difficulty exists, it is the goodness of the object that moves the appetite to conquer the difficulty, and not the difficulty itself. The arduousness of the object of infused hope, therefore, is merely a certain excellence, the eminence of the Infinite Good, which makes the Object more desirable, and, as such, adds nothing to the object that would require another habit than that of desire or concupiscible love.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, a. 4.

¹³⁶ Suarez, III, n. 4.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, n. 2.

The fact that the object is possible produces in the soul, it is true, a certain confidence and expectation. But to expect and to confide are, in the will, merely modes of desire that follow a judgment of possibility in the intellect.¹³⁸ Hope, therefore, requires a preamble of "hope-ability," which faith supplies in the judgment that the necessary help of God will be forthcoming; but hope is properly the tendency of the will toward the good and its Author. Suarez claims¹³⁹ that Cajetan supports this opinion that generically hope is desire from his words, "to hope is nothing more than to desire the arduous good possible to one's self."¹⁴⁰

Thus conceived, neither the arduousness nor the possibility of the object is sufficient to make the formal object of hope differ from that of desire. Suarez, therefore, concludes that both desire and hope are rooted in love, and that it pertains to the same virtue both to love the good and to hope for it if it is absent. By the same virtue, whether it be the love of friendship or the love of concupiscence, the will regards the end simply, its intention, and the choice of means.¹⁴¹ Therefore, the same virtue that loves, also desires and hopes.

If it be objected that someone can desire the good and not hope to obtain it, Suarez answers that although hope and desire spring from the same habit, i. e., concupiscible love, the

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*: "Confidere ergo in aliquo, erit velle ab illo habere aliquod bonum, quod iudico illum mihi daturum vel absolute, vel sub aliqua conditione, et haec eadem voluntas comparata ad bonum ipsum erit expectatio ejus." Harent sees even greater difficulties in excluding desire from the habit of hope (col. 636). If, as St. Bonaventure says, hope makes us expect the thing and confide in the person, this expectation and confidence must be acts of the will. How explain these acts without referring them either to love for the person who makes the good possible, or joy at the prospect of obtaining the desired thing? How can the will, whose object is good or evil, he asks, attain an object without either loving or hating it? Therefore, apart from joy or love, confidence becomes an intellectual, not an affective act.

¹³⁹ Suarez, III, n. 10.

¹⁴⁰ Tommaso De Vio, *Commentaria in Summam Theologicam*, II-II, q. 18, a. 1: "dicit sperare nihil aliud esse, quam velle bonum arduum possibile sibi, et in illa arduitate includitur absentia."

¹⁴¹ Suarez, III, n. 13.

act of hope is distinct from the act of desire. Desire has a much broader extension than hope, for it applies to all appetite of absent good, whether it be arduous or easy, procured by one's own power or another's, by the mode of perfect or imperfect willing. But hope is the perfect act of the efficacious will tending to a difficult good and often to the good that depends on the help of another,¹⁴² and thereby involves a relation to that other in the manner that the intention of the end involves the willing of the means. Moreover, desire requires as a prerequisite only a judgment of the objective goodness of the object, while the perfect motion of hope requires, in addition, a conviction of the possibility of obtaining the good and of the willingness and fidelity of Him from Whom the necessary assistance is to come. Therefore, while all hope is desire, not all desire is hope.

John of St. Thomas summarizes Suarez' opinion as follows:

Hope does not have an adequate habit itself, but the habit by which the act of hope is elicited is common to other acts, such as love of concupiscence, desire, delight, etc., which acts coincide in one formal motive by which this habit is specified. This formal motive is the divine goodness lovable by the love of concupiscence and for the benefit of the lover. The most difficult and special act of this habit is the act of hope, because it regards this good under the aspect of arduous and difficult, from which act the habit takes its name, although it extends itself to other acts. Therefore, the divine goodness, as it terminates the love of friendship, can be the formal motive of hope, because even by charity one can hope for something from God for oneself, or for another, if it hopes from the love of friendship; if, however, from the love of concupiscence, it will be an act of hope, not charity.¹⁴³

Although the object of the act of hope must be an arduous good, the object of the virtue of hope is merely good.¹⁴⁴ For

¹⁴² Suarez, III, n. 12: "unde saepe tendit in bonum, quod non tam ab sperante, quam ab alio pendet."

¹⁴³ Disp. IV, A. 1, n. 4.

¹⁴⁴ Suarez, III, n. 15: "Bonum arduum posse dici objectum actus spei, non vero totius virtutis spei."

arduousness is not the reason for the will tending to its object, but merely an occasion or condition that arouses the will to a perfect act, from which the whole virtue takes its name. Because it changes neither the power itself nor the virtue, arduousness does not necessarily enter into all the acts of the virtue, which, nevertheless, belong to the virtue of hope, providing they tend to the object under the aspect of good sought for the benefit and perfection of the lover.

God as our highest good, therefore, is an adequate object of the virtue of hope and needs no further specification. Certain conditions of the good—that it be absent or acquired with difficulty—account for the diversity of acts proceeding from the virtue on account of the diverse modes of attaining the object. The *habitus*, however, remains the same, and, as a more general principle, tends to the object merely as good.¹⁴⁵

Thus Suarez explains the manner by which we tend to God “as a good to be obtained finally.” This goodness is regarded by hope not merely as good, but as good to be obtained—this distinguishes hope from charity. Moreover, it is to be obtained finally, as the highest good and last end of man, and is therefore, not merely the material object, but the formal and specifying object of hope, for the intrinsic end must coincide with the formal object.¹⁴⁶

The Motive of Hope according to Suarez

Having established God as our good as the formal object of hope, Suarez shows in what sense God as our helper is attained by hope as an efficient cause. He says that although some see in Article 6—“by hope, we trust to the Divine assistance for obtaining happiness”—the reason for considering the Omnipotence of God as the formal motive of hope, he feels that St. Thomas clearly excludes the help of God from the formal

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, n. 20.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, n. 3: “idem scribit in articulo 5, quibus locis palam excludit Dei auxilium a ratione formali spei, bonum autem in tali ratione includit, cum . . . finis intrinsecus sub ratione formali, cum objecto sub ratione etiam formali coincidat.”

motive in Article 5—" (hope) attains the supreme rule of human actions (God) . . . both as the first efficient cause, inasmuch as it relies on His assistance, and as ultimate final cause, inasmuch as it expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof." When St. Thomas here qualifies hope as a virtue, he points out two ways by which it tends to God, as good and as help. Suarez thinks that since hope is an act of the will, its motive would have to be good under some aspect and therefore, the object itself, God's Goodness, is an adequate motive of the act. Divine help is merely the means by which man attains the Good, and as such does not pertain to the motive.

We do not hope in God, he says, in the same manner in which we believe in Him. For in faith the whole "reason" of the virtue, its object and its certitude, depends on the testimony of God and from this rises the whole species of faith. But in hope, the fact that the good is obtained by the power of God does not give the whole "reason" why it is lovable and hopable, that is, its motive.¹⁴⁷ Divine help, then, is a necessary condition of infused hope that makes us see the good as possible and thereby desire it efficaciously. Moreover, Suarez points out¹⁴⁸ that although St. Thomas¹⁴⁹ makes faith and hope equal as attaining God as the principle of beatitude and truth, he is thereby merely contrasting the imperfection of faith and hope because of their mode (i. e., ordained to us) to the perfect mode of charity, and does not confuse the virtues by giving them the same formal object. Hope, like faith, therefore, tends to God as the principle of these goods, not as its formal object, but as the cause and as one of the desired goods. The fact that infused hope tends to the supernatural Good that is procured, not only by its own powers, but also by God's help, gives the Omnipotence of God the character of an efficient cause, it is true. But in this way, Divine Omnipotence can be said to be

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, n. 17: "Tamen in spe, quod bonum aliquod fit a Deo, vel per Deum, non inde accipit totam rationem boni, et amabilis, vel sperabilis, sed solum illud adjungitur, ut conditio necessaria."

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, n. 18.

¹⁴⁹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 17, a. 6.

the efficient cause also of faith, and even of charity, insofar as these virtues tend to God as supernatural good which is effected or given by God.¹⁵⁰ The Power of God, therefore, as the efficient cause remains extrinsic to the motive and does not specify the object of hope, which remains God as a final cause and as a good to be desired.

Suarez concludes his treatment of the object of hope and its distinction from charity¹⁵¹ by affirming that if the traditional concept of expectant hope, motivated by the Omnipotence of God, be accepted as a theological virtue, it will be necessary to invent a fourth one to provide for acts of supernatural love of concupiscence. He is willing to admit, however, that, although we know from Sacred Scripture and Tradition that hope and charity are really distinct, we do not know with certitude in what this distinction actually consists.¹⁵² In retrospect, the interpretation of the texts of St. Thomas according to the Scotistic formula of hope presented two difficulties for Suarez: the exact relation of hope to concupiscible love and the precise connection of arduousness and the Omnipotence of God with the formal object.

The Refutation of Suarez by John of St. Thomas

John of St. Thomas, in defending the traditional Thomistic concept of expectant hope, examines these same problems and directly refutes Suarez' theories. He states unequivocally that Suarez is wrong when he admits of one common *habitus* for the acts of hope, love and desire.¹⁵³ In thus interpreting St.

¹⁵⁰ Suarez, III, n. 17: "Pertinet etiam hoc speciali ratione ad spem infusam, quia tendit in objectum, ut supernaturale bonum est, in quo includitur, ut non solum propriis viribus, sed Dei auxilio comparetur; quomodo etiam charitatis est tendere in supernaturale bonum, atquo adeo ut a Deo principaliter efficiendum, vel dandum."

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, Section III.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, n. 22: "quantum vero ad distinctionem realem non est tanta certitudo."

¹⁵³ Disp. IV, A. 1: "Utraque sententia patris Suarez, et patris Vasquez est contra D. Thomam et contra veritatem . . . quod ponit unum habitum non solum pro actu spei, sed etiam pro aliis actibus desiderii et amoris."

Thomas' statement that hope "pertains" to concupiscible love, Suarez has not taken into account other references he made to the subject, as when he teaches that hope presupposes love and desire and rises from it.¹⁵⁴ These acts, moreover, cannot flow from the same *habitus*, because although joy and desire do not have an object that requires a *habitus* distinct from love,"¹⁵⁵ the object of hope, insofar as it is an arduous and possible good, is specifically distinct from the aspect of absolute good, and hope is therefore not only a special act, but a special virtue.¹⁵⁶ As far as St. Thomas is concerned, only the specific *ratio* of hope constitutes the virtue, and not the *ratio* which is common both to arduous and non-arduous good.¹⁵⁷

This can be proved by an analysis of despair, the sin directly opposed to hope and which, therefore, dissolves its formal motive. Although the despairing man has ceased to hope for salvation, he has not ceased to desire it, because a man can neither hope for, nor despair of that which he does not desire. If hope, then, were merely an act of desire, despair would not destroy the *habitus*, but only impede one of its acts.¹⁵⁸ But it is commonly agreed by theologians that despair destroys hope radically just as infidelity destroys faith. If, therefore, despair destroys the virtue of hope while the soul continues to desire, the formal motive of hope cannot be something common to acts of hope and desire. The virtue of hope, then, requires its own special *habitus* which can be lost by despair without affecting the formal reason of desire. Moreover, according to such a theory, Suarez himself would have to admit that the *habitus* of hope remains in the souls of the blessed, at least as far as the act of joy and concupiscible love, although not with regard to the act of hope itself. St. Thomas, however, clearly says that neither hope nor faith are in the blessed since an arduous

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*: "ideo omittenda sunt plura loca D. Thomae, in quibus docet spem praesupponere amorem, seu desiderium et ex illo oriri."

¹⁵⁵ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 28, a. 4.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, ad 2.

¹⁵⁷ John of St. Thomas, Disp. IV, A. 1: (*De Spe*, A. 1, ad 6).

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, n. 9.

possible good that is present "is incompatible with the virtue of hope"¹⁵⁹ and not only with the act of hope.

And how does John of St. Thomas account for this concupiscible love, which he says is not hope, and which Suarez says must be a fourth theological virtue if it isn't hope? John of St. Thomas finds the motivation for perfect hope in charity, the love of friendship, by which the soul wishes good to God and good to self as something of God.¹⁶⁰ The soul in sanctifying grace desires to possess God as a friend and relies on His assistance in the special way one looks to a friend when in difficulty, and thus charity forms and perfects the movement of hope. This can be inferred from the words of St. Thomas, "Not every kind of hope proceeds from charity, but only the movement of living hope."¹⁶¹ Garrigou-Lagrange¹⁶² describes the influence of charity on hope by pointing out that living hope springs from an efficacious love of God above all things. The love of the soul in mortal sin, however, though it esteems God as the Highest Good and desires Him as such, remains inefficacious as long as it is opposed by a disordered love of self.

The Nature of the Love at the Root of Hope

What is this inefficacious love that precedes charity? By what principles does the soul desire the Infinite Good in unformed hope? John of St. Thomas says that the substance of hope, when unformed, is elicited by the habit of pious affection which is not a fourth theological virtue, but inchoate faith.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 18, a. 2.

¹⁶⁰ John of St. Thomas, *De Caritate*, D. 14, a. 1, n. 6: "Charity cannot elicit love of imperfect concupiscence, i. e., which wishes good for itself staying in itself (*sistendo in se*); it can, however, elicit perfect concupiscence, that is, not staying in itself, but related to friendship; so it desires God, enjoying Him as present, because this is proper to friendship. The enjoyment of charity can desire God for itself, insofar as the soul secondarily loves itself, but refers this totality ultimately to God as a friend."

¹⁶¹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 17, a. 8, ad 2.

¹⁶² *La Synthèse Thomiste*, p. 520.

¹⁶³ Disp. IV, A. 1, n. 21: "Et quod hoc principium sit habitus piae affectionis, qui non est quarta virtus Theologica sed inchoatio fidei." Cf. XIV *De Veritate*, A. 7, ad 10.

For although faith is an act of the intellect, it requires in the will a certain love and desire of supernatural goods which cannot proceed therefrom without a proportionate principle. This principle must precede both hope and charity, for faith can exist without them. From this appetite for "*boni repromissi*," the promised good, is elicited the desire both for the truth that is believed and for the good that is hoped for. This habit of pious affection is a concupiscible love, supernatural because it is directed to God, but imperfect because not formed by charity, and by it man both wills God imperfectly before he believes Him, and wills the promised good imperfectly before he hopes for it.¹⁶⁴

This same principle suffices for both acts because the love of concupiscence has no special difficulty, since one naturally loves oneself and wishes good to himself. And although the supernatural character of the good requires a higher principle by which to desire it, the imperfection of the habit allows it to be reduced to some other virtue, in this case, faith. This habit of pious affection pertains reductively to faith, as the foundation and the imperfect beginning is reduced to the perfect thing.¹⁶⁵ And from this same principle proceeds the imperfect love of concupiscence for God, which precedes the love of friendship.¹⁶⁶

Having thus eliminated the necessity of choosing between the identification of hope with concupiscible love and the invention of a fourth theological virtue, John of St. Thomas very pointedly remarks that when St. Thomas said that hope pertains to concupiscible love, he did not say that concupiscible love pertains to hope, as if that love were elicited by hope, but that hope pertains to imperfect love as having its foundation in love and presupposing it.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*: "et sicut prius vult Deum imperfecte quam credat Deo, sic prius vult imperfecte bona repromissa quam speret illa, et ab eodem principio elicitur appetitus concupiscendi id quod creditur, et quod speretur."

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, n. 22: "ad eamque reductive pertinet, sicut inchoatio et initium imperfectum reducitur ad rem perfectam."

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*: "Quare ab eodem principio sufficienter elicitur amor concupiscentiae imperfectus erga Deum, quo antecedit amicitiam charitatis." (A relation is suggested here to the famous "*diligere incipiunt*" of the Tridentine decree, *DB 798*.)

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, n. 29: "Quando autem dicit St. Thomas in ista quaestione 17, *spem*

John of St. Thomas then, having established hope as a habit distinct from love and desire, reaffirms the true character of the arduousness of its object and the reason why the Omnipotence of God as the efficient cause is also the motive that specifies hope. Arduousness is the specifying aspect of the object of hope, not because of the excellence of such an eminent good, nor because of the difficulty itself, but because, not being easily obtained, the object has a special aspect of goodness in its ability to overcome the obstacles that threaten it.¹⁶⁸ Whatever it is then, that constitutes the object as good under this special aspect of arduous and possible, will be the motive of hope. And this is the office of the Divine Omnipotence. However, it is not the fact that God is the agent who effects the hoped-for good in us that supplies the formal specification of hope. The assistance of God, specifies hope, not in the order of execution, but in the order of intention. Although it is true, as Suarez claims, that God is the Principle which effects this good in us; nevertheless, it is not in this sense that His efficient causality is considered the formal motive. The power of God is also the efficient cause of the hoped-for object by bestowing on it that certain denomination of mode which changes it from the good considered absolutely (i. e., attractive) to the good considered as triumphing over obstacles, and then—supposing this triumph—attractive.¹⁶⁹ And in this sense, the efficient cause cannot be extrinsic to hope. Since it is a means not only of attaining the object, but also of constituting it as good under the specific aspect peculiar to hope, Divine Omnipotence cannot pertain to hope accidentally as indicating the mode. Divine Assistance,

pertinere ad amorem concupiscentiae, notanda sunt verba; non enim dicit amorem concupiscentiae pertinere ad spem quasi ab ea elicited, sed dicit e contra, spem pertinere ad amorem concupiscentiae quasi in eo fundatam, et illum praesupponentem.”

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, n. 30: “Ista specialis ratio non consistit in sola excellentia, et magnitudine boni, neque in ipsa difficultate, ut tenet se ex parte laborum, et difficultatum, sed in ipsa ratione boni, ut est repulsivum, et vincense opposita impedimenta, ut explicatum est.”

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, n. 18: “intra lineam ipsius rationis boni constituit specialem rationem bonitatis, id est, non bonitatem absolute ut est attrahens et alliciens, sed ut est vincens, et supposita victoria, etiam alliciens, et sic est obiectum spei.”

therefore, pertains intrinsically to the specification of the good which is the object of hope.¹⁷⁰

So, although John of St. Thomas and Suarez both claim to interpret St. Thomas, they, nevertheless, conceive hope quite differently. For John of St. Thomas, hope is reliance on God's assistance to attain the final end; it is specified by the arduousness of its object and motivated by the omnipotence of God. This confidence and expectation necessarily presuppose a desire for the hoped-for good. Suarez, on the other hand, sees hope as the desire to possess God as our highest Good, specified by the goodness of its object and motivated by the consideration of God as the source of beatitude. Various acts flow from this one habit of desire i. e., concupiscible love, insofar as the good is absolutely lovable; hope, insofar as it is absent and acquired with difficulty; and joy, insofar as it is attained.

Thus the writings of John of St. Thomas and of Suarez give us a fuller development of the concepts of expectant and concupiscible hope, the foundations of which were laid by St. Thomas and Scotus.

IV. CONCLUSION

The two concepts of hope which have been compared, both in their source and in their later developments, are patently irreconcilable. There cannot be two formal objects for one *habitus*. The aspect of the object of hope that specifies the virtue cannot be both its goodness and its arduousness. And although St. Thomas often speaks of hope tending to God as to a good, the aspect by which Scotus specifies the object of hope, there are many instances where he clearly states that hope is constituted a virtue by the arduousness of its object. He says, for example: "The theological virtues have the same object under different aspects: God as the First Truth is the object of faith; as the Supreme Good, the object of charity; as the Highest Arduous Good, as the object of hope."¹⁷¹ "Whoso-

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, n. 30: "Sicut est omnipotentia divina auxilians, tale medium non accidentaliter, sed intrinsece se habet ad specificationem boni, ut specificati."

¹⁷¹ *III Sent.*, d. 26, a. 3, sol. 1, ad 1.

ever has hope, hopes to attain God and through Him all things that are necessary, insofar as they are difficult";¹⁷² "Hope proceeds from love even as joy does, but hope adds on the part of the object, a special character, viz., difficult and possible to obtain; for which reason it is accounted a special virtue."¹⁷³ So, although the object of hope must be a good in order to attract the will, it is not necessarily presented to the will under the aspect of absolute goodness. An arduous good has a special kind of goodness because of the difficulties encountered in acquiring it and it is this aspect that distinguishes the object of hope from that of charity.

This distinction is clearly seen in St. Thomas' discussion of the passions of hope and love, and although the distinction between irascible and concupiscible acts is not as clear-cut with regard to the will as it is in the sensitive appetite, nevertheless, there is an analogy in the diversity of acts produced by the will¹⁷⁴ that would not justify attributing the acts of desire and hope to the same *habitus* in the will.¹⁷⁵ One must conclude, therefore, that the Suarezian interpretation is not in accord with the mind of St. Thomas.

It is more difficult to determine the exact role St. Thomas gives to the goodness of the object and the desire it evokes in the concept of hope. John of St. Thomas notes¹⁷⁶ that something other than the form may pertain to the essence and to the constitution of the species, but it need not pertain to it as the formal reason, except insofar as it is the material toward which

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2.

¹⁷³ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 28, a. 4, ad 2.

¹⁷⁴ *III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1: "ideo dicendum, quod subjectum spei, prout dicitur virtus theologica, non est vis irascibilis, sed voluntas, inquantum actum spei dici potest: nisi forte ipsam voluntatem, inquantum habet actus similes actibus irascibilis dicamus irascibilem; sed tunc irascibilis et concupiscibilis non erunt diversae potentiae, sed nominabunt eandem potentiam, scilicet voluntatem, secundum diversos actus."

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, ad 3: "spes in voluntate dicitur ad similitudinem spei quae est in irascibili, ut prius dictum est. Sed spes quae est passio irascibilis, differt a cognitione quae est fidei, et amore qui est caritatis. Ergo spes quae est in voluntate, differt a fide et caritate."

¹⁷⁶ *Disp. IV*, q. 17, a. 1.

the power is drawn by means of the formal reason. In accord with this, St. Thomas seems to make goodness an essential condition of the object of hope on the part of the thing hoped for, that is, the material object, without making it, however, the specifying aspect of the object, since goodness is a quality common to the objects of both charity and hope. The character of arduousness which specifies the object, however, does not complete the reason why one hopes, and therefore the Omnipotence of God, which makes the arduous object possible, provides the ultimate resolution of hope. The only adequate response to the query: Why do you hope for beatitude? is not because it is good, or even because it is arduous, but because God can and wishes to give it, just as the only adequate response to: Why do you believe there are three persons in God? is because God who is Truth has revealed it. Thus the ultimate resolution of hope, as of faith, is in its formal object *quo*, or motive¹⁷⁷ which, however, constitutes the specific aspect of the object *quod*.

Since goodness is an essential quality of the object, desire, which goodness evokes on the part of the subject, is at least a necessary prerequisite to hope. St. Thomas says that when charity is absent from the soul, hope proceeds from desire,¹⁷⁸ but he adds that this imperfect love, which as desire, is the first movement of the appetite toward virtue, does not of itself suffice to produce acts of virtue.¹⁷⁹ Desire, therefore, is rather an inchoate love¹⁸⁰ which grows into hope but which is not hope, because it lacks the essential notes of confidence and expectation.

So, although St. Thomas' treatment of hope in the *Summa* is not so definite in this respect as that in his Commentary on

¹⁷⁷ Garrigou-Lagrange, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

¹⁷⁸ *III Sent.*, d. 26, q. 2, a. 3, sol. 2, ad 2: "Spes informis non est ex amore, sed ex desiderio."

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, ad 3: "ibi accipitur amor large pro amore imperfecto, quod est desiderium, quod est primus motus appetitivae virtutis; desiderium autem non sufficit ad formandum actus virtutum."

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, ad 2: "et ideo desiderium est quaedam inchoatio amoris, et quasi quidam amor imperfectus."

the *Sentences*, the combined evidence is clear enough that St. Thomas does not identify hope with desire and does not regard the goodness of its object as its ultimate specification.

The difference between the position of St. Thomas and Scotus, then, is one of emphasis. Scotus sees hope as a conditioned desire, while St. Thomas sees desire as a condition of hope. In other words, the problem is whether the aspect of arduousness and the consequent dependence of God's help introduce a difference into the definition of hope that involves a difference of species, or is this condition so nonessential as to be extrinsic to the virtue? Scripture and Tradition, as well as the accepted formula of the act of hope in use among the faithful—"O my God, relying on Thy almighty power and infinite goodness, and promises, I hope to obtain the pardon of my sins and life everlasting"—seem more in accord with the Thomistic formula. Moreover, if to hope is merely to desire everlasting life, the most grievous sin against hope would be committed by those who are so strongly attached to worldly goods that they would like to live forever in this world. But the sins against hope, presumption and despair, are manifestly not against the desire of heaven, but against the confidence due to God, and since the habit of hope is destroyed radically by these sins, the essence of hope must be confidence, and not desire.

Furthermore, both Scotus and Suarez very obviously rest their case for the identification of hope with desire on the necessity of accounting for supernatural acts of love of concupiscence. St. Thomas, on the other hand, who attributes this love of concupiscence either to charity as its secondary act by which we love ourselves in God, or in the absence of charity, to a certain inchoate love (which John of St. Thomas further reduces to inchoate faith), is free to draw the logical conclusions to the metaphysical principles he so consistently applies in his schema of the virtues.

So although the proximate cause of the two concepts of hope is a difference in their respective stands on the nature of love, the antithesis has its roots in an even more fundamental

concept, for St. Thomas and Scotus take divergent views on the will itself and on its tendencies. St. Thomas teaches that just as the intellect necessarily adheres to self-evident first principles of reasoning, so too the will necessarily cleaves to its last end which is happiness.¹⁸¹ Duns Scotus categorically rejects this parity between the intellect and the will because for him "natural necessity is incompatible with freedom."¹⁸² The will is never necessitated to will the good, or happiness, or any end proposed by the intellect, for the same reason that it is never compelled to choose any means to an end. The will can always compel the intellect to turn to the contemplation of some other object than the one that lies before it.¹⁸³ The root principle underlying this teaching is that the will has but one act, an elicited act, by which it both chooses the means and wills the end. The natural will, which Scotus identifies with the *affectio commodi*, is merely the inclination of the will as a power to receive its proper perfection, which is happiness or beatitude. This natural desire is not an operation, nor a movement of any kind, but only a relation of the will to its perfection, which might be described as a "passive tendency."

In other words, Scotus gives us a psychology of the will rather than a metaphysics. His method is that of introspection.¹⁸⁴ Because we do not experience within ourselves this natural appetite, he comes to the conclusion that it cannot be an elicited act, but only an inclination (in the sense of a relation) in the will toward its perfection, in the same way that there is a natural inclination in a stone towards its perfection.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸¹ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 82, a. 1.

¹⁸² *I Sent.*, d. 1, q. 4, n. 1.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, n. 3.

¹⁸⁴ William R. O'Connor, *The Eternal Quest* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1947), p. 46.

¹⁸⁵ "Praeterea, non experimur talem actum esse in nobis, cum tamen inconveniens est nobilissimos habitus naturaliter esse in nobis, et latere nos; quod etiam verum est de operationibus . . . ergo sequitur quod appetitus naturalis non sit nisi inclinatio quaedam ad perfectionem suam; nec est magis actus elicitus in voluntate quam in lapide. Quid ergo? Dico quod est inclinatio ad propriam perfectionem suam, scilicet voluntatis, sicut in aliis non habentibus appetitum liberum; et de illo appetitu loquitur Philosophus *I Physicorum* quod materia appetit formam, et

Beginning with this concept of the will, Scotus logically concludes to man's ability to love something independently of its relation to himself. This determines for him the nature of charity and leads him to identify hope with concupiscible love, which is entirely excluded from charity thus conceived. St. Thomas, on the other hand, since for him the will cannot move except toward an object that appears as its good, sees a natural relation between charity and man's attaining of his last end. Charity, therefore, is not disinterested in the same sense for St. Thomas as it is for Scotus, and hope is not essentially interested love, but a reliance on God's help to attain both the end and the means to that end for which man was made.

This thought is beautifully expressed in the compendium of hope which St. Thomas was writing for his beloved Frater Reginald when overtaken by death. He finds in the Lord's Prayer all that relates to the hope of Christians—the person in whom we ought to place our hope, and why, and what we should expect from Him. We must hope in God because we belong to Him as an effect belongs to its cause. Thus, Our Savior, knowing how necessary hope is for our salvation, thought it well to carry us on to a living hope by giving us a form of prayer that mightily raises up our hope to God, our Father in heaven. We sufficiently express our conviction that the divine will is ready to help us when we proclaim that God is our Father, but to exclude all doubt as to the perfection of His power, we add "Who art in heaven"—not as though He were contained by heaven, but we hail the power of God which sustains and transcends the heavens and enables us to hope.¹⁸⁶

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universaliter imperfectum suam perfectionem." (*In IV Sent.*, d. 49, q. 10, n. 2-3.)
Cited by O'Connor, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

¹⁸⁶ *Compendium of Theology*, p. 315 ff.

SEPARATE ENTITY AS THE SUBJECT OF ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS



IN *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics*¹ Fr. Joseph Owens, C.S.S.R., presents an original and highly challenging interpretation of that work. Opposing the view that First Philosophy bears upon the Being proportionately common to all things, he maintains that the true subject of the science is immobile or separate Entity. The view that common Being is the subject of Metaphysics, he holds, must ultimately attribute to Aristotle an "ontological" notion of the science. But, he states,

The "ontological" conception of the science . . . is nowhere to be found in the *Metaphysics*. A science treating universally of Beings which is not identified with the science of a definite type of Being, the primary type, is foreign to the Stagirite's procedure. The object of such a science would be the concept "Being." Aristotle is well aware of the presence of such a concept. He expressly teaches that it is not Entity. Entity—Being *qua* Being—, however, is what the Primary Philosophy treats. The concept "Being," therefore, cannot be its object.²

In addition to its negative content, this passage contains, in summary form, the principal elements of Fr. Owens' thesis. Its ultimate basis is found in the reference to Entity (separate Entity is actually meant) as the primary type of being. For he contends that Being is a *pros en* equivocal which has, as its primary instance, not Entity in general but separate Entity. In different words, this substance and all other things are held to fall under a certain unity solely by virtue of an analogy of attribution. From this he concludes that the nature of separate

¹ Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1951.

² P. 299. Henceforth reference to Fr. Owens' work will be by page alone.

Entity alone is signified by the word "Being," that it alone possesses the nature of Being.

The belief that separate Entity alone contains the nature of Being leads him to equate it with "Being *qua* Being." Verbally, this is perhaps the most decisive argument in support of the assertion that this Entity is the subject of the Primary Philosophy. For Aristotle consistently speaks of the doctrine as the science of Being *qua* Being.

The author's position on the *pros en* equivocal character of Being also permits him to account for the universality of First Philosophy. For the science of separate Entity will treat of all those things which are called Being by reference to this Entity. It will, indeed, treat of them *qua* Being. For this reason, too, the science can be called the study of "Being *qua* Being."

However, Fr. Owens holds that those things which are Being by reference to separate Entity do not truly fall within the subject of Wisdom. As secondary instances of Being they cannot. Rather, to study them *qua* Being is actually to study separate Entity. For when "Being" is predicated of them, it is really the nature of the immobile substance which is thereby signified. Separate Entity is thus the "universal Being" dealt with in First Philosophy. The ground of this view is again the assumption that this Entity alone has the nature of Being.

A detailed presentation of this position is found in Fr. Owens' commentary on a famous passage in Book Epsilon. There Aristotle explicitly relates the science of the immobile Entity to the universal consideration of Being *qua* Being. He writes:

For one might be in *aporia* about (Oxford—"might raise the question") whether the Primary Philosophy is universal or concerned with a particular genus and one particular nature (for not even the mathematical sciences are all alike in this respect—geometry and astrology are concerned with a particular nature, while universal mathematics is common to all). If, then, there is no other Entity above those constituted by Nature, natural science will be primary science; but if there is an immobile Entity, the science of this must be prior and must be primary philosophy, and uni-

versal in this way, because primary; and it will belong to this to consider Being *qua* Being,—both what it is and what pertains to it *qua* Being.³

Fr. Owens' commentary is as follows:

Being *qua* Being, accordingly, is now seen as the nature which constitutes separate Entity. In studying this definite nature, one studies the Being found in everything else. The "Being" expressed in regard to anything else seems the Being of the separate Entities. The science of the separate Entities, therefore, treats universally of all Beings insofar as they are *Beings*. Just as the "health" studied in all the instances of "healthy" is the health in the bodily organism, so the *Being* studied in anything whatsoever is the Being of the separate and divine Entities.

. . . The question is, how can this definite nature be universal in regard to all things? The reason given is its priority. This needs no further explanation when considered in sequence to the doctrine in Book Gamma regarding a science that deals with *pros en* equivocals. Aristotle does not give any further elucidation. He proceeds as though none were required. The simple reference to the "primary" nature of separate Entity is sufficient, in the context, to show the "hearers" that the science of separate Entity will deal universally with every instance of Being insofar as it is Being.

. . . The Being of separate Entity and the manner in which that Entity exercises its primary role, are not investigated. All that has been done is to "solve" the *aporia*. The "conception" binding the intellect was that a science of a definite nature could hardly treat other natures universally. A reference back to the character of a science that deals with *pros en* equivocals suffices to untie the "knot"; this character has already been explained in detail by the preceding treatment. The intellect is now free to study separate Entity with the full assurance that in studying this Entity it is learning the first causes of all things, the causes of Being *qua* Being. It is dealing universally with all Beings.⁴

The rigor and originality of Fr. Owens' thesis are amply revealed in this commentary. Its validity, however, is another matter. This can alone be ascertained by an analysis of its principal themes in the light of Aristotle's own text. Our im-

³ *Metaphysics*, Epsilon 1, 1026a23-32. Fr. Owens' trans.

⁴ P. 176.

mediate interest is in the positive arguments which the author presents in support of his interpretation. Later, we will take up his rejection of common Being as the subject of Wisdom.

A. THE *pros en* EQUIVOCAL "BEING."

In Book Gamma, Aristotle treats of the various ways in which "Being" is said of things. He writes:

"Being" is expressed in many ways, but *pros en*, that is, in reference to one definite nature. It is not purely equivocal but as, for instance, "healthy." Everything which is healthy is referred to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of health, another because it is susceptible of it. . . . In this way "Being," too, is expressed in many ways, but always in reference to one primary instance. For some things are called "Beings" because they are Entities, others because they are ways towards Entity or corruptions or privations or qualities or productive or generative principles of Entity or of the things expressed by reference to Entity, or the negations of any one of these or of Entity itself; for which reason we say that even not-Being is not-Being.

His purpose in determining these truths is then stated by Aristotle:

As, then, there is one science which deals with all healthy things, the same applies in the other cases also. For not only in the case of things which have one common notion does the investigation belong to one science, but also in the case of things which are related to one common nature; for even these in a sense have one common notion. It is clear then that it is the work of one science to study the things that are, *qua* being.

Following this, he adds an important qualification:

But everywhere science deals principally with the primary instance, on which the other instances depend and by virtue of which they are expressed. If this, then, is Entity, it will be of Entities that the philosopher must grasp the principles and causes.⁵

⁵ Gamma 2, 1003a33-b10, Fr. Owens' trans.; b10-16, Oxford; b16-19, Fr. Owens' trans.

Now it is Fr. Owens' belief that the above treatment of the various significations of "Being" is radically deficient. He adopts this view even though the analysis was ordered to the precise determination of the things considered in the science of Being *qua* Being. For, he holds, the truly primary instance of Being is separate Entity. It is actually by reference to this Entity that all other things, including material substances, are called Being. Such, he maintains, is clearly implied in subsequent passages in Book Gamma. Among them is one that deals with the relationship between Wisdom and the first principles of Being.

But since there is one kind of thinker who is above even the natural philosopher (for nature is only one particular genus of Being), the consideration of these principles also will pertain to him whose inquiry is universal and deals with the primary Entity. Physics is also a kind of Wisdom, but it is not primary.⁶

Commenting on this, Fr. Owens states:

Evidently Entity is being regarded as a *pros en* equivocal. As Entity extends to all Beings, so the primary Entity extends to all Entities.⁷

This judgment provides the foundation of the author's interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics. Its true significance is revealed in what Fr. Owens sees as the characteristic of all *pros en* equivocals. He calls attention to this characteristic in his commentary on Aristotle's treatment of "Being" in Gamma 2:

The point emphasized is that the true nature concerned in this type of equivocal is located as such *only* in the primary instance. The nature or form designated by the word is found in the first instance alone.⁸

The position taken here is the decisive factor in the development of the author's thesis. As the primary instance of Entity,

⁶ Gamma 3, 1005a33-b2, Fr. Owens' trans.

⁷ P. 164.

⁸ P. 152.

separate Entity will be the primary instance of Being. Thus its nature alone will be signified by "Being"; it alone will have the nature of Being. From this assumed principle are derived the arguments which immediately bear on the subject of Wisdom. There will be occasion later to deal with the principle in itself, but first the stated consequences.

B. BEING *qua* BEING AND SEPARATE ENTITY.

Following the assertion that the nature or form signified by any *pros en* equivocal is found in the primary instance alone, Fr. Owens states:

Health as such is found only in the disposition of the bodily organism. Medical art is found only in the habit of the physician's mind.⁹

Of relevance here is the use of the phrase "health as such" to designate the primary instance of "healthy." This manner of speaking has an important role to play. The primary instance of "Being" is dealt with in similar fashion. Noting that the examples of "healthy" and "medical" were "brought forward by the Stagirite precisely in order to introduce the explanation of Being," the author states:

In the light afforded by the illustrations, Aristotle's teaching on the *pros en* nature of Being should be probed. According to these examples, the nature of Being as such—and this is Being *qua* Being—is to be found only in Entity.¹⁰

This is the desired conclusion. A more complete formulation of the argument is also offered:

As such, Entity is declared to be the primary instance of Being. Through reference to Entity all other things are Being. So the inference that Entity alone contains in itself the nature of Being seems fully legitimate. The examples used to illustrate the doctrine stress the presence of the "nature" in the primary instance *alone*. The nature involved is found *only* in the first instance. Being in its

⁹ P. 152.

¹⁰ P. 153.

own nature, Being according as it is Being, Being *qua* Being, should be found only in Entity. "Being *qua* Being" should be synonymous with Entity—"Beingness."¹¹

The true goal of this reasoning is the identification of "Being *qua* Being" with separate Entity. This presents no problem. On the assumption that this Entity is the truly primary instance of Being, it follows that it "alone contains in itself the nature of Being." Whence the statement in the author's commentary on Epsilon 1: "Being *qua* Being . . . is now seen as the nature which constitutes separate Entity."

The importance of the argument is beyond dispute. As Fr. Owens reads him, Aristotle simply equates "Being *qua* Being" and separate Entity. And this would appear to justify the author's principal contention: when Aristotle states that there is a science of "Being *qua* Being," he is to be understood as saying that there is a science of separate Entity.

There is, however, one striking flaw in this last sequence. It has an equivocal middle term. The meaning Fr. Owens assigns "Being *qua* Being" is not Aristotle's. As used by the author, the phrase means "the nature of the primary instance of Being." But for Aristotle it means "Being with respect to the formality—that of Being itself—under which the intellect views it and under which certain principles, causes and attributes pertain to it." This is readily established. Many texts are available for the purpose, but one from Book Kappa will suffice. There Aristotle compares First Philosophy to the other sciences precisely in relation to the different formalities under which various things are considered. One of these is mathematics, which, he notes, deals with the attributes of the quantitative and continuous in a manner peculiar to it, namely "*qua* quantitative and continuous." And, he states,

the same is true with regard to being. For the attributes of this insofar as it is being, and the contrarieties in it *qua* being, it is the business of no other science than philosophy to investigate; for to

¹¹ P. 153.

physics one would assign the study of things not *qua* being, but rather *qua* sharing in movement; while dialectic and sophistic deal with the attributes of things that are, but not of things *qua* being, and not with being itself insofar as it is being; therefore it remains that it is the philosopher who studies the things we have named, insofar as they are being.¹²

The opposition between Fr. Owens and Aristotle on this point is clear. In Fr. Owens' lexicon, "Being *qua* Being" signifies simply the nature of separate Entity. Aristotle, on the other hand, distinguishes two elements in the phrase. One "Being," signifies the nature to which certain principles and attributes relate; the other, "*qua* Being," signifies the aspect under which these principles and attributes pertain to the nature. Thus the argument so carefully fashioned by the author comes to naught. He cannot attribute to Aristotle the identification of "Being *qua* Being" with separate Entity—thereby to equate the science of "Being *qua* Being" with the science of separate Entity—without doing violence to the very letter of the *Metaphysics*.

There is, to be sure, one text which does appear to justify the author's position in this regard. In Book Kappa, he asserts, there is an "explicit" identification of "Being *qua* Being" with Entity: "'Being *qua* Being' coincides with Entity as opposed to accident."¹³ The passage from Kappa reads:

So in the same way every Being is expressed. For it is by being an affection or habit or disposition or motion or whatever such else of "Being *qua* Being" that each of these is said to be.¹⁴

Considered materially, these words of Aristotle do lend support to Fr. Owens' interpretation. Apparently, "Being *qua* Being" here simply designates Entity as the primary instance of Being. However, the actual structure of Aristotle's thought

¹² K 3, 1061a35-b11, Oxford. It is interesting to note that Etienne Gilson holds that St. Thomas equates "being *qua* being" and God: "The science of being *qua* being passes into the science of the first causes, which itself passes into the science of the first cause, because God is, at one and the same time, both the first cause and being *qua* being." *Being And Some Philosophers*, p. 157.

¹³ P. 153.

¹⁴ K 3, 1061a7-10, Owens' trans.

is not difficult to make out. First, it is clear that by "Being" in "Being *qua* Being" he here means Entity; this restriction of the term within the context is proper since Entity is the primary Being. Nor is it unclear why he says that it is as inhering in this primary Being, considered under the formality of Being, that accidents are called Being. For the aspect under which we view their subject determines the way in which we speak of accidents. For example, the affections and habits of that Entity which is Man, considered precisely as Man, would be spoken of as human. Were this subject viewed under a different light, our way of speaking would vary accordingly. This is the reason for Aristotle's statement that the accidents of Being, *qua* Being, are said *to be*.

C. BEING AND SEPARATE ENTITY.

We will now consider the second use to which Fr. Owens puts the judgment that the nature signified by "Being" is found only in separate Entity. Its function stands out best when viewed in relation to a problem that arises from the text of the *Metaphysics*.

Aristotle's purpose in determining the various significations of "Being" was to establish the scope of the science of Being. Noting that one science dealt with all "healthy" things, he stated that the same applied to the study of Being. First Philosophy will thus consider not only Entity but also those things in whose notion there is a reference to Entity. In view of this, Fr. Owens must propose a similar doctrine relative to those things—the sensible Entities—which are said to have Being by reference to the immobile substances. He did so in his commentary on Epsilon 1:

The science of the separate Entities, therefore, treats universally of all Beings insofar as they are *Beings* . . . the science of the separate Entities will deal universally with every instance of Being insofar as it is Being . . . in studying this Entity, it (the intellect) is learning the first causes of all things, the causes of "Being *qua* Being."

As his words indicate, it is in this way that the author accounts for the universality of Wisdom. However, the extension of the science to things other than separate Entity poses a serious problem. In the light of this, what are we to make of his contention that Wisdom is concerned with separate Entity in an altogether exclusive manner? He does, of course, propose a way out of this difficulty, but consideration of that will be deferred until the problem has been more deeply probed.

One notable aspect of the above words of Fr. Owens is that a new meaning is assigned the all-important phrase "Being *qua* Being." It is now taken to signify sensible things under the formality of Being. Certainly such is his meaning when he speaks of the science of separate Entity as dealing "universally with every instance of Being insofar as it is Being" and with "the causes of Being *qua* Being." We must ask why he chose to use the phrase in this second sense, and then regards it as the only proper sense. What relation can this have to the text of the *Metaphysics* if, as he holds, when Aristotle speaks of the science of "Being *qua* Being," he means the science of the nature which constitutes separate Entity?

The answer is found in another notable aspect of these same words. They serve as a fairly accurate summary of Aristotle's first formal statement on the subject of First Philosophy. In Gamma 1 he writes:

There is a science which considers "Being *qua* Being," and what belong to it *per se*. Now this is not the same as any of what are called the particular sciences; for none of these treats universally of "Being *qua* Being." They cut off a part of Being and consider what happens to pertain to this part, as, for instance, the mathematical sciences do. Now since we are seeking the first principles and the highest causes, clearly there must be some nature to which these belong in virtue of that nature itself. If then those who sought the elements of Beings were seeking these same principles, it is necessary that the elements must be the elements of Being not *per accidens* but *qua* Being. Therefore it is of Being *qua* Being that we also must grasp the first causes.¹⁵

¹⁵ Gamma 1, 1003a21-32, Owens' trans.

We now see why, in his commentary on Epsilon 1, Fr. Owens said that the science of separate Entity treats universally of all Beings and seeks their causes *qua* Being. The text of Aristotle demands precisely this language. His understanding of "Being *qua* Being" is too evident to be ignored. It is also evident that he sees it as the task of Wisdom to learn the causes of Being insofar as it is Being.

But more important is the theme of Gamma 1. In the mind of Aristotle, that whose principles, causes and attributes we seek is precisely that of which we have science. This is "Being *qua* Being" in the one proper sense, or, as Fr. Owens at times interprets the phrase, sensible Entity under the aspect of Being. And yet, he maintains that this Entity does not truly fall within the subject of First Philosophy. The rigorous thesis that he has imposed upon the *Metaphysics* demands this negative judgment.

Fr. Owens offers two solutions to the above difficulty. The first rests on something already familiar to us. This is his unique understanding of the phrase "Being *qua* Being." Initially, his commentary on Gamma 1 reveals a proper grasp of its meaning. He notes, for example,

What pertains to "Being *qua* Being," in accordance with the *Posterior Analytics*, should

- a) belong to it *per se*,
- b) belong immediately to the Being found in anything whatsoever,
- c) pertain to any chance instance of Being,
- d) belong *universally* to all Beings,
- e) belong *necessarily* to all Beings.

The science of Being described in the *qua* and *per se* terms, the science which treats Being universally, should therefore possess the other characteristics given in this list.¹⁶

However, other passages in this same commentary turn upon a different interpretation of the phrase. These have to do with the relationship between Aristotle's statement on the causes

¹⁶ P. 148.

sought by Wisdom and the difficulties posed in Book Beta concerning the unity of the science. Fr. Owens writes:

The four causes had to be understood in a unity sufficient to bring them under a single science. Here they are shown to belong to one nature, "Being *qua* Being." How that unity provides the basis for a single science, remains to be examined.¹⁷

And again:

... the intellect has seen that the four causes must belong to one nature, and should therefore be all treated by the science which deals with that nature. That nature is "Being *qua* Being." The intellect can proceed to study "Being *qua* Being" in full confidence that it is thereby studying the four causes.¹⁸

The reference to "Being *qua* Being" as the one nature studied in the science reveals the meaning now assigned these words. As in the commentary on Epsilon 1, they are here taken to signify separate Entity. This presumably enables him to maintain the position that the science which seeks the causes of "Being *qua* Being" is really concerned with but one nature, that of the immobile substances. But again, the sequence is vitiated by the ambiguity in "Being *qua* Being." The difficulty posed by Gamma 1 remains. That whose causes we seek in the Primary Philosophy is, for Aristotle, that of which we have science—namely, Being under the formality of Being. Whatever the subject's ultimate scope, it certainly includes natural substance considered precisely as Being. The stated universality of the science assures this. What then of the author's thesis?

One path remains open to him. He must somehow reduce the Being of natural things to that of separate Entity. Only in this way can he justify the restriction of the science of Being to its primary type.

The necessary reduction is effected by the assertion that when "Being" is predicated of sensible things, separate Entity is signified by the word. This Entity is thus the one nature

¹⁷ P. 149.

¹⁸ P. 150.

studied in all things. The conclusion follows: First Philosophy is, simply speaking, the science of separate Entity.

Behind the present argument, of course, lies the assertion that a *pros en* equivocal term only designates the nature of the primary instance. The principle is first applied to "Being" as said of Entity and accident.

The accidents will not possess the nature of Being *in themselves*. The nature according to which they are Being will not be their own natures. It will be the *Entity* of which they are the affections. This should mean that when we say "The man is pale," the man alone really *is*. It is he who *is*—pale. The paleness itself, considered just in its own nature apart from the Entity of which it is the affection, could not be said to *be*. If we say, with any meaning, "Paleness is," we are really saying "The man *is*—pale." The Being as such is that of the man. But "paleness" is by its very nature an affection of man; and so it *is*, but only through and in the Being of the man. The nature of the man alone *is* in itself. When "paleness" is said to *be*, the nature of the man—the Entity—is denoted by the word.¹⁹

Much of this, if understood properly, is entirely acceptable. The questionable doctrine is that found in the last proposition: "When 'paleness' is said to *be*, the nature of the man—the Entity—is denoted by the verb." Here he clearly proposes that "Being" as predicated of an accident actually signifies Entity. In other words, "Being" predicated of accident has the same meaning as "Being" predicated of substance. Its corollary is apparently found in the ambiguous statement that in the case of paleness "The Being as such is that of the man"—the Entity.

The same doctrine will of necessity be applied to "Being" as predicated of natural and immobile substance. As the sole possessor of the "nature of Being as such" and the truly primary instance of "Being," separate Entity must always be that which is signified by the term. In his commentary on Epsilon 1, the author drew this very inference:

¹⁹ P. 153.

The "Being" expressed in regard to anything else seems the Being of the separate Entities.

The relevance of this to the science of Being was then noted: Just as the "health" studied in all the instances of "healthy" is the health in the bodily organism, so the *Being* studied in anything whatsoever is the Being of the separate and divine Entities.

Both these positions are further developed in the final chapter of Fr. Owens' work. Noting that the separate Entities are the final cause of natural generation, he adds,

Being is derived to all other Entity and all other Beings according to the degree in which the actual permanence of the separate Entities is shared or imitated. All sensible things strive to attain as best they can that actual permanence. They are *Being* according to the degree in which they attain that perpetuity. . . . The sensible thing, in striving after the permanence of separate Entity, imitates and expresses the permanence, the Being of the separate Entities themselves . . . When sensible things are called by their own names, their proper nature is expressed. When they are called Being, it is not their own nature, but the nature of the separate Entities which is primarily designated, just as the health in the body is expressed when a medicine is called healthy. Separate *form* is *Being* and is *universal* to all Beings.

As in his commentary on Epsilon 1, this position is immediately related to the Being studied in the Primary Philosophy:

As a science of *pros en* equivocals, the primary Wisdom contemplates form without matter—which is the nature of the separate Entities—in itself and as it is expressed in every other instance of Being. But this nature which it studies in every case is the same—separate Entity, which is Being *qua* Being in its highest instance. Wisdom is therefore correctly designated "the science of separate Entity," without any further addition.²⁰

In its apparent form, the argument developed by Fr. Owens is coercive. If "Being" always signifies separate Entity, it certainly follows that Wisdom, the science of Being, is correctly designated "the science of separate Entity," without

²⁰ Pp. 294-5.

any further addition. If "Being" were thus limited in its signification, there would be no other *Being* to serve as the subject of the science.

However, the antecedent in this sequence can hardly be granted. To begin with, it makes of "Being" a univocal term. For it is said to be a word which, in every instance, signifies one and the same nature. This alone should be sufficient ground for its unqualified rejection—particularly for one whose interpretation of the *Metaphysics* is based on the fact that "Being" is a *pros en* equivocal.

In addition, it implies that all things are separate Entities. That Aristotle would draw such an inference is clear from a passage in Book Kappa. There he takes up the position that Being and Unity are the most unchangeable principles of things. He is quick to note the absurd consequence of this view.

If, on the other hand, we are to set up what are thought to be the most unchangeable principles, being and unity, firstly, if each of these does not indicate a "this" or substance, how will they be separable and independent? Yet we expect the eternal and primary principles to be so. But if each of them does signify a "this" or substance, all things that are are substances; for being is predicated of all things (and unity also of some); but that all things that are are substances is false.²¹

These remarks are directly applicable to Fr. Owens' position. If, as he contends, "Being" always signifies the nature of separate Entity, then all the things that are are separate Entities, since "Being" is predicated of all things. But this is clearly unacceptable to Aristotle, whose "Doctrine of Being" Fr. Owens purports to expose.

It may be, of course, that the author will not accept the argument attributed to him. This is indicated by a qualification he introduces when speaking of "Being" in relation to separate Entity. In the selection from the final chapter of his work, he said that "Being" as predicated of sensible things *primarily* signifies immobile substance. This manner of speak-

²¹ K 2, 1060a35-b5, Oxford.

ing is repeated some few pages later, where he states that "the Entity expressed in all sensible things . . . is primarily the Being of the separate Entities."²² This last formulation suggests a further qualification. It could be his contention that separate Entity finds expression in every instance of Being as any cause finds expression in its effect. Or, possibly, he means that "Being" predicated of other things involves a reference to separate Entity as the primary instance. In any case, he would be enabled to turn aside the charge that he has converted a *pros en* equivocal into a univocal term.

However, other difficulties await him. If as predicated of sensible things "Being" *primarily* signifies separate Entity, such things are *primarily* separate Entities. If, on the other hand, his true position is only that the *Being* expressed by other things is that of separate Entity, on what basis would he restrict Wisdom to this *Being*? The same difficulty arises if he is to be interpreted as holding only that "Being" predicated of sensible things involves a reference to separate Entity. This simply means that immobile substance is the primary instance of Being. It hardly implies that we do not seek the principles and attributes—and thus science—of sensible things as the secondary instances of Being. And therefore it does not justify the assertion that Wisdom is to be designated "the science of separate Entity" without qualification.

But more important is the fact that the argument attributed to him is one that he actually adopted and one that follows from his own principles. In the two previous cases where he applied his theory of *pros en* equivocal predication no qualifications were introduced. In his commentary on Gamma 2 he said that "Being" predicated of accident signified the nature of Entity. In his commentary on Epsilon 1 he said that the "'Being' expressed in regard to anything else seems the Being of the separate Entities." And in both cases the ground of the assertion lay in his notion that the nature signified by a *pros en* equivocal is found in the primary instance alone. This can only mean that the signification of the term is restricted to its

primary instance; for if its meaning extends beyond the primary instance, the nature—or natures—signified could not possibly be that of the primary instance alone. Thus if one holds that the nature signified by the word is found only in the primary instance, he must also hold that, however used, the word signifies this primary instance; otherwise it would be mere sound.

The source of the author's difficulty here is readily seen. He should have said that in all *pros en* equivocal predication the nature *primarily signified by the word* is found in the first instance alone; or, that the nature to which there is a reference in every instance of the word is found only in the first instance. This is an evident but at times a very pertinent truth. It is not, however, a characteristic of analogy of attribution (the author's *pros en* equivocal) as such, but of all reasoned ambiguity. If the nature of the primary instance were realized properly in the other instances, we would not have equivocation of any sort, but univocity. Wherever there is a deliberate extension of a word, there is a primary instance by reference to which the others are named, the meaning of the word varies and the natures signified are diverse. This is true of both analogy of attribution and analogy of proper proportionately. In the latter case all the instances are proportionately one and are grouped under a common concept, but of necessity the nature primarily signified by the word is that of the first instance alone. This does not mean that the secondary instances are not properly signified by the word; they are. On the other hand, it is not only in such analogy that the word is properly applied to the secondary instances. This is true as well in analogy of attribution; for it is not by chance that the word is thus extended.

Fr. Owens apparently does not accept this last point. In *pros en* equivocal predication, he would hold, the primary instance alone is properly signified by the word. Thus, in the case of Being, separate Entity alone is thought to be *really* Being. And therefore it alone should be the nature studied in the science of Being *qua* Being. Some of the difficulties en-

countered in the development of this position should have suggested the initial error; they undoubtedly account for the wavering in his concluding chapter. It is fair to assume, however, that he would not take this position as regards analogy of proper proportionality. Here he would no doubt grant that the secondary instances are properly signified by the common word. However, he denies that Aristotle held to such an analogy in the case of Being. We now turn to that question.

D. COMMON BEING.

Fr. Owens asserts that a "science treating universally of Beings which is not identified with the science of a definite type of Being, the primary type," must have for its subject the concept "Being." At other times we are told that such a subject would be something "abstract," in contrast to the "definite nature" of separate Entity.²² His argument may be formulated as a disjunction. Being is common to all things either as separate Entity is "*universal* to all Beings" or in the manner of a concept. And so, the universal Being studied in First Philosophy is either that of the immobile substances or that of the concept. No other mode of community is thought

²² P. 176. On this point Etienne Gilson offers Fr. Owens direct support: ". . . let us leave aside the consideration of being in general as the 'formal object' of a possible metaphysics. Although many things which have been said by Aristotle may bear such an interpretation of his thought, he himself has certainly not reduced the highest of all sciences to the abstract knowledge of a merely formal object." *Op. cit.*, p. 155. The historian of contemporary *Catholic* philosophy will no doubt have detected in other places a similar distaste for the "abstract" character of metaphysics. It is apparently felt that if an "abstract nature" be posited as the subject of a science, the doctrine will bear upon the conceptual rather than the real. To overcome this presumed problem, those of the above philosophical persuasion will insist that, in the case of Metaphysics at least, the subject must be something "definite" or concrete. Thus Fr. Owens asserts that, for Aristotle, "Being *qua* Being" is "looked upon as a definite nature." And though "separate Entity" designates a *class* of Beings, on p. 295 he says of this class, "like any form, it is *actually* individual, and not abstract." As regards Thomistic Metaphysics, fear of the "abstract" may well be the source of the position that *esse*, rather than *ens*, is the subject of that science. *Esse*, perhaps, is seen as more concrete than *ens*. Certainly it would be if the *Esse* in question were that of God, as is implied in M. Gilson's identification of God and "Being *qua* Being."

to be possible. Being as something univocally common is excluded because it could only be a genus, and Aristotle is explicit in his rejection of this.²³ The only other community in the real order is that of an analogy of proper proportionality, and, as was pointed out, Fr. Owens denies that it is applied by Aristotle to Being.

His argument against analogy *secundum esse* is found in his commentary on H 2. There Aristotle applies "Entity" in an analogous fashion to accidental composites, and Fr. Owens concedes that "Analogies of this sort run through every category of Being." But, he states,

Analogy . . . is not found among the Aristotelian ways of expressing Being. The analogies are seen among Beings already constituted in their proper nature. But Being in its own nature is not constituted by analogy. The Aristotelian Being lacks the four-term relation necessary for analogy of the latter type.²⁴

The author's first point is that for an analogy of Being *secundum esse* "Being in its own nature" must be "constituted by analogy." On the truth of this depends the relevance of the second point—that Aristotle lacks the four-term relation required by this type of analogy. More specifically, Aristotle is said to lack the notion of existence which would permit an analogy between different things based on a similar relationship of each nature to its proper act of existence.²⁵ Fr. Owens does grant that Aristotle holds to an analogy "among Beings already constituted in their proper nature." Presumably, however, this is not a real non-univocal community among Beings.

But what are we to make of the stated opposition between an analogy which *constitutes* the *nature* of Being and one that holds among Beings already constituted in their nature? Is this other than a purely verbal distinction? Does either mean more than that a given thing is called Being because it is constituted

²³ B 3, 998b21-27.

²⁴ P. 237.

²⁵ P. 396, note 14.

in a manner analogous to that in which the primary Being is constituted? Or that a thing is constituted as a Being because its constitution is analogous to that of the primary Being? Certainly in either case the analogues are given as constituted in their proper natures. If they were not, we would not see them as analogously the same. Of course, if Fr. Owens insists that the phrase "constituted by analogy" signifies real causality on the part of *analogy*, his argument will have some merit. However, an explanation of this causality would be in order. As well, he should defend the assertion that the universal or common Being studied in Wisdom is either that of separate Entity or that of the concept "Being." Clearly, though his theory of analogy might differ from that of Fr. Owens, Aristotle held to another notion of common Being.

This may be seen in a passage from Gamma 3. Aristotle's purpose is to establish that the consideration of the first principles of things pertains to the Primary Philosophy. He writes:

We must state whether it belongs to one or to different sciences to inquire into the truths which are in mathematics called axioms, and into Entity. Evidently, the inquiry into these also belongs to one science, and that the science of the philosopher; for these truths belong to everything that is, and not to some special genus apart from others. And all men use them, because they are true of being *qua* being and each genus has being. But men use them just so far as to satisfy their purposes; that is, as far as the genus to which their demonstrations refer extends. Therefore since these truths clearly belong to all things *qua* being (for this is what is common to them), to him who studies being *qua* being belongs the inquiry into these as well.²⁶

Two points are of relevance here. That upon which the first principles follow is precisely the subject of the Primary Philosophy—Being under the formality of Being. And that nature, Being, of which, as such, we seek the first principles—and causes and attributes—is *common* to all things. What is meant by "common Being" here? Is the concept "Being" the subject

²⁶ Gamma 3, 1005a19-29, Fr. Owens' trans.

of such an inquiry? Is separate Entity the "universal Being" dealt with? Is "Being" said of its secondary instances precisely in the way that "healthy" is predicated of medicine? The answer would appear to be evident. It follows that real Being, proportionately realized in all its inferiors, is that considered by the Philosopher. Only if this be the case can the principles and attributes of Being *qua* Being pertain to all things. This conclusion alone is justified by the text of Aristotle.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. By JEAN-PAUL SARTRE. Translated with an introduction by Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. Pp. 657. \$10.00.

Sartre's major philosophical work, *L'Être et le Néant*, appeared in French in 1943. Until now, the American image of Sartre has been based largely on his literary, rather than his philosophical, output. It is a matter of some importance that his major philosophical work should now be available in English. Catholic theologians and philosophers will recall the injunction of Pope Pius XII in *Humani Generis* that the works of the atheistic existentialists, among others, should be mastered by competent Catholic scholars, with a view to criticism of errors, appropriation of such truth as they may contain, and a deepening of one's own hold on truth.

This English translation opens with an analytical and reasonably detached "Translator's Introduction." Prof. Barnes, while sympathetic to Sartre, is no mere worshiper. The author's "Introduction" follows, and in it Sartre raises gradually the dominating questions of this book: What is the relation of the *For-itself* to the *In-itself*? And how are both related to being?

The body of the book is divided into four parts. The first, "The Problem of Nothingness," deals with "The Origin of Negation" and "Bad Faith." Part Two, entitled "Being For-Itself," analyzes first "Immediate Structures of the *For-Itself*," then "Temporality," and finally "Transcendence." Part Three, "Being-For-Others," takes up three problems: "The Existence of Others," "The Body" and "Concrete Relations with Others." Part Four analyzes "Having, Doing and Being." It is here that the well-known Sartrean exploration of "Freedom" is found. The "Conclusion" reverts to the questions raised in the author's "Introduction" and answers them succinctly in the light of the intervening analyses. Sartre concludes with a promise of a further volume devoted to the ethical implications of his conclusions in ontology, but this promise has not been kept in the intervening thirteen years.

Prof. Barnes has done a very competent translation. There are a few typographical errors, most of which can be corrected from the context; there are probably fewer errors in the English than in the French. In addition to her translation and her introduction, she has drawn up a "Key to Special Terminology" (pp. 629-635) in which the definitions of Sartre's key terms are drawn from Sartre, and usually from this very book. There is also an index of proper names.

It would be a duplication of effort to summarize Sartre's teaching in this review. This has been splendidly done in James Collins' *The Existentialists* (Regnery, 1952) and in Kurt Reinhardt's *The Existentialist Revolt* (Bruce, 1952), as well as in numerous studies by non-Catholics, and in the "Translator's Introduction" to this volume. But the most efficient way to get an introductory understanding of Sartre, if that is still needed, would be to read his "Introduction" and "Conclusion" to *Being and Nothingness*.

Neither do I intend to attempt a Thomistic critique of Sartre, nor the construction of Thomistic answers to his problems. Both of these tasks were magnificently achieved in Maritain's *Existence and the Existent* (Pantheon, 1948).

Instead, I shall list six lines of study which might profitably be applied to this book. The *first* method of study might well be that of the logical analysts. It will be recalled that in 1903 G. E. Moore published a famous study of Idealism, the point of which was to determine what meaning, or meanings, if any, the sentence *Esse est percipi* may have. Moore's own philosophical position was weak, to say the least; but his criticism of Idealism was so devastating that Idealism has been a dead issue in England and America for fifty years.

Sartre's key terms all need that kind of attention. His use of the words "being," "is," "distance," but above all "not," "nothing" and every form of the negative, is highly ambiguous. My suspicion is that the terms "nothing" and "distance," at least, are devoid of meaning in Sartre; or are used so equivocally as to invalidate all of his conclusions. Interestingly, Sartre has called attention to the same kind of equivocation in Heidegger's use of the phrase "outside of self." (p. 250)

The *second* type of study might well be an appraisal of his phenomenological method. This book is well sub-titled "An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology." Now leaving aside Sartre's peculiar understanding of ontology as distinct from metaphysics (p. 297), there still remains the problem of "phenomenology."

To date, Catholic thinkers both in Europe and in America have been most hospitable to this method. But it is suspicious that, half a century after Husserl first announced this method, it is still so sprawling and vague. Even after one has read the major practitioners of it—Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre—one still faces these basic questions: 1) what, exactly, is this method? 2) how precisely, does it differ from the philosophical method described in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*? 3) insofar as it may be a distinct philosophical method, what are its advantages? 4) is it separable from the absolute Idealism of its founder? 5) is it, as a method, valid or invalid?

Sartre's method is that of phenomenology. If that method is a mere

piece of pomposity, devoid of meaning or of validity, his conclusions would be, to the extent that they depend upon his method, in question.

The *third* line of inquiry might well be historical. Descartes, Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger are the men referred to most frequently; Spinoza, Kant and Freud often, but less frequently. One has the uncomfortable suspicion that Sartre's handling of these philosophers is never dispassionate, never altogether accurate. What he takes from them is not in them; and what he criticizes in them is that they are not Sartre. This misuse of sources is, of course, a common fault among philosophers and, worse still, even among some historians of philosophy. Cherniss has made out a plausible case for saying that the first book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is just such a mishandling of his (Aristotle's) predecessors. But a common fault is still a fault. And if Sartre has this fault, it becomes a matter of justice to disengage Descartes' Descartes, for example, from Sartre's Descartes.

A *fourth* line of investigation would be to look closely at Sartre's starting point which, put in traditional terms, is the duality of subject and object (roughly *For-itself* and *In-itself*) implied by consciousness. This is not an uncommon starting point for the builders of massive philosophical structures; witness Plotinus, Hegel and Husserl; and, possibly, Descartes, Kant and Spinoza. But it may well be that what begins in consciousness remains in consciousness. As the ontological proof for the existence of God winds up, not at the feet of the living God, but merely at the analysis of the content of an idea, so, I suspect, any theory of reality which begins with the author's consciousness winds up as a merely vulgar exhibition of one's own mind. Such an exhibition may be of interest to psychiatrists, but it is devoid of philosophical significance.

Distinct both from starting point and conclusions are the unexamined dogmas which Sartre lays down incidentally to reaching his conclusions; and the enumeration and examination of these would be an instructive *fifth* procedure. For despite the "presuppositionless" method of phenomenology, Sartre makes numerous assertions which are neither self-evident nor demonstrated; they are merely laid down as true. Here are a few examples, quoted at random: "There is only intuitive knowledge." (p. 172) "Quality is nothing other than the being of the *this* when it is considered apart from all external relation with the world or with other *thises*." (p. 186) "Thus original sin is my upsurge in a world where there are others; and whatever may be my further relations with others, these relations will be only variations on the original theme of my guilt." (p. 410) "'Having' 'doing' and 'being' are the cardinal categories of human reality." (p. 431)

The *sixth* line of study is the obverse of the fourth. If it is necessary to examine closely where Sartre is starting from, it is equally necessary to examine closely where he is going to. What is his theme? What is the goal

of this lengthy inquiry? What is the conclusion, the new insight, he has labored to establish?

This insight broods over Sartre's book for several hundred pages before it is ever stated. It gathers slowly, oppressively, from the very first page. It is a twofold conviction.

The first part of the conclusion is that the meaning of man is to be God. "Thus the best way to conceive of the fundamental project of human reality is to say that man is the being whose project is to be God." (p. 566) "Man fundamentally is the desire to be God." (p. 566) "Every human reality is a passion in that it projects losing itself so as to found being and by the same stroke to constitute in In-itself which escapes contingency by being its own foundation, the *Ens causa sui*, which religion calls God. Thus the passion of man is the reverse of that of Christ, for man loses himself as man that God may be born." (p. 615) "Man makes himself in order to be God." (p. 626)

It is not sufficient that I should be God viewed simply in myself. Love means that "the other" [in this case, my lover] knows me to be God. "But if the other loves me then I become the unsurpassable, which means that I must be the absolute end . . . I am the absolute value . . . [To my lover] I must no longer be seen on the ground of the world as a 'this' among other 'thises,' but the world must be revealed in terms of me . . . I must be the one whose function is to make trees and water exist, to make cities and fields and other men exist. . . ." (p. 369)

I must, then, be God. But the second part of Sartre's conclusion is that *God cannot be*. It is not that man cannot become God; that is, the fault is not on the side of man. It is rather that God cannot be at all; the fault, the impossibility of existence, is on the side of God. "Of course this *ens causa sui* [throughout the book, Sartre so defines God] is *impossible*, and the concept of it, as we have seen, contains a contradiction." (p. 622) "But the idea of God is contradictory and we lose ourselves in vain. Man is a useless passion." (p. 615)

This is Sartre's final position. He is nauseated, in despair, and anguished because he is not God; and he is not God because God cannot be.

Philosophy has nothing to say to such a position, because this is not a philosophical position. This pining to be God, this sickness at not being God, is, on the psychological side, madness. On the theological side it is satanic pride. The philosophy of Sartre is an extrapolation on man's attempt to evade the first commandment.

I do not mean that Sartre has not written a serious philosophical work; he has, and it merits the attention of competent Catholic scholars. I mean, rather, that his whole philosophy is an incidental by-product of a non-philosophical disorder.

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Fundamentals of Mariology. By JUNIPER B. CAROL, O.F.M. New York: Benziger, 1956. Pp. 223 with index. \$3.75.

The desire of an author to present an acceptable study of the theology of the Mother of God is a commendable desire indeed. When that desire is coupled with a determination that such a study should be useable as a text on the seminary level and even as an adjunct to the theological enlightenment of the layman, then the project is to be commended for its vision and daring as well as its zeal. Father Carol deserves respectful praise for just such determination.

His work, the fruit of a series of mariological lectures given at St. Bonaventure University during the Summer sessions, is presented in a textual format; and the clarity and logical order of the presentation are enviable. The book is of particular value to those who have been irritated by a too cursory consideration of Patristic witness in regard to Mary and her privileges. The Fathers have been judiciously selected and their texts have been adequately exposed to satisfy those who seek doctrinal roots of Mariology in the Fathers.

We find here unfortunately, there is much too often an attempt to present questionable opinion as dogma. The work is, by intention of the author, a text which would be used in seminaries and religious institutes. Consequently the presentation of opinion and the frequent, off-handed dismissal of all opposition seem inexcusable. In short, Fr. Carol presents his theses and fails to inform the impressionable mind that these theses represent only one school, one side of a problem.

Again, courage in conviction is always praiseworthy, but disregard for major traditions in the theological investigation of mariological doctrine seems uncalled for. As an example to point up the reviewer's complaint, Fr. Carol spends much of his book exposing opinions which have as their point of origin the thesis of the priority of the predestining decree in regard to Mary. It is a thesis which is representative almost entirely of the Franciscan school, as the author openly admits. (p. 21) Yet the attempt to defend it is but cursory; its opponents are hardly mentioned. Such gratuitous definition of primary concepts and off-handed disregard for opposing and strong traditions would seem out of place in a work of the textbook type.

One might also object to the work's completely apodictic rejection of St. Thomas' teaching in regard to the Immaculate Conception. The various questions as to whether the Angelic Doctor accepted or rejected the doctrine, as to whether there is a certain evolution in his thought and conviction, are far from obvious in their solutions. But Father Carol would leave his students with the unchallenged impression that the Doctor of the Schools should be patronizingly pitied for the shortcoming of theological

fraility. Nor is this a question of mere fraternal pique. The authority of St. Thomas, the respect owed him in the Church, and the far from obvious decision as to what he held (and when and why) would, or should, make a textbook author hesitate in his temptation to cursory dismissal.

Another defect is to be found in Father Carol's discussion of Mary's sinlessness and the "debt to sin." This discussion suffers from both brevity and understated arguments. The opinions favoring the debt are dismissed with a casual remark that they "sufficiently safeguard the truth that Mary was redeemed by the merits of Christ; although at times this is done at the expense of her unparalleled holiness." (p. 115) His own opinion is defended by some remarkable arguments. This theory "not only does not withdraw Our Lady from the salutary influence of the Redemption, but it makes her all the more indebted to it. The efficacy of Christ's redemptive grace was so overwhelming in her case that it not only preserved her from the contraction of sin, but even placed her beyond the reach of the law of sin. In the order of God's intention, Our Lady's original grace was foreseen with a logical priority to the Redemption. However, in the order of execution, God decreed that the conferring of this grace would be merited for her by the Savior's Passion and Death. Hence, it remains true . . . that Mary was truly 'redeemed by Christ.'" (p. 117) It is difficult to see, even granted "that the word redeemed as used here, is taken in a less strict sense than when applied to us," (*ibid.*) how the redemptive character of the grace of Christ could be univocally predicated of Mary's sanctification and that of the rest of the children of Adam. Fr. Carol skirts the difficulty by maintaining that "as the concept of 'redemption' loses some of its strict connotation, it also gains in sublimity and perfection, thus redounding to the greater glory of the Savior." (pp. 117-118) Be that as it may, the meriting death of Christ was essentially redemptive and sanctificative of the children of Adam. Its effects in Mary's regard are more sublime and more perfect, but the efficiency was still in the order of redemption, both in the order of divine intention and execution.

One also regrets the impression which might well be made on the minds of students by an unnecessary and, perhaps, inaccurate footnote reference: "in our humble opinion, the widespread notion that descent from Adam by way of 'ordinary generation,' of itself and necessarily, brings about original sin, is theologically inaccurate. The fact that this notion, like many other stereotyped formulas, has been handed down from generation to generation through our manuals does not make it acceptable. Fortunately in recent years a growing number of theologians have become aware that the so called 'traditional' views on this point call for a thorough revision. They rightly point out that, of itself, "ordinary generation is only an occasion with regard to the contraction of original sin; it is the moral headship of Adam which alone causes it in us. Thus, in the

hypothesis that a child were conceived through a physico-chemical process of generation, he would still have to be baptized to be cleansed from original sin, because of his inclusion in the moral headship of Adam." (p. 88)

The value of this footnote in a textbook may well be questioned. The opinion concerning moral headship expressed in it, an opinion characterized by Janssens as "an innovation introduced at the time of the reformers . . . gratuitous fiction . . . , useless, hardly intelligible and hardly consonant with the justice of God," can hardly be reconciled with the traditional teaching of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. Needless to say, the whole tenor of Trent's declarations in this regard seems to demand more than can be explained by the mere moral headship which Fr. Carol would teach his students in this footnote.

In his chapter on the knowledge of Our Lady, Father Carol sets down some preliminary notions. While this reviewer does not relish the role of the iconoclast, mention should be made of the glaring inaccuracy in the presentation of the ideas of acquired and experimental knowledge. It is a strange innovation to define experimental knowledge in this fashion: "it (acquired knowledge) is called experimental when things previously known through infused knowledge are learned through one's own experience. . . ." (pp. 159-160) Such an explanation seems surprising and disappointing to this reviewer. One can understand slips in reference citations (n. 277) but confusion in basic definitions causes hesitation in accepting the work as desirable on the textbook level.

There is, of course, a great need for a work which would present Mariology in its fundamentals for teaching purposes. Father Carol certainly deserves our praise for attempting what is certainly necessary for the continued success of the theological movement of our times. However, this reviewer cannot share the enthusiasm of those who would say that this attempt has been entirely successful.

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De Extrema Unctione. By EMMANUEL DORONZO, O.M.I. Milwaukee, Bruce. I *De Causis Intrinsecis*, 1954. Pp. 634 with indexes. II *De Causis Extrinsecis*, 1955. Pp. 881 with indexes. Set \$17.50.

Following upon his four volumes on the sacrament of Penance, Fr. Doronzo logically takes up Extreme Unction, which is called by St. Thomas, *poenitentiae consummativum*. A previous evaluation of the quality of *De Poenitentia* (THE THOMIST, vol. XVII, pp. 120-121) is valid likewise for the present work, *De Extrema Unctione*. The extensive and balanced use

of positive theology under the primacy of the speculative, the consideration of Protestant and Orthodox teachings, the valuable aids provided by the many outlines, indexes and bibliographies are characteristic of each new publication in this dogmatic series. A statement concerning the previous volumes bears reaffirmation: that the student of theology who is not acquainted with this comprehensive treatment of Extreme Unction denies himself the full breadth of view of the subject; the professor of sacramental theology will find among modern manuals no more satisfying source-book.

The first volume embraces the intrinsic causes of this sacrament. After an extensively documented introductory chapter the author takes up the institution or existence of the sacrament. The exposition of this dogmatic question, especially against the heresies, is followed by a more historico-theological treatment of the mode, which ends with a brief note on the time of institution. Fr. Doronzo denies in this sacrament also the opinion of a generic institution by Christ.

The succeeding chapter on the matter of Extreme Unction soundly establishes that oil blessed by a bishop for this sacrament pertains to validity. Only by special deputation of the Holy See may a simple priest participate in this episcopal power as extraordinary minister. Demonstrating the validity of a single anointing the author notes the gravity of the sacramental necessity to supply the other anointings when possible, as long as the same danger of death perdures.

Finally, regarding the sacramental form, Fr. Doronzo analyzes at length the various formulas and concludes that the so-called indicative formulas are de facto equivalently deprecativ, and that the short Latin formula also suffices for validity. As a consequence of Christ's specific institution of the sacraments (cf. *De Sacramentis in genere*, pp. 408-419), the author holds that the Church very probably does not have the power to determine the matter and form.

The four chapters of volume two consider the extrinsic causes,—Effects, Properties, Subject, Minister. The principal or specific effect of Extreme Unction is stated as the cure or healing of the remains of sin—proneness to evil and difficulty in good—explained in terms of the teaching of St. Thomas. Fr. Doronzo's position on the reviviscence of the sacraments (*op. cit.*, art. 11) leads him to maintain that Extreme Unction, if received *informe*, may revive during the same danger of death.

Repetition of an anointing, especially in the same illness, merits a long discussion in the chapter on Properties and is resolved in five practical norms of administration. The mode of necessity of reception of this sacrament is investigated, and the chapter ends with a delightful comparison of the three sacraments of spiritual healing—baptism, penance, extreme unction.

Regarding the subject of the priest's ministrations Fr. Doronzo, on the

basis of the state of moral opinion, holds that this sacrament can be given up to one half hour from the time of apparent death and up to two or three hours in sudden or violent death.

As previously promised (*De Poenitentia*, vol. IV, p. 600) the author has completed his consideration of absolution of the dying non-Catholic and of the unconscious in conjunction with the same cases regarding Extreme Unction. The positions adopted are summarized in two long conclusions.

Conclusion 1 (p. 697): Extreme Unction and Penance cannot be administered lawfully to a dying and conscious person who is either a formal heretic or schismatic, or a contumacious sinner, since the requisite disposition is lacking and likely also the necessary intention.

These sacraments *probably* can be given to a dying conscious person who is a non-Catholic only materially or in good faith. Controversy over the lawfulness of such sacramental administration still prevails among theologians. Fr. Doronzo attempts to establish the intrinsic probability of his opinion by showing that the required disposition and intention are easily present at least implicitly, and that the practice does not necessarily violate any pertinent ecclesiastical documents. At the same time certain safeguards and norms are insisted upon.

Conclusion 2 (p. 712): *Probably* (more or less) these sacraments can be administered to any unconscious dying unbaptized person. Such individuals, even though they may have given no previous sign of good disposition, would include formal heretics and schismatics, those who have obstinately continued in formal infidelity or impenitence, material non-Catholics or those in good faith, Catholics who have lived pagan lives without, however, having denied the faith, those who have refused the priest or the sacraments, those who have lapsed into unconsciousness in the very act of sin or while in the habitual state of sin or whose lives have been hardly Christian or who are entirely unknown.

The divergence of opinion here is, of course, much sharper. In his discussion Fr. Doronzo lays down certain clear principles: the sacraments cannot be administered to those certainly lacking the required intention and disposition; failing this certitude and lacking a positive ecclesiastical prohibition, a priest may administer the sacraments of necessity, at least conditionally; however, the *possibility* of the presence of intention and disposition does not suffice, as some *probability*, however slight, must be possessed; even so, the present state of theological opinion does not urge a clear *obligation* upon the minister in most of these cases.

Without using greater space for a detailed criticism it does appear that a very wide interpretation is given to the terms in some ecclesiastical documents. Moreover, the necessity for *probability* as a basis for lawful administration in these controverted cases does not seem to be properly

and adequately grounded. The *probable* reasons alleged are in fact rooted in the operations of divine grace *after* loss of consciousness or, in other words, in the divine mercy, as well as in the possible and variable human factors attendant upon the unconscious state. The sacraments have been instituted as sensible signs; especially in the case of Penance some *sensible* communication of interior disposition is a sacramental necessity, according to the Thomists. From the viewpoint of the *sacraments* the *probabilities* alleged in the explanation of Fr. Doronzo's position are *merely possibilities* and thus an insufficient basis for sacramental administration.

The final chapter on the Minister of Extreme Unction includes a treatment of the sources and extent of the priest's obligation to administer the sacrament of the dying.

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True Morality and its Counterfeits. By DIETRICH VON HILDEBRAND with ALICE JOURDAIN. New York: David McKay Co., 1956. Pp. 181. \$3.00.

Since the publication of this work, *Roma locuta est* concerning its principal subject matter, *situation ethics*. This apparently modern position, but really nothing more than an emotionally charged version of the ancient heresy of *Illuminism*, has received the censure of the Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office (*Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, XXXXVIII, pp. 144-145). The condemnation was presaged by the allocution of the Holy Father given in April of 1952 to the Fédération Mondiale de Jeunesses Feminiennes Catholiques. Dr. Von Hildebrand has wisely based his analysis and criticism of situation ethics upon the doctrine contained in this allocution. While not cast in the form of a commentary on the papal pronouncement, reductively *True Morality and its Counterfeits*, insofar as it treats of situation ethics, amounts to just that, a very lucid, penetrating presentation of the Pope's verdict on the "New Morality."

Eminently successful in its principal goal of criticizing circumstance ethics in such a way as to refute in detail its disastrous errors while safeguarding and, to the extent possible, profiting from the truth it exploits, the book has not attained the same degree of success in its secondary and subsidiary aims. Spawned by existentialism, circumstance ethics, like its progenitor, is a form of protest, specifically a protest against mediocre, conventional Christians, our modern Pharisees. Dr. Von Hildebrand has treated the various aspects of this revolt in several chapters by drawing caricatures of the classical moral Pharisee and the mitigated derivatives of Pharisaism, the diverse types of self-righteous people. An air of unreality

hovers about the delineation of these characters and the attempt to analyze their psychology of moral conduct, for the characters have been too overdrawn; so much so that they are definitely unreal, the author's own mental fictions. It seems that the author in this case has been carried away from diligent and careful observation of real persons by his own rhetorical creations. As a result, the fundamental reason for treating these moral types: to discover the element of sin that makes them reprehensible and a foil to portray the humility of the publican, the humble sinner, lacks the emphasis that a brief and concise statement would have made possible. Real threats to moral integrity should be treated realistically without rhetorical device or substitute.

Again, situation ethics pleads its case for moral acceptability on the grounds that it gives full respect to the spirit of the law in preference to the letter and as a result more perfectly enjoys the true freedom of the spirit of the Christian life. Both claims are considered by the author in separate chapters and both are soundly refuted. But the mode of refutation gives reasons for pause. As in his previous works, Dr. Von Hildebrand is not content to approach the problem from the established principles of formal moral theology or ethics. Instead, his phenomenological bent of mind demands long and detailed investigation of single instances where letter and spirit may be distinguished, where they coincide, where they may be antithetical, etc. While this method may well produce, under ideal circumstances, good results, obviously the fruits cannot be imparted to others without complete presentation of the analysis undertaken, step by tedious step, to prepare the mind to see the necessity of accepting a particular conclusion. The book, however, despite the length of treatment, omits the steps and presents the conclusions without any reason for their necessity. As a result, the force of the conclusion is lost on the reader, who has neither reasons to recognize their necessity (which is excluded by the method) nor the requisite intellectual preparation to understand or intuit their full import. Briefly, while the treatment gives many indication of the author's great power of understanding of the matter of the letter vs. the spirit, his more plodding readers, who could well be more interested in truth than in a display of the author's intellectual capacity, might still require to be guided through the maze from the more general knowledge to particular applications. That is the more natural way, although at times far less dramatic than the unfolding of the evidence of a brilliant intellect. Obviously, the more prosaic approach to the matter through the general principles of *epieicheia* and the principles determining the binding force of various kinds of law are applicable here and are more conducive to generate science than a disjointed array of brilliant insights.

Again, the author has chosen to treat the question of Christian freedom

of spirit from the phenomenological, analytic view rather than from the traditional theological view. Deprived of the initial starting point of Faith, the method, of course, is doomed to failure; for the reality establishing the Christian freedom of spirit is supernatural, grace. But to judge the results of his inquiry, the method involved thoroughly confuses the whole problem by making problems and more problems where no problem existed really in the first place. Thus, in the traditional view, freedom of spirit is the result of grace operating in the soul of man in such a way that the instinct of grace prompts a man to perform works which are neither prescribed nor prohibited in the New Law (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 108, a. 1) but still retain morality insofar as they fall within the scope of the virtue of prudence. The matter is definite, clear, unequivocal, easily stated, and authoritative, ultimately with the authority of Sacred Scriptures. In short, all morality is not a matter of precept; all obligations do not fall under legal justice or obedience. The author's methodology leads him into uncharted waters to sound the depth of Christian freedom of spirit with an instrument of his own making, specifically his personal distinction between "formal" and "material" obligations. As a result, he must postpone to a later publication the ultimate determination of the relationship between "formal moral obligation" and "juridical bonds." A second more obvious result is an obscuring of what is a thoroughly clear matter. This chapter on "Freedom of Spirit," while revealing the original inspiration of the author (which occasionally makes for interesting reading), might very well be an indictment of his methodology as an obscurantist instrument.

Like existentialism, situation ethics has found the medium of the novel and the drama an excellent vehicle to communicate through action what cannot be communicated through words. Spiritual crises involving man's desires for God and for His rivals have proved most effective themes to present the fundamental thesis of this new morality. On the European scene Catholic literateurs have been so productive in this field and have so frequently exploited and glorified the theme of man's sinfulness that their works are now summarily categorized as specimens of "Sin Mysticism." A serious threat to morality in Europe, the excesses of "Sin Mysticism" were the subject matter of a pastoral letter of the German Bishops in December of 1955. The letter reveals the extent of the movement, the favored themes of the authors, the fundamental moral errors involved, and the legitimate role of sin in dramas and novels. Surprisingly, in his treatment of "Sin Mysticism," Dr. Von Hildebrand makes no mention of this letter and does not avail himself of its authoritative doctrinal content. But by abandoning his methodical analysis in favor of straight narration, he has managed to present an authentic picture of the essential teaching of this school. He has also shown its rather limited influence

in America through the novels of François Mauriac and Graham Greene. Considering the popularity of the latter author and his favorable reception by some of the more outstanding American Catholic book reviewers, one regrets that Dr. Von Hildebrand has not chosen to give us, in this instance where he is far more competent, a more detailed analysis of the extent of circumstance ethics and sin mysticism in Greene's novels.

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BRIEF NOTICES

The Bridge, A Yearbook of Judaeo-Christian Studies. Ed. by John M. Oesterreicher. New York: Pantheon, 1955. Pp. 349. \$3.95.

It is a sublime fact that we cannot ignore: God once spoke to His people and gave them a Law. He had chosen them for a great purpose: to prepare the way for His Son. This choosing placed them above all the peoples of antiquity. It not only made them our spiritual ancestors, but it placed us under an eternal obligation to these precursors of the Word. When He came among them, He uttered the divine verdict on their status: not a jot or tittle of that Law was to be destroyed, but all was to be fulfilled in the New Covenant.

This is the imperishable glory of the Jewish people. Their tragedy was that historical circumstances and temporal considerations made it difficult for them to accept Him when He appeared among them. Hence the ambivalence of the Christian toward the Jew: with respect for their historic role goes sorrow for the rejection by the majority of the Savior for whom all their history had prepared. The Epistles of Saint Paul are weighted with his mingling of admiration and regret which leads to a sense of tremendous responsibility that the Gospel be first preached to the Jews, and to the prophecy of the final conversion of the first-chosen people.

The same spirit animates this volume, which is the first of what will be a yearbook of Judaeo-Christian studies. It is titled *The Bridge* to indicate its purpose. It makes no attempt to find a least common denominator, nor does it attempt to conceal the essential fact which separates the Christian from the Jew—the divinity of Jesus Christ. On the contrary, it sees Him as the Bridge which now links us to them and which one day they shall cross into His Body, the Church. As an ancillary objective, it hopes to lessen anti-Semitism among us, which it sees as a derivative of scriptural and historical ignorance and an obstacle to the appeal of Christ. It is over the chasm of misunderstanding that the Bridge must be built.

The volume is a series of studies of varying length on subjects of interest to Christian and Jew. In addition to these essays by specialists in their respective fields, there are five reviews of serious books. The authors have been carefully selected, and write with solid scholarship and usually with literary grace. As a group, they fulfill the promise of Monsignor John L. McNulty, president of Seton Hall University, in the introduction: "These volumes will explore the basic unity of Old and New Testaments, confront the rabbinical tradition with the teaching of the Church, examine the relationship between Christians and Jews on the temporal plane, review

Jewish thought and life down the ages, weigh recent attempts by Jewish thinkers and artists to interpret the Christian revelation, sift modern views of Jewish existence by Jews, Christians, and writers who are neither, and discuss many other apposite topics. Thus the work of *The Bridge* will extend from theology, philosophy, and history, to literature, art, and sociology."

The essay of Raissa Maritain, "Abraham and the Ascent of Conscience," explores a mystery which is familiar to any reader of the Old Testament. Abraham, the father of his people and the special friend of God, was unquestionably a man of sanctity who accepted the divine will even at great personal loss. Generations of Christian preachers and artists have been inspired by his response to the call of God at Ur and his obedience to the demand that his son be sacrificed. Yet he married his half-sister, took a second wife, and deliberately lied to Pharoah. These acts would have been sinful under the law of Moses and certainly seem shocking to one brought up under the New Law. But Abraham was conscious of no fault and was called to no repentance. His conscience was certainly operative, but it was not sufficiently informed to reach positions that later were to be engraved on tablets of stone and in the hearts of men. In a word, Abraham lived in the first, and most immature stage, of man's perception of the moral law which lasted from Adam to Moses. The latter inaugurated the second, and higher stage, and the third stage began with the Gospel. This unfolding of revelation was accompanied by man's growing perception of the natural law and by his growing sensitivity to moral imperatives. Man not only slowly accumulated data on the physical universe; he equally grew in awareness of moral law.

An outstanding contribution is the essay of Fr. John M. Oesterreicher on Simone Weil. The author is thoroughly familiar with the writings of this mystic Jewess whose love for Christ brought her so close to the Church. She understood His passion profoundly, and wished to unite her tragic life with His. She was pained by the denial of Peter and the flight of the others. But her concept of God and the world made it impossible for her to accept the Resurrection. Deeply attached to Christ as Victim, she felt that the Christ of Glory distorted the image of His suffering, which is man's greatest strength in a world of sin. Hence she embraced the Cross passionately, but it was not the Christian Cross, for it lacked the essentials of hope and victory. She was a product of the despair of the war and its aftermath. Had she lived, she might have found the integral Christ she sought.

The other contributions approach this high level of intellectual excellence. Together, they are in the best tradition of Catholic apologetic: they are rational, positive, and aim to persuade rather than to win an argument.

Integration of Religion and Psychiatry. By W. EARL BIDDLE, M.D., F.A.
P. A. New York: Macmillan, 1955. Pp. 165. \$3.75.

This book represents "the culmination of sixteen years effort in attempting to bring Freud's work into conformity with my own Christian beliefs—to integrate religion and psychiatry." (p. x) In order to do this, however, the author states: "It was necessary to construct a new system of depth psychology which would explain normal and abnormal behavior and restore imagination to its rightful place as a function of the total personality." (p. x) From these comments it would seem that the author had found Freudianism unsatisfactory inasmuch as he found it necessary to develop a new psychology to replace it. However, on page 9, he states, "When the truth in Freud's discoveries is brought to light it will be found that they do not conflict with religious principles. To the contrary, Freud discovered that man is by nature religious and that the concept of the Supreme Being is *experienced* (emphasis given by author) in childhood." In any case we see here the beginnings of the author's attitude throughout the text that Freud did not really mean what he said, that he was in fact a misunderstood man and a religious one. This has been a very popular trend lately, with Maryse Choisy taking the lead.

The impression which we get is that the author has learned his scholastic philosophy by discussion rather than by study. As a consequence many of his principles are incompletely stated and consequently only half true. It would be impossible to discuss all instances of this, but a few examples might be cited. His concept of religion, for example (p. 2-4), seems to be equated with ethics. Certainly ethical concepts are necessary for religion but religion is much more than ethics. This may be noted in the meanings of the words themselves, ethics from *ēthos* meaning rule of behavior and religion from *religio* meaning bond, i. e., the bonds which tie mankind to its creator.

The author's discussion of God as a father-image (p. 37 ff.) seems to overlook the frequently overlooked fact that God's authoritarianism is only a corollary which follows from His nature as a self-existent being. To equate God with authority is to lose the whole point of proof for the existence of God. Authority, eternity, infinity, transcendence, etc., all follow from self-existence. Again, the whole discussion of imagination is extremely difficult to understand because the author does not set forth definitions or clarifications. He simply begins to discuss imagination. (p. 55) When he is speaking of the role of imagination in conjunction with intellect he is not too certain in his exposition. When the intellect is working, imagination is usually furnishing sense images to accompany the act of intellection. But the sense images need not be those of objects—they may be merely words. For example, in my own case, when I hear the

principle of identity enunciated I usually see the words printed on a page or on a blackboard: "A thing which is itself, is itself." On page 57 the author seems to confuse the roles of sense memory and imagination. On this same page, in discussing space relationship Doctor Biddle fails to mention that the imagination is controlled by the intellect. His notions of imagination at times approach those of David Hume.

On page 59 the author's failure to define emotion leaves the reader at a disadvantage. He fails to distinguish between emotion and feeling. In fact he equates the two which adds to the confusion in this section of the book. On page 61 the author states: "Logical thinking is possible only when phantasy life is in order and under the guidance of the intellect." This is a good example of the many sentences which are difficult to understand. What he probably means by logical thinking is "thinking which is compatible with reality." Any logician knows that a syllogism could be constructed on premises which were unreal and which would lead to a *perfectly logical* conclusion insofar as the conclusion followed *consistently* from the premises.

On page 67 there is another similar faulty expression: "The act of taking the life of a human being is, in itself, neither good nor bad." The author seems to deny any basis of morality in the natural law and makes morals a matter of local custom. "Behavior is good when it is directed toward goals which are socially or individually regarded as good, or toward the improvement or annihilation of that which is considered bad. The means by which the goal is attained must also be regarded as good." (p. 67) These are a few examples cited from many possibilities which show the difficulties of easy reading of the book. There are numerous minor inaccuracies, e. g., on page 10 it is stated that there are 6,500 psychiatrists in the United States which is about one-half the actual number.

The author states that his theory of depth psychology was verified for him in a dream. He states in a footnote (p. 37-38): "While I was in the process of trying to correlate the concept of the phantastic bad mother with an analogous religious concept I had a significant dream. . . . The dream terrified me so that I awoke. . . . On going back to sleep the continuity of the symbols was the same, but this time I was hovering over a deep pit. . . . Upon awakening I realized that at last I had found a solution to my problem." It is of such dream stuff that Doctor Biddle's theory is made.

The author's own theory of depth psychology which had its confirmation in his dream is based on the following ideas of the child's relations with his parents. In the author's own words this theory briefly is as follows: "The small child under age three views his parents and other adults as gigantic, all-powerful people. They can do infinite good or infinite harm to him. In the child's mind the parents have the power to gratify every

wish, or to annihilate him. But according to the logic of the child, a good person cannot do anything bad, and a bad person can do no good. When the father gratifies the child, the parent is regarded as all-good; when he frustrates or displeases the child he becomes totally bad in the mind of the child. The child does not regard the gratifying father and the frustrating father as the same person. The same is true in the relationship of the child and the mother. Besides being real people the parents represent phantastic, illusory, or imaginary persons. The child, then, has, in addition to his real parents, a phantastic father and mother who are preposterously good, and a phantastic father and mother who are preposterously bad. No real person could ever hope to be as good as the phantastic good parents. The real parents, when invested with the qualities of the phantastic parents, become alternately extremely good or bad depending upon whether they are at the moment pleasing or displeasing to the child. The preposterous phantasies of the child are in a constant state of flux. When his gigantic real mother pleases and satisfies the child she is endowed with all the preposterous good qualities of the imaginary good mother. When she deprives or frustrates him she becomes in his imagination an annihilating bad mother. The real father is treated in a similar manner. When he does something which the child thinks of as good, the father is regarded as preposterously all-good. When he is frustrating he becomes preposterously bad in the child's imagination."

The author himself raised the question as to whether his theories are merely gratuitous assumptions or whether they can be proven scientifically. He does not answer this question but states merely that they have proven practical as a means of therapy. His theory of the influence of childhood experiences which covers some twenty-one pages in the book is offered without any supporting evidence or attempted proof.

In the opinion of this reviewer the author has failed to achieve his purpose. From the standpoint of scholastic philosophy the discussion is weak and at times faulty. From the standpoint of depth psychology nothing helpful is added and no attempt at proof is made. From the standpoint of at least the Catholic Religion the religious views presented are on the whole unacceptable.

Beatitude. By REGINALD GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, O. P. Translated by Patrick Cummins, O. S. B. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1956. Pp. 381 with index. \$6.00.

In these days when we are reaping the fruit of philosophical relativism in ethical nihilism, it is of absolute necessity that we review constantly that philosophy of life which alone can perfect man socially, and that

theology which alone can show man the road to eternal life. It is therefore without hesitancy that we hail this translation of Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange's *On Beatitude, Human Acts and Habits*, which is his commentary on the first fifty-four questions of St. Thomas' *Prima Secundae*. The venerable figure of the author needs no introduction to Thomistic circles. Grown old in the fight to present St. Thomas in himself and not in the trappings of nineteenth century experimentalism, Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange has rendered signal service to Thomism, the Church, and to all who strive to preserve their sanity and integrity in an intellectual world gone mad.

Yet, although we heartily welcome this most recent contribution by the eminent theologian, let us not err by excess, lest by injudicious zeal we betray the author's intention. This book is certainly a compilation of Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange's class notes for his lectures on the *Prima Secundae*. Since, then, their origin cannot be divorced from the text of the *Summa*, surely their purpose is not that they should be used as a text-book or manual apart from the same *Summa Theologiae* of the Holy Doctor. For thus to make use of this volume would be to render a grave disservice to the student of moral theology, and a betrayal of the author's life-long dedication to the Saint of the Schools. Used with the words of St. Thomas, the student or reader will benefit greatly from the explanations of more abstruse passages, the inclusion of positive theology, the opinions and controversies that have arisen, and the traditional interpretation of St. Thomas in their regard. This is the value and wisdom of Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange's *Beatitude*.

In his commentary the author simply follows the course of the *Prima Secundae* from question one to question fifty-four. There is prefixed an introduction in which Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange exposes the nature of Moral Theology in its connection with the dogmatic part of the one science, as well as its relationship with other moral systems. Then he treats of beatitude as man's ultimate goal and purpose. Human acts are considered in their psychological and moral entities. Next is inserted a section on conscience, its nature and divisions, which summarizes the considerations of manuals in practical moral theology. Finally there is a brief treatment of passions and habits.

This is a work that could prove of inestimable value to the student or scholar, layman or cleric, who wishes to discover through the eyes of St. Thomas the true notion of moral theology and the only sane explanation of man. For this thanks are due to Fr. Cummins who has faithfully, if at times too literally, translated the amazingly clear latin of Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange.

The Role of the Laity in the Church. By MONSIGNOR GERARD PHILIPS.
Chicago: Fides Publishers Association, 1956. Pp. 175. \$3.25.

Fathers Gilbert and Moudry have performed a real service for American Catholicism in translating this work of Monsignor Philips. The book is one that does not contain much that is new, yet it is a synthesis that is not readily available in English. Profound and extensive in treatment is this product of a speculative theologian, professor of dogmatic and mystical theology at the University of Louvain, and promoter of Catholic Action.

That this is the hour of the laity the prelate establishes. He then proceeds to lay down the principles of Catholic Action, applying them to the laity's field of action. The chapter on the laity's power of Orders is thorough, but scientifically silent on many practical questions. The treatment of the laity and the magisterium is as concise and deep as any scholar could wish for. When dealing with the laity and Church government the author gives helpful indications for cooperation between the hierarchy and faithful. Catholic Action is something that never took hold in the United States as it did in the Belgium of Monsignor Philips, yet the chapter dealing with it is something that could benefit every active Catholic and worthy priest. The chapter on the Lay Apostolate and Allied Contacts sheds needed light on Church and State relations. The chapter concerning a lay spirituality leaves admittedly much to be demanded as does the conclusion.

From this book every American cleric, religious, and intelligent layman could profit. It evinces a truly intellectual insight and prudential approach which we need in the United States in order to come of age or continue to flourish. This broad-mindedness is a reproach to a theology that is as narrow as a paper bound catechism.

The jacket of the book states that it is theological not sociological. Yet Philips himself writes on page fourteen: "Our starting point is not purely sociological." There is much of a sound sociological nature in this work.

There is a noticeable lack of reference to an awakening of the laity in the United States. The interest shown in real theology by the laity is proven by the success of the theological institutes conducted by the Dominicans in many places in the United States, by the Conventual Franciscans in Richfield, Minnesota, and by the Institute of Adult Education at Catholic University. The students at the institutes are proving what Monsignor Philips writes on page 79: "No sincere intellectual will be content with a grammar school acquaintance of the vital questions, nor will anyone expect encyclopedic knowledge from him. The intelligence of an adult Christian is all that is required." A recurring theme in the work is the fact that theology is hard work because it must seek the truth avoiding extremes.

The translators deserve a word of praise as well as thanks. They have rendered a very readable translation and have given the data for English translations of foreign language references when possible.

What is Catholicity? By PAUL H. HALLETT. Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1955. Pp. 254.

This relatively slender volume, whose purpose in the words of its author is "to explain the principles that guide Catholicity and interlace its doctrine, worship, and discipline," (p. 30) contains a veritable mine of information about Catholicism. In the pursuance of his plan Paul H. Hallett, Associate Editor of *The Register* of Denver, states that he has closely followed Catholic textbooks on philosophy, moral and dogmatic theology used in seminaries for the training of priests.

The range of topics covered is indeed wide, including the meaning of Catholicity, the origin and nature of the Church, "Catholic philosophy," Scripture, Dogma, Morals, the Sacraments, and Church Government. Plainly intended for the interested layman, Catholic as well as non-Catholic, and not for the professional scholar, the work necessarily runs very hurriedly through some points. Yet, some of the sections are noteworthy for their clarity and succinctness as well as for their accuracy. Of particular note in this regard are those dealing with the Commandments (Ch. XIV), Matrimony (Ch. XVII), and Tolerance (Ch. XX).

However, the approach to many serious and profound matters is frequently *simpliste* and this detracts from the effect of the work. Chapter III, entitled "Between Faith and Reason: Thomism," undertakes an explanation of some of the fundamental philosophical tenets of Thomism, and it is here that the basic weakness of the work becomes apparent. Referring to Thomism as "simply sublimated common sense," the author insists that once a reader has become familiar with the technical terms of Aquinas "he will never fail to understand his meaning." (p. 53) Such optimism, though laudable in intent, can hardly impress those who have long sought correctly to interpret the teachings of the Angelic Doctor. Moreover, it is discouraging to see a recurrence of the equation of Thomism with Scholasticism and to find it defined as "the philosophy elaborated by Aristotle and perfected in the service of Christian truth." (p. 52)

The discussion of some of the leading philosophical principles of Thomism is so compressed as to be almost unintelligible and is not calculated to impress favourably the careful reader. What, for example, are we to make of such a passage: "Every being is good. For every being is true, that is, is an object of the mind. A being that is not good for doing or receiving something could not be known. Moreover, every being, since it has some

degree of perfection, is desirable as an end or means, either by the human will, or at least by God as willed and approved by Him. Hence the axiom: good is being, being is good." (pp. 56-7)

In connection with the problem, What is the best form of government?, there is another profoundly ambiguous and misleading statement. After stating (correctly I think) that such a question cannot be decided in the concrete by recourse to the natural law, the author goes on, without further clarification, to say: "In the abstract, however, the natural philosophy and tradition of Catholicity have certainly a preference for monarchy (in the United States the federal government is essentially a monarchy)." (p. 73) Certainly such a statement betrays "the precision of definition and tightness of logic and clarity of language" which the author holds to be the trademark of Catholic philosophy and theology. (p. 55)

In the wealth of facts about Catholicism presented clearly and accurately in this work, it is perhaps not wholly fair to single out for mention some of the more obvious defects. Yet it is these defects which detract from the fulfilment of the basic aim of the book. From beginning to end this work emphasizes the reasonableness of all aspects of Catholicism, and the ease with which these reasonable aspects of our faith can be accepted and presented. Yet when some of the more fundamental problems are so ill presented in the work itself, it is difficult both to demonstrate their reasonableness or to obtain reasonable acceptance of them. Such inaccuracies as exist may have little direct ill effect upon the majority of readers of this book, those untrained in theology and philosophy, but they will gain little understanding of certain fundamental principles after a careful reading of the text. And those who have some training in theology or philosophy, whether Catholic or non-Catholic, cannot but be disappointed or unimpressed at these serious shortcomings. Perhaps a future edition of the work can correct or eliminate such portions as tend to defeat the basic and highly laudable purpose of such a book.

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